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INTRODUCrION
One of the major changes in recent memory affecting U.S.
Government contractors has been the mandate for Federal agencies
to accumulate "past performance information" on contractor
performance, and to use that information as a mandatory
comparative evaluation factor for award in nearly all competitively
negotiated acquisitions.' As of January, 1999, end of contract
performance reviews and the evaluation of that information in
making source selection decisions are required for all contracts
exceeding $100,000.2
Contracting agencies have long been required to consider past
performance information concerning an offeror in determining
whether the offeror is qualified to perform the contract as a
"responsible prospective contractor."'  A responsible prospective
contractor must have, at a minimum, adequate financial resources,
the ability to comply with the delivery schedule, a satisfactory
performance record, a satisfactory record of business integrity and
ethics, the necessary organizational and administrative resources,
sufficient production facilities, and must be otherwise qualified to
receive an award . However, responsibility determinations normally
occur only after identifying the otherwise apparently successful
offeror5 Responsibility determinations deal only with whether the
offeror's past efforts have been "satisfactory.,6 They do not involve
comparisons of the relative capabilities of the competing offerors
based on past work efforts completed for government or commercial
customers.7 The Office of Federal Procurement Policy's ("OFPP")
initiatives concerning contractor past performance have not
1. Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") 48 C.F.R. § 15.304(c) (3) (1997), as amended by
62 Fed. Reg. 51,236 (1997) (requiring past performance as an evaluation factor); 48 C.F.R.
§ 42.1502(a) (1997) (mandating an accumulation of contractor performance information).
2. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.304(c)(2) (1997). According to the time-table set forth in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), as of January 1, 1998, collection of past performance
information became mandatory for contracts exceeding $100,000.
3. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.101 (1997) (defining "responsible prospective contractor" as a
contractor that comports with the standards set forth in section 9.104).
4. See id. § 9.104-1.
5. See id. § 9.105-1(b) (1) (stating that there is an exception for negotiated contracts,
especially those involving research and development).
6. Seeid. §9.104-1(c).
7. Seeid. § 15.305(a)(2).
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supplanted responsibility determinations. Rather, they have
incorporated past performance considerations in the comparative
process of proposal evaluation in the source selection process as an
original matter."
With the best of intentions, OFPP is leading executive agencies
toward government-wide implementation of its policy
pronouncements concerning past performance. OFPP's purpose has
been simply stated: "[T]o further the exercise of good business
judgment and improve contractor performance." 9  Yet, in the
author's view, implementation of these policies creates risks that
should be identified. Chief among the author's concerns are:
(1) the potential for de facto debarment of contractors, particularly
small businesses, as a result of unfavorable past information
accumulated in decentralized databases; (2) the potential for
undermining the statutory requirement for full and open
competition'0 as a result of the intensely subjective nature of
contractor performance evaluations; and (3) a certain potential for
unjust retaliation against contractors who choose to pursue legitimate
requests for equitable adjustment or claims.
The potential for de facto debarment arises from a number of
converging factors. Among these are the highly informal nature of
routine contractor performance evaluations," OFPP's stated policy
objective that past performance should be a heavily weighted award• 12
factor for all new contracts of any size, a sharply limited standard of
review in the General Accounting Office ("GAO") and in the courts,"
and GAO's unwillingness in the cases decided thus far to question the
validity of the underlying past performance information that agency
procurement officials must utilize in making their many source
selection decisions.'
4
8. See id. § 15.305(a) (2).
9. Past Performance Information, OFPP Letter No. 92-5, 58 Fed. Reg. 3573, 3575, 1 1
(1993).
10. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1) (A) (1994) (providing that except in limited cases, an agency
head who conducts a procurement for property or services must use competitive procedures to
promote "full and open competition"); 41 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1) (A) (1994) (same); FAR, 48 C.F.R.
§ 6.101 (1997) (prescribing the policy and procedures that should be employed to foster "full
and open competition").
11. See infra Part 1.C (explaining the procedures required by the FAR for communications
with offerors regarding past performance).
12. See infra Part I.D (noting that the OFPP Guidebook's provisions were designed to
ensure the meaningful consideration of past performance evaluation as a selection criterion for
an award).
13. See infra Part IIIA.4 (quoting the controlling legal standards of review set forth by GAO
in Wind Gap Knitwear, Comp. Gen. B-261045, 95-2 CPD 1 124 (1995)).
14. See infra Part IIIA16.b (discussing the limited success those challenging adverse past
performance ratings have experienced).
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The potential for undermining full and open competition arises
from the obvious opportunity these fundamentally new practices
create for government personnel to affect future source selection
decisions. Through reference check replies,'5 past performance
questionnaire responses,'6 and highly subjective contractor
performance assessments placed in past performance databases, 7
government personnel can now have a profound impact upon the
outcomes of contract awards, both in their own agencies and in
others. The potential for misuse becomes more apparent when one
observes GAO's liberal acceptance of past performance/cost
tradeoffs, 8 its extreme deference to agency point scoring of past
performance evaluation criteria, 9 its unwillingness to require
procuring agencies to check all references provided by offerors in
their proposals, 2 and its refusal to look behind the written record to
test the validity of the past performance information itself.2' Also
somewhat troublesome in terms of undermining competition is the
very concept of an evaluation scheme which envisions a "tradeoff'
between past performance and cost.22
The concern regarding retaliation for a contractor submitting
equitable adjustment requests and claims derives initially from
OFPP's guidance that past performance reports should consider
contract change proposals23 Further, no provision is made for
excluding such information from past performance files or databases
while disputes are resolved through the contract appeals process.24
Government officials are presumed to have acted properly and in
15. See infra Part IIIA8 (addressing the issue of whether GAO requires evaluators to check
references supplied by the offeror in a proposal).
16. See infra Part IIIA9 (stating that "GAO does not object to the use of past performance
questionnaires by agencies in conducting source selections").
17. See infra Parts IIA-E, llI.A.14 (discussing agencies' efforts to compile usable past
performance information and limitations which apply to agencies' uses of contractor
performance information databases).
18. See infra Part IIIA5 (stating that past performance and cost trade-off must be
reasonable and consistent with stated evaluation criteria).
19. See infra Part IIIA7 (describing a disturbing case in which GAO upheld a seemingly
arbitrary point scoring method and citing another reported case where GAO felt the point
scoring system was used unreasonably).
20. See infra Part IIIA8 ("GAO has made it clear that the agency has no obligation to
check all references provided by an offeror.").
21. See infra Part IIA16.b (arguing that no challenger to its own past performance rating
has a real prospect of successful rebuttal because GAO seems uninterested in looking behind an
evaluation write-up to examine the legitimacy of the evaluator's information).
22. See infra Part IIIA5 (stating that GAO again has resorted to conventional principles in
judging whether a superior past performance rating will overcome a competitor's price
advantage).
23. See infra Part I.D (stating that guidelines suggest that agencies consider contract change
proposals among other factors).
24. See infra Part LD (describing OFPP guidelines).
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accord with the applicable laws and regulations.2s That presumption
only may compound the problem. How can an offeror be assured
that the government's files or databases contain only correct and
objectively presented past performance information? If an offeror
becomes aware of erroneous information, what can be done about it?
The first objective of this Article is to summarize the law as it
currently exists in the area of past performance. The second and
more important objective is to offer observations-and a word of
caution-concerning the direction in which the past performance
initiative could take the competitive procurement system. This
Article begins by surveying the applicable OFPP guidance, statutory
requirements, and applicable provisions of the FAR.26  It then
discusses agencies' efforts to compile past performance data.2' Next,
this Article considers the emerging principles of past performance
law as enunciated in the relevant decisions.28  The Article then
considers, in detail, those relatively few decisions thus far where GAO
and one U.S. Court of Appeals have ruled in favor of an offeror
challenging a government source selection decision based upon
problems in the agency's evaluation of past performance
information.29 Finally, this Article proposes a modest revision to the
FAR to provide contractors with a more meaningful opportunity to
correct inaccurate or unfair reports of past performance through
Alternative Dispute Resolution.0
I. OFPP POLICY LETTER 92-5 AND OTHER STATUTORYAND FAR
REQUIREMENTS
A. OFPP's Past Performance Initiatives
On January 11, 1993, OFPP issued Policy Letter No. 92-5, entitled
"Past Performance Information." s' OFPP Policy Letter 92-5 first
announced the phased implementation of two related requirements:
(1) that executive agencies prepare contractor performance
25. SeeUnited States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) ("The presumption
of regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties."); Petrelle
v. Weirton Steel Corp., 953 F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1991) ("It has long been recognized that
public officials are accredited with a presumption of regularity.").
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part III.B. Currently, there are twenty-four such decisions, twenty-three of
which were considered by GAO and one by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
30. See infra Part W.
31. 58 Fed. Reg. 3573 (1993).
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evaluations on all contracts exceeding $100,000, and (2) that past
performance be utilized as an evaluation factor for award in
solicitations for all competitively-awarded negotiated contracts
expected to exceed $100,000.32
OFPP believes that "[a] contractor's past performance record is a
key indicator for predicting future performance."" OFPP has set up
specific guidelines for each of the Federal Government Agencies to
follow in conducting their evaluations of offerors and determining
which offeror should receive the award of the contract.
3'
Agencies are to notify contractors of their past performance
evaluations at the time they are completed and to provide contractors
with a minimum of thirty days notice to respond to any evaluation.35
The contractor's response, if any, must be included with the
evaluation itself 36 Past performance information may be obtained
from the contracting agency, from other government agencies, and
from private firms. 7
Concerning the use of past performance information, OFPP states
as follows:
(8) Using Past Performance Information. Past performance
information should be used to assess risk. Each performance
32. See id. OFPP defines "Past Performance Information" as:
[R]elevant information regarding a contractor's actions under previously awarded
contracts. It includes the contractor's record of conforming to specifications and to
standards of good workmanship; the contractor's record of containing and forecasting
costs on any previously performed cost reimbursable contracts; the contractor's
adherence to contract schedules, including the administrative aspects of performance;
the contractor's history for reasonable and cooperative behavior and commitment to
customer satisfaction; and generally, the contractor's business-like concern for the
interest of the customer.
Id. at 3575.
33. Id.
34. See id. According to OFPP, Executive Agencies shall:
a. Prepare evaluations of contractors' performance on all new contracts over
$100,000. Evaluations shall be made during contract performance ... at the time the
work under the contract is completed.
b. Use past performance information in making responsibility determinations in both
sealed bid and competitively negotiated procurements ....
c. Specify past performance as an evaluation factor in solicitations for offers for all
competitively negotiated contracts expected to exceed $100,000 except where the
contracting office determines that such action is not appropriate. Such
determinations shall be in writing and included in the contract file. As an evaluation
factor, past performance should be used to assess the relative capabilities of competing
offerors and to help assure greatest value source selections.
d. Allow newly established firms to compete for contracts even though they lack a




37. See id. at 3576.
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evaluation and risk assessment should consider the number and
severity of a contractor's problems, the effectiveness of corrective
actions taken, and the contractor's overall work record. The
assessment of performance risk should consider the relative merits
of the contractor's prior experience and performance as compared
to that of other competing offerors.s8
OFPP's answers to public comments submitted in response to its
proposed Policy Letter 9 addressed the concerns of some agencies
that the use of past performance information in source selections
could lead to defacto debarment in individual cases. OFPP, however,
chose to avoid the issue.40
B. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
Subsequent to Policy Letter 92-5, Congress addressed the issue of
contractor past performance information in Section 1091 of the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ("FASA"). 41  FASA
amended Section 2 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
to require OFPP to establish policies and procedures concerning past
performance.4 2 Congress found that "[p]ast contract performance of
an offeror is one of the relevant factors" that should be considered in
contract award decisions, and that "[i]t is appropriate for a
contracting official to consider past contract performance of an
offeror as an indicator of the likelihood that the offeror will
successfully perform a contract to be awarded by that official."
43
Congress explicitly required that offerors "be afforded an
opportunity to submit relevant information on past contract
performance," that this information be considered, and as for
offerors with no past performance information, that such contractors
"not be evaluated favorably or unfavorably on the factor of past
contract performance.""
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. 56 Fed. Reg. 63,988 (1991).
40. See Past Performance Information, OFPP Letter No. 92-5, 58 Fed. Reg. 3573, 3574
(1993). OFPP stated only that:
[T]he Policy Letter is not intended to supplant contracting officials' judgments in
initiating or conducting debarment and suspension proceedings under FAR 9.4. Even
though P[ast] P[erformance] I[nformation] may be used in debarment or suspension
proceedings, the Policy Letter does not waive or change any of the due process
requirements presently provided with suspension and debarment proceedings ....
Id.
41. Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243, 3272 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 405 (1994)).
42. 41 U.S.C.§ 401(14) (1994).
43. Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 1091(b)(1), 108 Stat. 3272, 3272 (1994).
44. § 1091(b) (2) (C-D), 108 Stat. at 3272-73 (adding 41 U.S.C. § 4050)).
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C. FAR Coverage of Past Performance Information
The FAR contains four basic requirements concerning
accumulation of past performance information and its use in
negotiated acquisitons. 5 First, FAR § 15.304(c) (2) mandates that in
nearly all cases, past performance shall be an evaluation factor in
each competitively negotiated acquisition expected to exceed $1
million, and, on or after January 1, 1999, in all such acquisitions
expected to exceed $100,000.46
Second, FAR § 15.305(a) (2) (ii) requires that solicitations provide
offerors the opportunity to identify all types of contracts, including
Federal, state, and local government contracts and private contracts,
which have a bearing on the contractor's past performance.4 ' At the
contracting officer's discretion, offerors may be invited to comment
on problems encountered in these contracts and the offeror's
corrective actions.48 FAR § 15.305 (a) (2) (iv) dictates that if a firm has
no record of relevant past performance or if there is no past
performance information available for the offeror, "the offeror may
not be evaluated favorably or unfavorably on past performance.,
49
Third, FAR § 15.306 addresses communications with offerors
concerning past performance at various stages of the negotiation
process. Upon receipt of initial proposals, "clarifications" may be
obtained pertaining to the "relevance" of the offeror's past
performance, and even with respect to adverse past performance
information on which the offeror has had no prior opportunity to
45. All references in this section to FAR Part 15 ("Contracting by Negotiation") are to the
rules as set forth in the "FAR Part 15 Rewrite," published in final form at 62 Fed. Reg. 51,224
(1997). The FAR Part 15 Rewrite applies to all solicitations issued on or after October 10, 1997.
See id. The reader should note that many of the GAO and court decisions surveyed in this
Article were issued under the previous version of FAR Part 15. In discussing the case law
throughout the Article, the author endeavors to note those few instances where the new version
of FAR Part 15 may lead to results contrary to past decisions.
46. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 15.304(c) (2) (1997). Prior to the FAR Part 15 Rewrite, milestones
were established requiring past performance to be an evaluation factor on solicitations with an
estimated value of $1 million issued on or afterJuly 1, 1995; $500,000 issued on or afterJuly 1,
1997; and $100,000 issued on or afterJanuary 1, 1999. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.605(b)(1) (1996). In
a December 1996 Memorandum, however, OFPP Administrator Kelman temporarily eliminated
the $500,000 milestone. See Steve Kelman, Memorandum for Agency Senior Procurement Executives
and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) (Dec. 18, 1996)
<httup://ww.anet.gov/References/PolicyLetters/pperfsus.html>. In addition, DOD's Director of
Defense Procurement has issued a "class deviation" from the FAR, providing that for systems
and operations support contracts, collection of past performance information and its use in the
competitive negotiation process is required only for contracts exceeding or expected to exceed
$5 million. See Spector Issues Class Deviation on Collecting Using Contractors'Past Performance Data,
69 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 26 (Jan. 12, 1998).
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comment.0 Such clarifications do not affect the government's right
to award the contract based on the initial proposals without formal
negotiations.5' Likewise, prior to establishing a "competitive range"
of those offerors with the most highly rated proposals,"2 the
government must communicate with offerors concerning their past
performance information when the offeror has had no prior
opportunity to comment on the adverse information and when that
information "is the determining factor preventing them from being
placed in the competitive range."53 After establishing the competitive
range, the government must "indicate to, or discuss with, each
offeror... significant weaknesses, deficiencies, and other aspects of
its proposal [including past performance] that could, in the opinion
of the contracting officer, be altered or explained to enhance
materially the proposal's potential for award."54  Regardless of the
stage of the acquisition process, the names of individuals providing
past performance information should not be disclosed to the affected
offeror.55
Finally, FAR Subpart 42.15 sets out the rules for compiling and
maintaining contractor performance information based upon end-of-
contract routine reviews. FAR § 42.1502(a) specifies a time-table for
preparing evaluations of contractor performance.6 Contract
agencies must complete such performance evaluations for each
contract exceeding $1 million by July 1, 1995, $500,000 beginning
July 1, 1996, and $100,000 beginning January 1, 1998, regardless of
the date of contract award. 7 The agency must complete these
50. See id. § 15.306.
51. See id. § 15.306(a) (2). The term "Negotiations" denotes "exchanges... between the
Government and offerors ... undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to revise its
proposal." Id. § 15.306(d).
52. Seeid.§ 15.306(c)(1).
53. Id.§ 15.306(b)(1)(i).
54. Id. § 15.306(d) (3). While this language suggests that the contracting officer could, in
his or her discretion, decline to discuss adverse past performance information where such
information could not be "altered or explained" in a way that would materially affect the
offeror's evaluation, the prefatory comments to the final version of the FAR Part 15 Rewrite
suggest the contrary. These comments state, without equivocation, that the rules "[require]
that all adverse past performance information be brought to the offeror's attention during
discussions, if the offeror is placed in the competitive range." 62 Fed. Reg. at 51,225 (1997).
Yet in another place, the comments state that offerors admitted to the competitive range are
entitled to notice of adverse past performance information only where the offeror has not
previously had an opportunity to comment, for example, in the offeror's proposal (for known
past performance problems), or in responses to routine past performance reports maintained
by agencies pursuant to FAR, 48 C.F.Rt § 42.15. See62 Fed. Reg. 51,228 (1997).
55. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(e)(4) (1997) (reporting that Government personnel
involved in the acquisition may not reveal the names of references providing information about
an offeror's performance).




evaluations when the contract work is completed.58
The procedure is intended to be fairly simple. Under FAR
§ 42.1503(a), the contracting agency seeks input from the technical
office, the contracting office, and when appropriate, from end
users.5 The contracting agency must provide past performance
evaluations to the contractor "as soon as practicable after completion
of the evaluation," and contractors are entitled to a minimum of
thirty days within which to offer comments, rebuttal, or additional
information.4 An agency review at a level above the contracting
officer is required.' The resultant evaluations and contractor
comments "may be used to support future award decisions, 62 and for
that reason should be marked "Source Selection Information. '' 3
Agencies are expected to share past performance information with
each other through interviews and/or by sending copies of
evaluations and contractor comments to the requesting agency.64
Contracting agencies are not to retain past performance information
for longer than three years after completion of contract
performance. 5
References to past performance information and its use in award
decisions appear in other parts of the FAR as well. FAR § 12.206,
entitled "Use of Past Performance," states that past performance
"should be an important element of every evaluation and contract
award for commercial items."6 FAR § 13.106-2(b) provides that
contracting officers may at their discretion evaluate past performance
on purchases exceeding the "micro-purchase" threshold.67  In this
58. See id. These rules do not apply to acquisitions from Federal Prison Industries, Inc. or
from agencies involving the blind or severely disabled. Furthermore, past performance
evaluations for construction and architect/engineer contracts are handled under other sections
of the FAR. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 42.1502(b) (1997) (referring to 48 C.F.R Part 8, subparts 6.6
and 8.7 regarding acquisitions from Federal Prison Industries, Inc. and non-profit agencies
employing people who are blind or severely disabled, respectively).
59. See id. § 42.1503(a). End users are the Government agency personnel whose
requirements are satisfied by the acquisition in question. See, e.g., AAC Assoc., Inc., Comp. Gen.
B-274928, 97-1 CPD 1 55 (1997) (reporting that end users were those personnel actually
supported by local area network and communications systems being procured); Salt America,
Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270111, 96-1 CPDI 134 (1996) (noting that Army soldiers were "end users"
of lithium batteries procured for military applications).




64. See id. § 42.1503(c).
65. See id § 42.1503(e). OFPP's December 18, 1996, Memorandum for Agency Senior
Procurement Executives and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) also temporarily
suspended the requirement to perform post-performance/past performance evaluations on
contracts of less than $1 million. See Kelman, supra note 46.
66. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 12.206 (1997).
67. Seeid. § 13.106-2(b)(1).
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optional context, the past performance evaluation does not require
the maintenance of a formal database and may be based on "such
information as the contracting officer's knowledge of and previous
experience with the item or service being purchased, customer
surveys, or other reasonable basis. "6s Under FAR § 16.505(b),
applicable to orders under multiple award contracts, contracting
officers "should consider factors such as past performance on earlier
tasks under the multiple award contract, [and] quality of
deliverables" 9 in determining who will receive the order.
D. OFPP Guide to Best Practices for Past Peformance
OFPP has undertaken considerable efforts to assist agencies in
effectively implementing the statutory and FAR requirements relating
to past performance information. In May 1995, OFPP issued an
"interim edition" of "A Guide to Best Practices for Past Performance"
(the "OFPP Guidebook") .
The OFPP Guidebook emphasizes that the techniques and
practices it discusses are "not to be viewed as mandatory regulatory
guidance and should not form the basis for Inspector General or
other audit reviews; instead they should be viewed as techniques that
OFPP has found are useful in recording and using contractor past
performance in the contractor selection process."7 However, the
OFPP Guidebook also states that "[t] he use of past performance as an
evaluation factor in the contract award process makes the awards
'best value' selections [and] ... enables agencies to better predict the
quality of, and customer satisfaction with, future work. It also




70. § 16.505(b). The Department of Defense FAR Supplement goes a step further. It
requires contracting officers to consider past performance in complying with the clause at FAR
§ 52.219-8, "Utilization of Small, Small Disadvantaged and Women-Owned Small Business
Concerns," when awarding a contract that will include such a clause. See Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 48 C.F.R. § 215.608(a) (2) (1997).
71. OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY, A GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES FOR PAST
PERFORMANCE (Interim ed. May 1995) [hereinafter OFPP GUIDEBOOK]. This document is
available from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and also may be downloaded from the
Internet at <http://www-far.npr.gov/BestP/BestPract.html>.
72. Steven Kelman, OFPP Administrator, Forward to OFPP GUIDEBOOK, supra note 71.
73. Id. at 3. OFPP Administrator Kelman's Forward further explalns that:
Industry and the government must move from an adversarial, litigious relationship to
a relationship based on partnership. Government suppliers must deliver the same
high quality of service to government customers as they deliver to their best
commercial customers. The government will, in turn, reward those contractors that
deliver quality service by giving them credit for their good performance when making
1550
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The OFPP Guidebook states that "[t]he key to the long term
success [of the past performance initiative].. . is the establishment, in
each agency, of a past performance information system to
systematically record on every contract exceeding $100,000
contractor performance" 74 in very specific areas.75 Furthermore, the
OFPP Guidebook explains that:
[t]he objective of Policy Letter 92-5 and FAR Subpart 42.15 is to
have a clear and concise evaluation of a contractor's past
performance on every contract that is readily available in the file,
or in a database, and can be shared with a requesting source
selection team with a minimum of delay.76
The OFPP Guidebook expresses the hope that as agencies
implement these requirements and observance of past performance
initiatives becomes common throughout government, "solicitations
will need only to ask offerors to provide a list, in the proposal, of past
contracts they have performed that were similar to the potential
contract."7
Chapters Two through Six of the OFPP Guidebook enumerate
perceived "best practices" in several areas: "Basic Considerations"
(Chapter Two); "Solicitation Language for Using Past Performance"
(Chapter Three); "Obtaining Information on a Contractor's Past
Performance" (Chapter Four); "Rating Past Performance" (Chapter
Five); and "Contractor Performance Reports" (Chapter Six).
Appendix One provides agency contacts and Appendix Two provides
"sample questionnaires" for agency use in obtaining past
performance information as a part of the award process.
Specifically, Chapter Two of the OFPP Guidebook emphasizes the
inherent difference between utilizing past performance as an
selections for future contracts.
Id.
74. Id. at 7.
75. See id. at 7-8. These areas include:
[1] [c]onformance to specifications and to standards of good workmanship; [2]
[c]ontainment and forecasting of costs; [3] [a]dherence to contract schedules,
including the administrative aspects of performance; [4] [h]istory of reasonable and
cooperative behavior and overall business-like concern for the interests of the
customer; and [5] [s]ervice to the end user of the product or service.
Id.
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 8. The Guidebook continues:
[t]he need of source selection boards to conduct extensive interviews... or conduct
other investigations to verify an offeror's past performance, should be greatly reduced.
Because the contractor will have been offered the opportunity to comment on the
ratings as they were prepared, further comment in the proposal, or during discussions,
if held, will usually not be necessary.
Id. at 9.
78. See id. at I (providing Table of Contents).
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evaluation factor for award versus a "responsibility criterion. '' - When
used as an evaluation factor for award, past performance "should be
included in the solicitation as a factor against which the offerors'
relative rankings will be compared."' On the other hand, when past
performance is expressed as a minimum requirement that all firms
must meet, with no comparison of the relative merits of the
evaluation, past performance is "considered part of the responsibility
determination."'" In the case of a small business, this determination
is subject to the Small Business Administration ("SBA") review
82pursuant to the Certificate of Competency program.
OFPP's Guidebook, Chapter Two, continues by noting that it is
"best" to set forth past performance as a "stand-alone" factor, not to
integrate consideration of past performance with the other non-price
factors. The concern is that the impact of the past performance
factor otherwise can be lost.
84
Furthermore, evaluation factors for award should include six
"general considerations: Quality of product or service, timeliness of
performance, cost control, business practices, customer (end user)
satisfaction, and key personnel past performance."8 5  For new
companies that have no relevant company experience, "it will be the
quality of the past performance of their key management personnel
that will indicate the risk of good performance and become the basis
of the past performance evaluation. 86
In addition, Chapter Two of the OFPP Guidebook addresses the
particular problem of the "relevancy" of the available past
performance information. Agencies are told that "the issue of
relevancy should play a key role" and that "[i]t is inefficient [sic] to
consider data just because it is available."87 However, the Guidebook
does not suggest how "relevancy" is to be determined. Where
subcontractors will perform critical aspects of the contract,
subcontractor past performance also should be evaluated "to
determine the overall risk of the prime contractor performing the
contract."8 Subfactors under the major evaluation factor of "past
performance" include "those actions of a contractor that can be
79. See id. at 11.




84. See id. at 12.
85. Id. at 13.





reasonably asked of a reference." 9  Examples of subfactors and
corresponding questions for references are:
[1] Management responsiveness-Is the offeror cooperative,
business-like and concerned with the interests of the customer?
[2] Contract change proposals-What is the contractor's history of
contract change proposals? This includes changes that lower the
overall cost or improve performance-timely and accurate
proposals for equitable adjustments-changes that have been
withdrawn or dismissed as invalid.
[3] Substitution of key personnel-What is the contractor's history
on changing the key personnel proposed in the offer?
[4] Emergency responsiveness-Has the offeror responded in a
credible manner to emergency service requirements?
[5] Overall satisfaction-Would you do business with this
contractor again, if you had a choice?9
In weighing past performance as an evaluation factor for an award,
the OFPP Guidebook states that it should be ranked "to ensure that it
is meaningfully considered."9' Specifically, OFPP recommends that
past performance be "at least equal in significance to any other non-
cost evaluation factor.02  In a numeric rating system, past
performance should be weighted at twenty-five percent or more.9'
OFPP reports that the Labor Department has in some cases rated past
performances at forty to fifty percent, and that the Air Force "intends
to make past performance equal to the color code which indicates
relative scores in price, technical and management."4
Chapter Three of the OFPP Guidebook provides specific
suggestions for Sections L (Instructions to Offerors) and M
(Evaluation Factors for Award) in solicitations as they relate to past
performance information. 5 One of the most important points is that
contractors should not be allowed to "cherry pick," or rather, to put
forward only their most favorable references.96 Thus, Section L
should ask only for a list of the previous contracts and contact
points.97 The solicitation should contain a copy of the questionnaire
89. Id. (explaining that the idea is that "[t]he subfactors in the solicitation will be the basic
questions on a questionnaire to use for interviewing references or reviewing any written
evaluations provided by the references").




94. Id. at 17.
95. See id. at 19-25.
96. See id. at 19.
97. See id. at 19-20.
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agency evaluators will use.98  Section M should "stipulate the
percentage score, or relative importance, that past performance will
receive"" and how offerors having "no" past performance will be
evaluated."°
In addition, when addressing the use of previously-completed
contractor performance evaluations compiled by agencies in making
source selection decisions, OFPP Guidebook Chapter Three contains
a problematic suggestion concerning adverse information. "Since
contractors will already have had a chance to rebut evaluations and
obtain review at a level above the contracting officers, and such
information will be included in the file, the source selection team
would rarely need to solicit additional information from the
references."'O'
OFPP Guidebook Chapter Three also provides sample language for
SectionsJ (List of Attachments), L, and M. Section L (Instructions to
Offerors) includes draft language to the effect that newly formed
offerors "without prior contracts should list contracts and
subcontracts... for all key personnel."'' 2 Offerors are asked to list
only the key identifying information concerning the contract.'
Specific language is also set forth in a specimen of Section M. This
example describes a hypothetical point-scored evaluation scheme that
rates past performances at thirty-five percent of the non-cost
evaluation factors.'° These factors include enumerated subfactors in
generally descending order together with narrative description of
what is required to receive an "excellent" rating under each
subfactor.'Y
5
Chapter Four, entitled "Obtaining Information on a Contractor's
Past Performance," discusses reference checks, the use of agency
evaluations completed on previous contracts, and questionnaires and
survey forms.' 6 OFPP emphasizes that when conducting reference
check interviews, all evaluation team members should ask the
questions to potential contractors exactly as they appear on the
98. See id. at 20.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 31.
102. Id. at 22.
103. See id. (stating that the pertinent information in a contract would include the name of
contracting activity, contract number, type, dollar value, nature of work, contracting officer and
telephone, program manager and telephone, administrative contracting officer, and major
subcontractors).
104. See id. at 23-24.
105. See id.
106. Seeid. at 27-33.
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questionnaire. 7 "At least two references should be contacted on
each previous contract effort."0 8 Specific warnings are given to the
effect that references have a natural inclination "to give an upward
bias to ratings."'09 Hence, evaluators must ask enough questions to
differentiate between a "good" and an "excellent" performance."
Based on an informal interview with OFPP Deputy Associate
Administrator David Muzio on March 27, 1997, it is evident that
OFPP is concerned that a species of "inflation" could easily affect
such ratings."' OFPP's hope is that when a contractor has met all
aspects of the contract requirements, the contracting agency will
assign an average rating.
Chapter Four concludes with a paragraph addressing "Discussions
on Past Performance."' 2  The OFPP Guidebook emphasizes that
many awards are made without discussions. When discussions are
conducted, however, the source selection team must give offerors the
opportunity to discuss reference information on which the offeror
"has not had a previous opportunity to comment."' 3 The Guidebook
states that once contractor performance evaluations become
commonly available throughout the Federal Government,
discussions, if any, will need to be conducted only with respect to
reference information obtained from state and local governments
and private sector references."
4
"Rating Past Performance" of contractors as a part of the award
process is addressed in OFPP Guidebook Chapter Five." 5 OFPP
emphasizes that the ratings are intended to assess "performance
risk."' 6 The final rating could be a color code, a number, or other
means capable of indicating a relative ranking of proposals." 7 OFPP
admits that a past performance rating "is not a precise mechanical
process and will usually include some subjective judgment."' 8
OFPP explains that rarely should an offeror have "no" available
past performance information."9 "[O]n the rare occasion that no
107. See id. at 28.
108. Id. at 29.
109. Id. at 30.
110. See id.
Ill. Interview by author and Tenley A. Carp, Esq. with David Muzio, OFPP Deputy
Associate Administrator, in Washington, D.C. (May 27, 1997) [hereinafter Muzio Interview].
112. See OFPP GUIDEBOOK, supra note 71, at 33.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 3536.
116. See id. at 35.
117. SeeiU
118. Id.
119. See id. at 36.
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relevant experience exists within the offeror's organization, the
offeror's lack of past performance should be treated as an unknown
performance risk."'"2 An "average score" is suggested as a means of
providing such an offeror a "neutral" rating.2 ' Again, the contracting
agency should obtain past performance information regarding
similar contracts previously handled by the offeror's key personnel
and evaluate it accordingly22
Finally, OFPP Guidebook Chapter Six addresses "Contractor
Performance Reports ' ss as the method by which "each federal
department and agency must develop a cost effective way to record
and disseminate contractor performance information.'2 4  OFPP
encourages "voluntary development of a uniform government-wide
format.'' 1ss A specimen on an interagency-developed report form is
provided at Appendix Three as "one possible approach."'2 6 The one
basic limitation is that "all rating systems be translatable into five
basic ratings: excellent, good, fair, poor, and unsatisfactory."'27
There is also an exceptional rating titled "excellent plus.",2  Six areas
for ratings are specified: quality, timeliness, cost control, business
relations, customer satisfaction, and key personnel.'29
Where the contractor wishes to submit a rebutting statement
challenging the agency's Contractor Performance Report and an
agreement cannot be reached on the rating, a review by at least one
person ranked a level above the contracting officer is required.'"
The decision resulting from the review must be in writing and issued
within fifteen days after receipt of the rebuttal statement.'3 ' Both the
rebuttal statement and the decision on review must be attached to
the performance evaluation report and provided to other agencies
requesting a reference check.
32
Contracting officials must place completed evaluations in the
120. Id. (describing how a past performance might receive a "neutral" rating).
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 37-43.
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id.
126. Id. at app. 3.
127. See id. at 37.
128. See id. According to an interview with OFPP Deputy Associate Administrator David
Muzio on March 27, 1997, OFPP is considering the relative merits of the present
recommendation-a five-tier rating system-versus a ten-point or ten-tier system. The purpose
of moving to a ten-point scale would be to avoid a perceived risk of rating inflation. See Muzio
Interview, supra note 111.
129. See OFPP GUIDEBOOK, supra note 71, at 38-39.





contract file, in a separate file, or in a database where they are readily
accessible.'33 The Guidebook reiterates that under FAR § 42.1503(b),
contracting officials should mark contractor performance evaluations
with "Source Selection Information" as they may be used to support
future source selection decisions.-"
Appendices attached to the OFPP Guidebook provide agencies
with example forms of performance evaluations for completed
contracts. 35 Also included with the Guidebook is a twenty-eight
question "Business Management Past Performance Questionnaire"
for use in collecting past performance information to be used in a
competitive contract award process.'36
II. AGENCIES' EFFORTS TO COMPILE USABLE PAST PERFORMANCE
INFORMATION
The Executive Branch Agencies have put forward a substantial
effort to compile past performance information and to use it
rationally in making source selection decisions. The most fully
developed options, as of this writing, include those implemented by
the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the Navy, the Defense
Logistics Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
National Institutes of Health.
A. Department of Defense
In a Memorandum for Service Acquisition Executives, Commander
in Chief Special Operations Command, and Directors of Defense
Agencies, dated February 20, 1997, (the "February 1997
Memorandum"), Principal Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology, R. Noel Longuemare stated that the
Past Performance Coordinating Council (the "PPCC"), established by
the Department of Defense ("DOD"), has determined that in
accumulating contract performance information as specified by FAR
Subpart 42.15, "neither a single standard system for collection of
[past performance information] nor dollar thresholds, without
regard to the nature of the specific business area or sector, are
desirable.' ' 37  DOD thus will pursue a decentralized approach to
collecting this information. The DOD initiative is "to strive for a
reasonable degree of uniformity of [past performance information],
133. See id.
134. See id. at42-43.
135. See id. at app. 2.
136. See id. at app. 3.
137. See 67 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 323 (Mar. 17, 1997).
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within business sectors, to ensure fair and equitable treatment of all
contractors.' '38 The February 1997 Memorandum directed defense
components to become an "Integrated Product Team" to "develop a
uniform management approach to the use and collection of [past
performance information], including 'a process for deciding how
business areas are defined and how [past performance information]
is to be collected and shared.. .. "'139
During November, 1997, DOD's Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology, Jacques S. Gansler, issued another
memorandum (the "November 1997 Memorandum") formalizing
DOD's policy for collection of contractor past performance
information. 40 Information is to be collected by DOD components in
different ways for different "key business sectors" and "unique
business sectors.' 4' For all types of businesses, the rating levels will be
"exceptional, very good, satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory."''
In addition, the November 1997 Memorandum explained that
contracting officials must provide a narrative discussion in past
performance ratings to assist in determining relevance in future
source selections.
In July 1998, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
and Reform) promulgated a draft "Guide to Collection and Use of
Past Performance Information" (the "DOD Guidebook") for use by
the entire DOD acquisition workforce, which "explains best practices
for both use of past performance information during source selection




A "Past Performance Top Ten List" enumerates guiding principles
for the collection and use of past performance information
throughout DOD.' 4 Key principles include that the narrative portion
is the "most critical aspect" of a past performance assessment, that
performance assessments are a combined responsibility of the
contracting team and the customer, and that all past performance




140. See Gansler Calls for Tailoring Collection of Contractor Performance Information by Sector, 68




144. Stan Soloway, Foreward to DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, A GUIDE TO COLLECTION AND USE
OF PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION at ii (1998), available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ar/
#hot> [hereinafter DOD Guidebook] (on file with author).
145. See id at iv.
146. See id.
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B. Contractor Performance Assessment Reports or "CPARS"
The Air Force 47 and the Navy148 use a "Contractor Performance
Assessment Reporting System" ("CPARS") to track contractor past
performance information. At present, CPARS are limited to
contracts for major weapon systems or service contracts valued in
excess of $5 million.' 49 The Air Force CPARS reports assign the
contractor an adjectival rating: red, yellow, green and blue, with blue
being the best.'"
C. Defense Logistics Agency-"Automated Best Value Model"
One computerized approach to evaluating contractor performance
is the Defense Logistics Agency ("DLA") "automated best value
model" ("ABVM") scoring system."" The ABVM compiles past
performance data and converts it into a numeric score for each
contractor, representing the average of the vendor's "delivery" score
152and "quality" score. The delivery score is based on the vendor's
delivery record during the twelve-month period ending sixty days
prior to the date the score is posted.13  These scores are made
available to each vendor on an electronic bulletin board each
month.'" DLA encourages vendors to challenge the scores at any
time, but preferably before the next monthly scores are posted
because award decisions are based on the posted ABVM scores.5
147. The Air Force CPARS was originally promulgated as a proposed rule at 53 Fed. Reg.
9455 (1988), which added 32 C.F.R pt. 838, "Air Force Systems Command Construction
Performance Assessment." See 53 Fed. Reg. 30,253 (1988) (final rule). Air Force CPARS was
expanded to service contracts in a proposed rule. See 55 Fed. Reg. 9733 (1990). These
regulations were withdrawn at 61 Fed. Reg. 4351 (1996), in view of a then-pending proposal to
cover the subject matter in the Defense FAR Supplement. However, Air Force CPARS remains
in use today. See DOD Guidebook, supra note 144, at 42 (Appendix I: Automated Past
Performance Information Systems).
148. The Navy CPARS was implemented pursuant to an October 16, 1997 memorandum
issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition. The document is available on the Internet at <http://www.navsea.navy.mil/
acquisition-reform/cparsl.htm>.
149. See DOD Guidebook, supra note 144, at 42 ($5,000,000 threshold). The coverage of
weapons systems and service contracts is described in the Federal Register issuances cited in
note 147.
150. See Teledyne Brown Engineering Comp. Gen., B-258078 et aL, 94-2 CPD 223 (1994)
(describing the adjectival rating system). See also ECC International Corporation, Comp. Gen.
B.-277422 et aL, 98-1 CPD 1 45 (1997).
151. See DOD Guidebook, supra note 144, at 43.
152. See id. The ABVM program is fully explained at <http://www.dscc.dla.mil/Programs/
abvm/index.html>. The scoring methodology may be found at <http://www.dscr.mid/
procurement/abvm/ABVMnetl.html>, found on an Internet site administered by DLA's
Defense Supply Center Richmond.
153. Rotair Industries, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-276435.2, 97-2 CPD 1 17 at 2 n.1.
154. See http://www/dscc.dla.mil/Programs/abvm/index.html (visitedJan. 1999).
155. See id. GAO has held that a contractor's failure to file any bid protest based upon
perceived defects in an ABVM past performance evaluation before the due date for receipt of
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D. Environmental Protection Agency
On September 16, 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") issued a proposed rule formalizing EPA's contractor
evaluation process. 5r The proposal would revise EPA Acquisition
Regulation ("EPAAR"). 7 §§ 1509.170-.172 through 1509.170-.178,
adding requirements for use of a specific Contractor Performance
Report1e5 8 for rating quality, cost control, timeliness of performance,
and business relations on a "zero" to "five" scale.'59 A new contract
clause, entitled "Contractor Performance Evaluation," would be
inserted in all EPA contracts with estimated dollar values exceeding
$100,000 6° EPA has borrowed liberally from the National Institutes
of Health ("NIH") system,'6' including the actual NIH Contractor
Performance Report form itself. 62 EPA will employ the NIH past
performance database to record contractor past performance
histories and to research contractor performance information for use
in making source selection decisions.
6
3
E. National Institutes of Health
The National Institutes of Health has implemented a computerized
past performance database which allows NIH personnel to access
questionnaires quickly and efficiently.'" NIH Personnel prepare
"Contractor Performance Reports" upon completion of each contract
pursuant to FAR Subpart 42.15,'6 and the results are stored in an on-
line database.'6 The NIH Contractor Performance Report requires
the rater to assign numerical ratings and to provide narrative
discussion addressing four areas: quality of product or service, cost
control, timeliness of performance, and business relations.' 67 The
numerical ratings and related narrative are included in the system as
is information indicating where the contractor's rebuttal, if any, may
initial proposals for a new contract renders the protest untimely under GAO's bid protest rules.
See 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a) (1) (1998); Dayton-Grayton-Reconsideration, Comp. Gen. B-279553.3,
98-2 CPD 1 322, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS (1998).
156. 63 Fed. Reg. 49,530 (1998).
157. 48 C.F.Rt Ch. 15.
158. 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,534.
159. See id. at 49,534-35.
160. See id. at 49,531 (proposed 48 C.F.R. § 1509.170-1), 49,532 (proposed 48 C.F.R.
§ 1552.209-76).
161. See infra part II.E.
162. 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,534 (showing EPA's duplication of the NIH form).
163. See id. at 49,531 (proposed 48 C.F.R. § 1509.170-5(a)-(c)).
164. See generally NIH Launches On-Line Contractor Performance Database, Invites Govermentwide






be found, and information identifying the contractor's point of
contact.
III. THE EMERGING CASE LAW
A. Principles Guiding Decisions on Past Performance Problems
The General Accounting Office has amassed a great deal of
experience in deciding bid protests when protesters have raised issues
related to past performance. Past performance issues played an
important role in the outcome of approximately 500 GAO decisions
issued since December 31, 1992.'o Reported court decisions
containing meaningful discussion of past performance in a
procurement context are far fewer in number.
Protesters bringing past performance issues to GAO have had little
success thus far. Of all the GAO decisions, protests were sustained in
only twenty-three instances; a success rate of about four percent.'
Moreover, in only one court decision has a court ruled in favor of a
protesting offeror in a past performance contention.
In the few instances where protests have been sustained, the
winning issue has fallen into one of four broad categories: (1)
disregard of past performance evaluation criteria; (2) unsupported
evaluation of a protester's or the awardee's past performance
information; (3) unreasonable past performance evaluations; and (4)
inadequate discussions of unfavorable past performance
information.'7 First, however, it is useful to provide a background in
order to understand the emerging legal principles.
With few exceptions, GAO has consistently applied existing
principles of procurement law in deciding protests where contentions
involve past performance evaluations. GAO's standard of review in
these cases, however, may effectively deprive the protester of any
chance for meaningful review. Its unwillingness to question the
validity or correctness of the underlying past performance data raises
a concern that past performance rules may result in de facto
debarments in some cases, and undermine the competitive process in
others. Moreover, to date, the courts have not provided a more
168. See id.
169. See OFPP GUIDEBOOK, supra note 71. This date was chosen because it generally
coincides with theJanuary 11, 1993, final issuance of OFPP Policy Letter 92-5. The research for
this article considered GAO and court cases issued to the public as of December 31, 1998.
170. See infra Part III.B (citing relevant cases and providing discussion).
171. See infra notes 452-75 (discussing Latecoere International Inc. v. United States
Department of the Navy, 19 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1994)).
172. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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hospitable forum for protesters challenging procurement outcomes
based upon past performance evaluations.
1. Past performance: What does the term mean to the procuring agencies?
The OFPP's definition of past performance'" has been adopted
verbatim or without substantive change in a large number of cases.
For example, in PMT Services, Inc.,'74 the DLA's evaluation criteria
closely tracked the formulation of past performance in the OFPP
Policy Letter 92-5:
Evaluation of past performance will be a subjective assessment
based on a consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances. It
will not be based on absolute standards of acceptable performance.
The Government is seeking to determine whether the offeror has
consistently demonstrated a commitment to customer satisfaction
and timely delivery of services .... By past performance, the
Government means the offeror's record of conforming to
specifications and to standards of good workmanship; the offeror's
adherence to contracts schedules, including the administrative
aspects of performance; the offeror's reputation for reasonable and
competitive behavior and commitment to customer satisfaction;
and generally, the offeror's business-like concern for the interest of
the customer. [The Government] will also consider an offeror's
performance on same or similar contracts in terms of waste
quantities, variety of pick up locations and waste streams,
performance timeframes, and complexities of the services
provided.' 75
A large number of other cases demonstrate this close adherence to
OFPP's guidance.
7 6
173. See Final Issuance of OFPP Policy Letter 92-5, 58 Fed. Reg. 3573, 3575 (1993); see also
supra Part I.A. (discussing OFPP's past performance initiatives).
174. Comp. Gen. B-270538.2, 96-2 CPD 1 98, at 2, recon. denied, Comp. Gen. B-270538.5, 96-2
CPD 1 194 (1996) (sustaining the protest based on the agency's unreasonable evaluation of
past performance and source selection).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., UNICCO Gov't Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277658, 97-2 CPD [ 134 (1997)
(explaining that past performance pertains to customer satisfaction, adherence to legal
requirements, and ethics compliance versus "experience," which deals with similarity of past
contracts); HLC Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274374, 96-2 CPD 1 214 (1996) (stating that a
proper inquiry focuses on "to what extent the [offeror's] past performance has been
satisfactory... ; offeror's cooperative behavior and commitment to customer satisfaction with
the government, public and private agencies, [and] [t]he timeliness of delivery taking into
account excusable delays..."); Dynamic Aviation-Helicopters, Comp. Gen. B-274122, 96-2
CPD 1 166, at 2 (1996) (reporting that past performance subfactors included: "a) quality of
service; b) timeliness and responsiveness of performance; c) commitment to customer
satisfaction; d) quality awards and certifications; e) problems; and f) cost control"); PW Constr.,
Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272248 et aL, 96-2 CPD 1 130, at 5 (1996) (explaining that the factors
evaluated "offeror's capability to successfully complete projects of similar scope and complexity
and with an emphasis on timeliness of performance, quality of work, cost controls, and
1562
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2. What latitude does the agency have in defining the type of past
performance an offeror must have demonstrated?
Agencies have wide latitude in specifying the type or extent of past
performance an offeror must demonstrate in order to be eligible to
participate in a negotiated acquisition process. For example, in Leon
D. DeMatteis Construction Corp.,177 GAO turned back a protester's
challenge to solicitation requirements for construction of a new
federal courthouse in Brooklyn, New York. Specifically, the Request
for Proposals ("RFP") required the contractor to demonstrate that it
had completed at least three projects as a prime contractor in the
past ten years where the facility was a courthouse, civic building,
museum, library, embassy, hospital, corporate headquarters, or office
building.1 7' Also, the facility had to be a minimum of 400,000 gross
square feet, not less than ten stories above grade for each project,
and a contract dollar value of not less than $100 million for each
cooperation"); Cardinal Scientific, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270309, 96-1 CPD 70, at 6 (1996)
(defining past experience as the "offeror's record of conforming to specification/commercial
product descriptions and to standards of good workmanship; adherence to contract schedules;
and reputation for reasonable and cooperative behavior"); Contrack Int'l, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-
270102 el aL, 96-1 CPD 1 53, at 4 (1996) (holding that an evaluation would compare offeror to
others based on "reputation for satisfying its customers by delivering quality work in a timely
manner at a reasonable cost," including "offeror's reputation for integrity, reasonable and
cooperative conduct, and commitment to customer satisfaction"); Fluor Daniel, Inc., Comp.
Gen. B-262051 el aL, 95-2 CPD 1 241, at 11 (1995) (evaluating an experience or past
performance to determine "how well the offeror has performed on past contract of a similar
nature and magnitude."). In FluorDanie4 Inc., the subfactors of past performance included "a)
related corporate and technical experience on contracts of similar nature, magnitude, and
complexity; b) ability to meet schedule and cost constraints; c) ability to achieve program
objectives; d) quality of past services; e) outside inputs on offeror's schedule, cost, and quality
performance." Fluor Daniel, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-262051 et at, 95-2 CPD 1 241, at 11 (1995); see
also Moore Med. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-261758, 95-2 CPD 1 204, at 3 (1995) (stating past
performance evaluation assessed "offeror's reputation for conforming to specifications and to
standards of good workmanship, for adherence to contract schedules (including the
administrative aspects of performance), for reasonable and cooperative behavior and
commitment to customer satisfaction, and for having a business-like concern for the interests of
the customer," and emphasizing the "depth, breadth, relevancy, and currency of [the offeror's]
work experience..."); Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-259252, 95-1 CPD 1 149
(1995) (quoting OFPP language regarding past performance with the exception of a reference
to cost performance and "behavior"); Laidlaw Envti. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-256346, 94-1
CPD 1 365 (1994) (referring closely to OFPP language); SDA, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-256075 et aL,
94-2 CPD 71, at 2 (1994) (detailing quality of past performance in terms of "timeliness and
technical success"); Daun Ray Casuals, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-255217.3 el at, 94-2 CPD 1 42 (1994)
(referring substantially to the OFPP language except for a reference to cost performance);
Tennier Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-252338, 93-1 CPD 1 471 (1993) (using language similar to
OFPP); Centre Mfg. Co., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-251665, 93-1 CPD 1 340 (1993) (same);JCI Envtl.
Servs., Comp. Gen. B-250752.3, 93-1 CPD 1 299 (1993) (quoting language of OFPP); Kings
Point Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-249616, 92-2 CPD 1 395 (1992) (tracking closely the language
of OFPP).
177. Comp. Gen. B-276877, 97-2 CPD 1 36 (1997).
178. See id. at 3 (explaining that the basis for this specific criterion is to demonstrate "a
firm's overall coordination and subcontracting responsibilities...").
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project.'79 Despite the contractor's claim that these requirements
were unduly restrictive, GAO stated that the government enjoys
broad discretion in the selection of evaluation criteria and declined
to object "so long as the criteria used reasonably relate to the
agency's minimum needs .... .""o
3. How does past performance figure in the source selection process-as an
indicator of "risk, " or of technical merit?
One point emphasized by OFPP in Policy Letter 92-5 is that past
performance, as an evaluation factor for award, is designed to assess
the "risk" associated with how the offeror will perform the contract
once it has been awarded.' Specifically, OFPP states: "Past




Dragon Services, Inc.,'"5 provides a good example of the type of case
in which past performance is clearly and unambiguously utilized in a
solicitation to assess performance risk. In awarding a contract for
nutrition care services at an Army Hospital, the government
stipulated four factors to be considered: technical capability,
managerial capability, price, and performance risk.'8 4  A
"Performance Risk Assessment Group" ("PRAG") conducted the risk
assessment, assigning ratings of "low, moderate, or high" risk to each
proposal based largely on past performance.'85  GAO found the
resultant "moderate" risk for the low-price offeror justified the
procuring agency's award at a substantial price premium to another
offeror which received a "low" risk rating."6
Numerous cases indicate that many agencies have understood
OFPP's "risk" guidance and attempted to follow it. For example, in
Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support,8 7 a U.S. Special Operations Forces
179. See id.
180. Id. at 4. GAO denied a protest challenging an agency's formulation of past
performance criteria, which, in the aggregate, were assigned greater weight than price. See
Braswell Services Group, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-276694, 97-2 CPD 1 18 at 1 (1997). The past
performance evaluation in Braswell encompassed eighteen different aspects of the offeror's past
performance. See id.; see also ENDMARK Corp., Comp. Gen. B-278139, 97-2 CPD 1 179 (1997)
(explaining that a solicitation requirement that an offeror list its subcontractors' support
service contracts performed or completed in past three years is not unduly restrictive of
competition).
181. See Final Issuance of OFPP Policy Letter 92-5, 58 Fed. Reg. 3573 (1993).
182. Id. at 3576.
183. Comp. Gen. B-255354, 94-1 CPD 1 151 (1994).
184. See id. at 2.
185. See id. (noting that price was not to be scored, but would be considered as a risk of
performance).
186. See id. at 6 (concluding that the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the
stated criteria).
187. Comp. Gen. B-277263.2 et aL, 97-2 CPD 1 91 (1997).
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solicitation categorized past performance as an element of the
"Performance Risk" factor. Likewise, in GEC-Marconi Electronic Systems
Corporation,.. relevant "present and past performance" was
considered "in assessing risk.""'9  In addition, in Computer Systems
Development Corp.,'o the agency gave past performance, the single
most heavily weighted of five (5) non-price factors, both a "color
code" adjectival rating"" as well as a risk assessment.
Other cases, however, do not explicitly refer to a "risk" factor. This
omission makes it difficult to judge whether the agency saw past
performance as a matter of risk assessment. For example, in
Consultants on Family Addiction'9 the most important factor, quality of
services, included (in descending order of importance) the
subfactors "capacity to perform, proposed approach, quality of staff,
ability to provide the range of services," and others.'9 Such terminology
appears ambiguous, and suggests that agency personnel who
developed the evaluation criteria may not have completely grasped
188. Comp. Gen. B-276186 et aL, 97-2 CPD 23 (1997).
189. See id. at 2; see also POT Services, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-279168, 98-2 CPD 1 152 (1998)
(contending that past performance evaluation was made to "assess past performance rule");
Best Foam Fabricators, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-275436, 97-1 CPD 1 78 (1997) (using separate
technical and risk ratings, the awardee's proposal received an excellent (low) risk rating based
on twelve current contracts with only two delinquencies and another ten earlier contracts with
no delinquencies); SEAIR Transp. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274436, 96-2 CPD 1 224, at 4-5
(1996) (stating that the Air Force factors clearly referenced "performance risk" in terms of the
offeror's current and past work record as one of the three criteria for analyzing the technical
areas of a proposal); Cessna Aircraft Co., Comp. Gen. B-261953.5, 96-1 CPD 1 132, at 3 (1996)
(reporting that the Air Force's past performance evaluation directed "proposal and
performance risk"); Caltech Serv. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-261044.4, 95-2 CPD 1 285, at 2-3 (1995)
("[e]ach subfactor was also to be evaluated for proposal risk-to assess the risk associated with
an offeror's proposed approach-and for performance risk-to assess the probability of
successful performance based on the 'offeror's relevant past and present performance.'");
United Int'l Eng'g Inc., Comp. Gen. B-257607.3, 95-2 CPD 1 108, at 2 (1995) (using
.performance risk," as a major evaluation factor, an evaluation which would "make a
performance risk assessment based upon each offeror's and his subcontractor's current and
past records of performance as they relate to the probability of successful completion of the
required effort"); Decision Sys. Techs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-257186 et aL, 94-2 CPD 1 167 (1994);
NCI Info. Sys., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-257186 et aL, 94-2 CPD 1 167, at 3 (1994) (explaining that
.performance risk" was rated separately from the management, technical, and cost factors "to
assess the probability of successful performance based on the offeror's past performance");
Lockheed Aircraft Serv. Co., Comp. Gen. B-255305 et aL, 94-1 CPD 1 205, at 2 (1994) (stating
that "performance risk" was used to assess "the probability of the offeror successfully
accomplishing the proposed effort based on ... demonstrated present and past performance");
TRI-COR Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. R-252366.3, 93-2 CPD 1 137, at 3 (1993) (reporting that the
Army's past performance evaluation was expressed "through a risk assessment on a scale of
high, moderate, or low risk").
190. Comp. Gen. -275356, 97-1 CPD 1 91(1997).
191. The ratings included the following: "blue" defined as "exceed[ing] specified
performance or capability in a beneficial way," and "green" defined as "meet[ing] evaluation
standards and any weaknesses are readily correctable." Id. at 2 n.1.
192. Comp. Gen. B-274924.2, 97-1 CPD 1 80 (1997).
193. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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the concept of comparative performance "risk" versus a particular
offeror's "responsibility."
American Combustion Industries, Inc.194 involved an evaluation scheme
in which four separate major criteria each directly addressed an
aspect of past performance and comprised eighty percent of the
scored non-price criteria. 95 Nothing in GAO's decision indicated
whether "risk" was the focus of this evaluation, although clearly past
performance was a comparative evaluation among the offerors.'96
In most cases, GAO will not consider post-award protests attacking
the evaluation factors.'97 As a result, GAO does not appear to be an
available forum for refocusing the agencies on OFPP's original
intent-that past performance be a means of making informed,
comparative assessments of performance risk.
4. Agencies must act reasonably and follow the stated evaluation criteria
In cases addressing protester challenges to past performance
evaluations in source selections, GAO has followed a well established
principle of limited review. GAO's typical formulation of the
standard is presented in Wind Gap Knitwear.98 In that case, Wind Gap
194. Comp. Gen. B-275057.2, 97-1 CPD 1 105 (1997).
195. The breakdown of the criteria included: thirty percent of past performance on
building construction; twenty percent of past performance on phased refurbishing; twenty
percent of past performance on personnel; and ten percent past performance of construction
schedule adherence. See id. at 2.
196. In DIGICON Corp., past performance was the most important criterion. See DIGICON
Corp., Comp. Gen. B-275060 et aL, 97-1 CPD 1 64 (1997). GAO's decision provides no
indication as to whether the focus was on risk, though again, clearly a comparative evaluation
was conducted. ValueCAD involved an evaluation scheme where "past performance, capacity,
key personnel, and the offeror's experience" were considered in descending order. GAO's
decision is unclear as to whether the agency was assessing "risk" or something else. See
ValueCAD, Comp. Gen. B-272936, 96-2 CPD 1 176 (1996) (noting the decision that ValueCAD
was not among the highest-rated proposals despite its offer of the lower price).
In Morrison Knudsen Corp., GAO sustained the protest but past performance was not a separate
evaluation factor. Rather, under the technical approach (involving nine subfactors), past
performance was "evaluated as a general consideration as it relates to the above subfactors."
Morrison Knudsen Corp., Comp. Gen. B-270703, 96-2 CPD 86 at 2 (1996). In Wind Gap
Knitwear, the past performance evaluation served twin purposes, one suggesting risk, the other
suggesting a more non-risk orientation: "evaluation of the offeror's credibility regarding its
proposal representations and evaluation of the relative capability of the offerors." Wind Gap
Knitwear, Comp. Gen. B-261045, 95-2 CPD 1 124, at 2 (1995). John Brown U.S. Servs., Inc.
involved an evaluation of the "quality" of the offeror's past performance, to be used "to evaluate
the credibility of the offeror's approach... and as one means of evaluating the relative
capabilities of offerors." John Brown U.S. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-258158 el aL, 95-1 CPD
35, at 4 (1994). No explicit reference to "risk" is to be found. See id.; see also Daun Ray Casuals,
Inc., Comp. Gen. B-255217.3 et al., 94-2 CPD 1 42 (1994) (reporting that past performance was
evaluated in connection with "determining the credibility of proposals and each offeror's
relative capability".).
197. 4 C.FR. § 21.2(a)(1) (stating that protests based on alleged defects in evaluation
criteria generally must be protested prior to an award).
198. Comp. Gen. B-261045, 95-2 CPD 1 124 (1995).
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claimed that the Defense Logistics Agency's past performance
evaluation of the awardee, Daun Ray Casuals, Inc., was irrational.
The RFP set forth a best-value selection scheme listing technical
factors as more important than price, and "experience/past
performance" as the less important of two technical subfactors.'"
The past performance evaluation turned on an assessment of the
offeror's experience producing the same or similar clothing articles
within the last two years and was intended to serve twin purposes:"o
First, to judge the offeror's "credibility" regarding proposal
representations; and second, to evaluate the relative capability of the
competing firms.Y In rejecting the protester's challenge that the
awardee's "highly acceptable" rating was improper due to alleged
poor delivery performance on past contracts, GAO set forth the
controlling legal standards:
The evaluation of technical proposals is primarily the responsibility
of the contracting agency since the agency is responsible for
defining its needs and the best method of accommodating them,
and it must bear the burden of any difficulties resulting from a
defective evaluation. It is not a function of our Office to reevaluate
proposals; rather, we review the agency's evaluation of proposals
only to ensure that it was fair, reasonable, and consistent with the
evaluation criteria stated in the solicitation. Where a solicitation
requires the evaluation of offerors' past performance, an agency
has discretion to determine the scope of the offerors' performance
histories to be considered, provided all proposals are evaluated on
the same basis and consistent with the solicitation requirements.
2
01
GAO also has frequently stated that a protester's "mere
disagreement" with the evaluation is not a basis for protest.
203
199. See id. at 1-2.
200. See id. at 2.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
203. See, e.g., Cobra Technologies Inc., Comp. Gen. B-280475 el aL, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen.
WL 743567 (1998) (stating that a protester's mere disagreement does not establish that the
evaluation was unreasonable); Rockhill Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-278797, 98-1 CPD 1 79, at 5
(1998) (stating that the protester's disagreement does not itself render the evaluation
unreasonable); DIGICON Corp., Comp. Gen. B-275060 et aL, 97-1 CPD 1 64, at 7 (1997)
(holding that mere disagreement does not provide any basis to question the evaluation); HLC
Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274374, 96-2 CPD 1 214, at 3 (1997) (stating that "[m]ere
disagreement with the agency's evaluation does not itself render the evaluation unreasonable");
Hughes Georgia, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272526, 96-2 CPD 1 151, at 4 (1996) (holding that "[a]n
offeror's mere disagreement with the agency does not render the evaluation unreasonable");
GZA Remediation, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272386, 96-2 CPD 1 155, at 4 (1996) (stating that the
protester's disagreement with the agency does not make the evaluation unreasonable); PW
Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272248 el at, 96-2 CPD 1 130, at 3 (1996) (remarking that a
protester's disagreement with an agency's technical evaluation does not render the evaluation
unreasonable).
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There is nothing remarkable about GAO's standard of review.
Dozens of comparable GAO cases have recited it regardless of
whether the protester challenged its own past performance rating or
the rating of the awardee.2  The standard of review in court cases is
204. See e.g., Caterpillar Inc., Comp. Gen. B-280362 et at, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 329
(1998) (stating GAO will examine agency evaluation only to ensure it was reasonable and
consistent with stated evaluation criteria); SDV Telecomm., Comp. Gen. B-279919, 98-2 CPD
1 34, at 2 (1998) (holding that GAO examines evaluation and selection decisions to ensure they
were reasonable and consistent with stated criteria); Hard Bodies, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-279543,
98-1 CPD 1 172 (1998) (stating GAO reviews only to determine whether evaluation was
"reasonable and consistent" with evaluation criteria); Xeno Technix, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-
278738 et al, 98-1 CPD 1 110, at 2 (1998) (asserting that evaluations will only be questioned
when they lack a reasonable basis or conflict with stated evaluation criteria); U.S. Technology
Corp., Comp. Gen. B-278584, 98-1 CPD 1 78, at 5 (1998) (stating that OFPP will only determine
whether the evaluation was reasonable and comported with evaluation criteria); Compania De
Asesoria Y Comercio, Comp. Gen. B-278358, 98-1 CPD 1 26, at 5 (1998) (stating that in
reviewing evaluations OFPP does not reevaluate the proposals but merely ensures that the
evaluation was reasonable and consistent with evaluation criteria); BFI Waste Sys. of Neb., Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-278233, 98-1 CPD 1 8 (1998);J&E Assoc., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-278187, 98-1 CPD
1 42, at 2-3 (1998) (remarking that in reviewing an evaluation, OFPP will look at the record to
determine if the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with evaluation criteria);
International Consultants, Inc. et al, Comp. Gen. B-278165 et aL, 98-1 CPD 1 7, at 3 (1998)
(declaring that evaluations will only be questioned if the record shows that it was unreasonable
or inconsistent with evaluation criteria); Dawco Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-278048.2, 98-1 CPD
1 32, at 3 (1998) (explaining that examination of an agency's evaluation only consists of
ensuring that the evaluation was unreasonable and consistent with evaluation criteria);
Mechanical Contractors, SA., Comp. Gen. B-277916, 97-2 CPD 1 121, at 6 (1997) (stating that
the "[o]ffice will not sustain a protest unless the protestor demonstrates a reasonable possibility
that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions" and sustaining a protest where the protestor was
prejudiced by multiple material errors); ECG, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277738, 97-2 CPD 1 153, at 6
(1997) (asserting that there is no evidence in the record that the agency's evaluation was
improper and agency has discretion in how it structures its evaluation as long as it is reasonable
and follows evaluation criteria); UNNICO Gov't Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277658, 97-2 CPD
1 134, at 6-7 (1997) (concluding that the agency's evaluation was reasonable and evaluations
need not be totally objective but must be reasonable and have a rational relationship to the
evaluation criteria); Crown Clothing Corp., Comp. Gen. B-277505.2, 97-2 CPD 1 127, at 3-4
(1997) (upholding agency's evaluation as reasonable and consistent with evaluation criteria);
Court Copies & Images, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277268, 97-2 CPD 1 85, at 3 (1997) (holding that
evaluation was reasonable and record supports agency's findings); Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft
Support, Comp. Gen. B-277263.2 et aL, 97-2 CPD 1 91, at 7 (1997) (sustaining the protest
because the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions, but holding that agency's past
performance evaluation was reasonable and consistent with evaluation criteria); Pearl
Properties, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277250.2, 97-2 CPD 1 80, at 4 (1997) (holding that the record
establishes that agency's evaluation was consistent with evaluation criteria and was reasonable);
Richard M. Milburn High School, Comp. Gen. B-277018, 97-2 CPD 1 53, at 3-4 (1997) (finding
no basis in the record to question the reasonableness of the evaluation); Rotair Indus., Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-276435.2, 97-2 CPD 1 17, at 3-4 (1997) (holding that Rotair was on notice of
.price/past performance tradeoff" and that agency would assess "best possible delivery" and
that agency's determination was reasonable); Computer Sys. Dev. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-275356,
97-1 CPD 1 91, at 3 (1997) (finding nothing unreasonable or objectionable in agency's
evaluation); H.F. Henderson Indus., Comp. Gen. B-275017, 97-2 CPD 1 27 (1997) (stating that
the agency evaluation of "performance risk"/"past performance" examined only "to ensure that
is was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation criteria."); Roy F.
Weston, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274945 et aL, 97-1 CPD 1 92 (1997) (explaining that GAO does not
question evaluations which are reasonable and follow stated evaluation criteria); Consultants on
Family Addiction, Comp. Gen. B-274924.2, 97-1 CPD 1 80 (1997) (explaining that GAO does
not review proposal de novo, the evaluation must be reasonable and consistent with the stated
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evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations, and that relative merits of proposals
are a matter of administrative discretion); Continental Serv. Co., Comp. Gen. B-274531, 97-1
CPD 1 9 (1996) (using a nearly verbatim recitation of quoted language from lVind Gap
Knitwear); SEAIR Transp. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274436, 96-2 CPD 1 224, at 5 (1996)
(finding that the Air Force reasonably determined that one contender posed a low
performance risk and holding that the merit of proposals is left to the discretion of the agency
unless it is unreasonable or inconsistent with stated evaluation criteria); ValueCAD, Comp. Gen.
R-272936, 96-2 CPD 1 176, at 2-3 (1996) (stating that record supports agency's evaluation that
EagleMapping's proposal was superior to that of ValueCAD's and that agency acted
reasonably); Hughes Georgia, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272526, 96-2 CPD 1 151, at 4 (1996)
(announcing that the record provided no evidence that the agency's evaluation was
reasonable); Hughes Missile Sys. Co., Comp. Gen. B-272418 et aL, 96-2 CPD 1 221, at 6-7 (1996)
(concluding that an agency's evaluation of past performance must be reasonable and that in
this case, the Air Force reasonably determined that Hughes's prior performance had been
deficient); PW Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272248 et aL, 96-2 CPD 1 130, 3 (1996) (denying
protest because agency evaluation was reasonable, consistent with evaluation criteria, and fair);
Volmar Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272188.2, 96-2 CPD 1 119, at 3 (1996) (finding that
agency's rationale for "highly satisfactory" rating demonstrated that agency evaluation was
reasonable); Macon Apparel Corp., Comp. Gen. B-272162, 96-2 CPD 1 95, at 3 (1996) (holding
that agency's use of protester's past delinquencies on contracts in evaluating protester's
proposal was reasonable); Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (GS), Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271903, 96-2 CPD
1 75, at 4 (1996) (holding that agency's technical evaluation was reasonable where protester
had past performance problems); Quality Elevator Co., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271899, 96-2 CPD
1 89, at 3 (1996) (concluding that where an agency looked at its own direct knowledge of a
protester's past performance and only contacted one of the protester's references, then the
agency evaluation was reasonable); Smith of Galeton Gloves, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271686, 96-2
CPD 1 36 (1996) ("Where a solicitation requires the evaluation of offeror's past performance,
an agency has discretion to determine the scope of the offeror's performance histories to be
considered, provided all proposal are evaluated on the same basis and consistent with the
solicitation requirements.") (quoting Wind Gap Knitwear); American CASA/National Air, Comp.
Gen. B-271274 et aL, 96-1 CPD 1 251, at 4 (1996) (determining that agency's evaluation of
proposal under past performance subfactor was reasonable); Systems Integration & Dev., Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-271050, 96-1 CPD 1 273, at 3 (1996) (deciding that agency's evaluation did not
use any unstated evaluation factors and was reasonable and consistent with stated evaluation
criteria); Morrison Knudsen Corp., Comp. Gen. B-270703, 96-2 CPD 86, at 5 (1996) (stating
that when an agency clearly violates procurement requirements the GAO will "resolve any
doubts concerning prejudicial effect in favor of the protestor" and finding that the agency
prejudiced the protestor by its "unsupported selection rationale"); Moheat Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-270538.2 et al., 96-2 CPD 1 98, recon. denied, Comp. Gen. B-270538.5, 96-2 CPD
I 194, at 2 (1996) (denying a request for reconsideration of a decision in favor of the protestor
because the agency's judgement was not reasonable or in accordance with evaluation criteria);
Cardinal Scientific, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270309, 96-1 CPD 1 70, 5 (1996) (holding that the
agency's determination was reasonable); Ogden Support Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270012.2,
96-1 CPD I 177, at 7 (1996) (sustaining a protest because the agency's determination of the
awardee's technically superiority was not reasonably supported by the record) (1996); Criterion
Corp., Comp. Gen. B-266050, 96-1 CPD 1 217, at 2-3 (1996) (asserting that agency's evaluation
of awardee's proposal as superior was reasonable); Cessna Aircraft Co., Comp. Gen. B-261953.5,
96-1 CPD 1 132, at 7 (1996) (finding that agency's evaluation of Cessna's proposal as a "green"
rating under "system safety" was reasonable and consistent with evaluation criteria); Pannesma
Co., Ltd., Comp. Gen. B-251688, 93-1 CPD 1 333, at 4 (1993) (finding agency's evaluation that
protester's proposal was adequate but did not deserve an exceptional rating, was reasonable).
205. The Claims Court's standard of review is established by 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (4) (1994),
which cross references the familiar standard of judicial review set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2))-the agency's actions must have been arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. See Cubic Applications, Inc. v. United
States, 37 Fed. Cl. 345, 362 (1997) (denying the plaintiff's claim because the agency's past
performance evaluation had not been shown to be arbitrary and capricious).
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Hughes Missile Systems Company'° is a particularly good example of
how GAO applies the "reasonable and consistent with evaluation
factors" rule. The case involved an Air Force procurement for
definition and development of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile ('JASSM") .27 Hughes Missile Systems protested two separate
awards, to McDonnell Douglas Aerospace Corporation and Lockheed
Martin Integrated Systems, Inc., challenging the past performance,
cost, and technical evaluations.2 0° Past performance, including past
technical performance ° and past affordability performance, 0 was
weighted most heavily, being twice as important as "technical
performance" and "affordability."211 Past performance was evaluated
on the basis of three contracts or programs for each of the five
212different subfactors under the overall past performance criterion.
The solicitation specifically described what prior contracts and
211programs would be considered "similar" for evaluation purposes.
The Air Force reserved the right to obtain information from various
sources, including "Contractor Performance Assessment Reports"
("CPAR"), the other services, and the offerors themselves.14
Hughes's past performance rating of "marginal" resulted from "a
weakness with respect to ability to perform to cost/schedule," while
the other offerors, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas, were
rated "most strongly" and "consistently good" respectively.215  The
Source Selection Authority ("SSA") chose the awardees after
concluding that only Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas were
"consistently good-to-excellent performers" and that only they were
rated acceptable under "cost/schedule performance. 2 1' The SSA felt
that schedule and cost problems attributed to Hughes under the
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile ("AMRAAM") program
and the Tomahawk cruise missile program precluded a higher
206. Comp. Gen. B-272418 et aL, 96-2 CPD 1 221 (1996).
207. See ild. at 1 (noting that Hughes protested Air Force's award of contracts to Lockheed
Martin and McDonnell Douglas).
208. See id.
209. See id. at 2 (reporting that past technical performance was divided into product
performance, computer software, and aircraft integration).
210. See id. (noting that past affordability performance was divided into manufacturing and
cost/schedule).
211. See id. (noting that "technical performance" includes key performance parameters and
integrated master plan and schedule).
212. Seeid. at5.
213. See id. (quoting the RFP that "[w]henever possible, the Government will gather past
performance [data] on contracts/programs which are similar to theJASSM program").
214. See id.
215. See id. at 3.
216. See id. at 4.
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217rating.
In protesting its past performance rating as unreasonable, Hughes
contended that the Air Force's evaluation of its prior work on the
Tomahawk cruise missile had been "superficial" and unreasonable
when it concluded that the cost growth "would inevitably lead to
schedule delays. ... ,," Rejecting this argument, GAO seemed to
accept at face value the content of the evaluation record bearing on
219Hughes's past performance. In other words, as long as
documentation tending to support the Air Force's evaluation was
present in the file, GAO was not willing to go beyond that
information to test its validity. "The Air Force reasonably determined
that Hughes's cost/schedule performance on the [Tomahawk]
program had been materially deficient. The record shows that the
Air Force relied on information received from the Navy.. .
GAO discussed Hughes's response to its determination only in a
general way. Despite a fact-finding hearing in the case, GAO's
decision exhibits an unwillingness to question the contents of the file
as long as the right words are to be found on paper somewhere in the
record.22'
Hughes further contended that the Air Force fell short in failing to
consider the complexity of the products being developed when
evaluating past performance. 2 GAO rejected this argument, noting
that the agency had provided worksheets to potential offerors with
217. See id. (reporting that the SSA was particularly concerned about Hughes's cost and
schedule problems because these programs were of similar scope toJASSM's).
218. Id. at 6.
219. See id. at 7.
220. Id. GAO also explained that:
[T]he Navy [Tomahawk] program office rated both Hughes's cost and schedule
performance as a "2" on a scale of 1-4, with "4" indicating an ability to perform with
little or no government oversight and "l" indicating an inability to perform .... The
agency also obtained specific information and documents from the [Tomahawk]
office which supported the Navy's determination that Hughes had encountered
significant cost/schedule problems in its performance .... Further, the information
available to the Air Force ... reasonably indicated that Hughes was encountering
performance delays that could ultimately delay delivery of the [Tomahawk]
improvements ....
Id.
221. Seeid. at9. GAO stated:
In our view, the Air Force could (and did) reasonably attribute the potential 3 .-
month funding-based delay in the first instance to Hughes's failure to properly cost its
proposed [Tomahawk] contract effort .... Having reasonably determined that
Hughes was experiencing serious cost and schedule problems on the [Tomahawk]
contract for which it bore significant responsibility, and in view of Hughes's 9-month
schedule delay in its performance on the AMRAAM program, the Air Force reasonably
evaluated Hughes's past cost/schedule performance as marginal ....
Id.
222. See id. at 10 (reporting Hughes's argument that the agency overemphasized program
similarity instead of product similarity).
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the draft RFP in order to assist the agency in identifying "relevant"
past contracts.223 The worksheets generally "indicated the agency's
position that for purposes of evaluating past cost/schedule
performance, program similarity would be more significant than
product similarity., 2 4 As a result, GAO found nothing unreasonable
with the Air Force considering programs for products dissimilar in
complexity as a relevant factor of predicting future cost/schedule
performance.225
This basic principle-that an agency's past performance evaluation
will not be disapproved so long as it is reasonable and comports with
the stated evaluation criteria-has, thus, been repeatedly applied.2 6
Even incumbent contractors, in recompeting for their current
contracts, are entitled to no more evaluation credit than is afforded
by the solicitation.
5. Past performance/cost trade-offs must be reasonable and consistent with
stated evaluation criteria
The FAR procedures for competitive negotiation expressly
contemplate a "tradeoff process" in determining whether the
government's best interest is served by making an award to offerors
other than the lowest priced offeror or the highest technically rated
offeror.228 Therefore, tradeoff decisions often must be made to judge
whether a superior past performance rating will overcome a
competitor's price advantage. Again, GAO has resorted to
229conventional principles in deciding such cases.
In USA Electronics,21° GAO rejected a challenge to the protester's
own past performance evaluation and approved the award to the
offeror with superior technical and past performance ratings despite
223. See id. at 10-11.
224. Id.at1l.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 6 (stating that offeror's performance risk will be reviewed "to ensure that it
was reasonable and consistent with stated evaluation criteria"). See, e.g., Dragon Servs., Inc.
Comp. Gen. B-255354, 94-1 CPD 1 151 (1994) (reviewing an offeror's evaluation to ensure that
it is reasonable and consistent with stated evaluation criteria); Instrument Control Serv., Inc.
Comp. Gen. B-247286, 92-1 CPD 1 407 (1992) (stating that "[o]ur office... will object to a
contracting agency's determination of its need ... if the determination is shown to be
unreasonable").
227. See, e.g., Modem Tech. Corp. Comp. Gen. B-278695 et al., 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS
69 (1998) (holding that the agency is not to give "extra credit" to a successful incumbent where
the agency has given such a contractor the maximum rating available under the solicitation); see
also, e.g., Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 96-2 CPD 1 221, at 6 (requiring each offeror to provide data
on past performance so that the agency my equally evaluate offers).
228. See Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 96-2 CPD 221, at 3 (discussing the "trade of process" and
how it was applied during evaluation).
229. See infra notes 230-54 and accompanying text.
230. Comp. Gen. B-275389, 97-1 CPD 1 75 (1997).
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a small price advantage to the protester. GAO explained:
In a best value procurement, price is not necessarily controlling in
determining the offer that represents the best value to the
government. Rather, that determination is made on the basis of
whatever evaluation factors are set forth in the RFP, with the source
selection official often required to make a cost/technical tradeoff
to determine if one proposal's technical superiority is worth the
higher cost that may be associated with that proposal. In this
regard, price/past performance tradeoffs are permitted when such
tradeoffs are consistent with the RFP evaluation scheme. 3 '
As would be expected, GAO has frequently approved selection
decisions in favor of offerors having high past performance ratings
despite occasionally significant cost premiums. 232 In each such case,
231. Id. at 3 (citations omitted). GAO further stated that
[W]here, as here, an RFP identifies past performance and price as the evaluation
criteria and indicates that an offeror with good past performance can expect a higher
rating than an offeror without such a record of performance, proposals must be
e~aluated on that basis, and ultimately the selection official must decide whether or
not a higher-priced offeror with a better past performance rating represents the best
value to the government.
Id.; see also U.S. Tech. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-278584, CPD 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 66
(1998) (assessing past performance as being a "more important" factor than price, and finding
that "perceptional past performance" did not justify price); Nomura Enterprise, Inc., Comp.
Gen. B-277768, 97-2 CPD 1 148 (1997) (reporting that past performance superiority justified
price premium associated with awardee's proposal); Trend NV. Technical Corp., Comp. Gen. B-
275395.2, 97-1 CPD 1 201 (1997) (stating that giving the tradeoff and award to the higher price
offeror was reasonable where the protester's past performance superiority was overcome by
protester's inadequate proposed staffing); Engineering and Computation, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-
275180.2, 97-1 CPD 1 47 (1997) (holding that cost/past performance tradeoffs are permitted
when such tradeoffs are consistent with RFP); Creative Apparel Assocs., Comp. Gen. B-275139,
97-1 CPD 1 65 (1997) (denying the protest in a situation where the agency awarded the
contract to a low-price offeror despite the protester's advantage in technical/past performance
factors and explaining that the tradeoff is reasonable where agency met "the test of rationality
and consistency irith the established evaluation factors); ef Excalibur Sys., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-
272017, 96-2 CPD 1 13 (1996) (reporting that contracts can be properly awarded to lowest price
offeror for whom current past quality information was not available).
232. See Caterpillar Inc., Comp. Gen. B-280362 et aL, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. WL 694539
(1998) (approving a $7.26 million or twenty-nine percent premium); see also Nomura Enter.,
Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277768, 97-2 CPD 1 148 (1997) (asserting that past performance superiority
justified $3.47 million or sixty-two percent price premium); SWR, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-276878,
97-2 CPD 1 34 (1997) (allowing "relatively small" price premium); TMI Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen.
B-276624.2, 97-2 CPD 1 24 (1997) (allowing a $187,914 or eleven percent cost premium);
Science and Eng'g Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-276620, 97-2 CPD 1 43 (1997) (approving a
$193,138 or 2.3 percent cost premium); Rotair Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-276435.2, 97-2 CPD
1 17 (1997) (permitting a fifty dollar per unit or nineteen percent cost premium); GEC-
Marconi Elec. Sys. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-276186 el aL, 97-2 CPD 1 23 (1997) (permitting a $3.33
million or twenty-three percent cost premium); Computer Sys. Dev. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-
275356, 97-1 CPD I 91 (1997) (allowing a $1.2 million or twenty-one percent cost premium);
Creative Apparel Assocs., Comp. Gen. B-275139, 97-1 CPD 1 64 (1997) (reporting $1.5 million
or twenty percent cost premium); DIGICON Corp., Comp. Gen. B-275060 el aL, 97-1 CPD 1 64
(1997) (approving $2.6 million or nine percent cost premium); H.F. Henderson Indus., Comp.
Gen. B-275017, 97-1 CPD 1 27 (1997) (allowing $1.4 million or eighteen percent cost
premium); Dynamic Aviation-Helicopters, Comp. Gen. B-274122, 96-2 CPD 1 166 (1996)
(permitting $29,650 or six percent cost premium); Myers Investigative and Sec. Servs., Inc.,
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GAO found the selection decision to be reasonable and consistent
with the stated evaluation crite a.23
Specifically, in Brunswick Defense,24  GAO denied a protest
challenging an award which involved a cost tradeoff resulting in an
eighteen million dollar or twenty-five percent price premium 9
Brunswick objected to the award of a Navy contract to Beech Aircraft
for supersonic, high altitude expendable targets for enemy threat
simulation.236 Beech was the original supplier and had held contracts
for this item for nearly thirty years.2" The RFP involved a best value
selection scheme with three factors in descending order: price,
technical, and past performance/systemic improvement. The
Comp. Gen. B-272947.2, 96-2 CPD 1 114 (1996) (upholding $52,421 or two percent cost
premium); Macon Apparel Corp., Comp. Gen. B-272162, 96-2 CPD 1 95 (1996) (conceding
$409,548 or sixteen percent cost premium); Quality Elevator Co., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271899,
96-2 CPD 1 89 (1996) (approving $194,378 or thirty percent cost premium); Smith of Galeton
Gloves, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271686, 96-2 CPD 1 36 (1996) (permitting $73,478 or ten percent
cost premium); Omega World Travel, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271262.2, 96-2 CPD 1 44 (1996)
(approving travel rebate of five percent by protester versus only 2.01 percent by awardee which
equaled a premium of 149 percent); Systems Integration & Dev., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271050,
96-1 CPD 1 273 (1996) (conceding $66,218 or sixteen percent cost premium); Criterion Corp.,
Comp. Gen. B-266050, 96-1 CPD 1 217 (1996) (allowing $2.2 million or thirteen percent cost
premium); Federal Envtl. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-260289, 95-1 CPD 1 261 (1995) (allowing
$870,000 or fifteen percent cost premium); Executive Closers, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-259848, 95-1
CPD 1 184 (1995) (upholding fifteen million dollar or three percent cost premium for each
real estate closing); Advanced Envt. Tech. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-259252, 95-1 CPD 1 149
(1995) (conceding $110,000 or fourteen percent cost premium);John Brown U.S. Servs., Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-258158 et aL, 95-1 CPD 1 35 (1995) (permitting $276,321 or two percent cost
premium); United Int'l Eng'g, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-257607.3, 95-2 CPD 1 108 (1995)
(permitting $4.6 million or 3.3 percent cost premium on a $146 million program); Hawk Servs.,
Inc.; A-Bear's Janitorial Serv., Comp. Gen. B-257299.4 et aL, 95-2 CPD 1 91 (1995) (upholding
$7.3 million or eighteen percent cost premium); Young Enters., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-256851.2,
94-2 CPD 1 159 (1994) (allowing $249,144 or four percent cost premium); Dragon Sers., Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-255354, 94-1 CPD 1 151 (1994) (upholding $562,169 or forty-two percent cost
premium where low offeror had "moderate" risk versus "low" risk for awardee); Corvac, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-254757, 94-1 CPD 1 14 (1994) (admitting $89,690 or eight percent cost
premium); Corvac, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-254222, 93-2 CPD 1 294 (1993) (conceding $96,000 or
eight percent cost premium); Chem-Services of Indiana, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-253905, 93-2 CPD
1 262 (1993) (granting 13.4 percent cost premium); Macon Apparel Corp., Comp. Gen. B-
253008, 93-2 CPD 1 93 (1993) (upholding $559,227 or seven percent cost premium); TRI-COR
Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-252366.3, 93-2 CPD 1 137 (1993) (accepting $2.1 million or six
percent cost premium); Pannesma Co., Ltd., Comp. Gen. B-251688, 93-1 CPD 1 333 (1993)
(permitting $1.4 million or two percent cost premium); Martech USA, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-
250284.2, 93-1 CPD 1 110 (1993) (conceding $324,967 or seventeen percent cost premium);
Federal Envfl. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-250135.4, 93-1 CPD 398 (1993) (approving $630,000
or twenty percent cost premium). But see Randolph Eng. Sunglasses, Comp. Gen. B-280270, 98-
2 CPD 1 39 (1998) (GAO approval as reasonable agency determination that a forty percent
price premium did not justify award to an offeror with "excellent" past performance where the
awardee's rating was "good").
233. See infra note 253 (discussing relevant cases).
234. Comp. Gen. B-255764, 94-1 CPD 1 225 (1994).
235. See id. at 3.
236. See id. at 1.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 2.
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solicitation called for review of information in existing government
data bases, data from other contracting offices, and from on-site
surveys.2" The information bearing on past performance was used to
assess risk.24' GAO observed that there was a dramatic disparity
between the offerors' past performance/systemic improvement
evaluations. Beech, the awardee, was "highly satisfactory" with "low
performance risk," while Brunswick was "unacceptable" with a "high
performance risk. 24' Brunswick's past performance problems were
significant indeed. Of five flights under one contract, three failed
due to "low thrust" and fell to the ground.242  Of two additional
missile flights following corrective action, one failed, leaving
Brunswick with a success rate of only forty-three percent.243 The
evaluators were concerned that Brunswick had not isolated the
problem.1
The Source Selection Authority, concerned about the price
premium, deferred the selection decision and awaited more test
flights.214 Three additional launches resulted in two successes and
another failure.216 The new failure involved an "excess thrust"
problem or quick burn-out, as opposed to the low thrust problem on
the earlier tests. 247 By the end of the tests, Brunswick's success rate
was only fifty percent.24' During discussions, Brunswick did not
convince the Navy that it had identified the problem.49 By contrast,
Beech's success rate was ninety-six percent.2'0 Finding that the excess
failure rate would likely translate into a cost of thirty-three million
dollars based on 392 anticipated flights, the SSA decided to award the
contract to Beech.251
GAO had little problem upholding this award. Simply stated, GAO
found that the evaluation and resulting source selection was
239. See id.
240. See id. (noting that a performance risk assessment would help to evaluate the
effectiveness of the offeror in resolving any problems).
241. See id. at 3.
242. See id.
243. See id. (comparing to Beech's ninety-six percent flight reliability rate for missiles
launched in the past eleven quarters).
244. See id (explaining that the inability to correct the low thrust problem "evidenced 'a
lack of effective corrective action'").




249. See i. at 6 (citing the agency's concern that Brunswick had a "fix it when it breaks"
attitude instead of conducting a full investigation into the flight failures and preparing to
prevent similar future failures).
250. See id. at 7.
25 1. See id.
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reasonable and complied entirely with the stated evaluation criteria. 27
The Navy's past performance/systemic improvement evaluation
"amply supported the protester's unacceptable performance rating
and the tradeoff decision in favor of a more reliable, higher-priced
proposal."' 3
However, in a few cases, because of various defects in the
evaluation process or inadequate discussions related to past
performance, GAO sustained protests against awards made to
offerors at higher prices than the protester.24 Each of these cases is
considered in detail in Part III below.
6. Mhen is the past performance evaluation factor actually a matter of the
offeror's responsibility?
These decisions draw a seemingly clear distinction between
responsibility, on the one hand, and past performance as a non-cost
comparative evaluation factor for award, on the other. When a
comparative evaluation between offerors is performed, past
performance is a non-cost evaluation factor. By contrast, a
responsibility determination involves no comparison between
competing offerors, but only a general inquiry into whether the
offeror is reputable and is capable of performing.25
252. See id. at 9.
253. Id. at 12; see also Nomura Enters., Inc., Comp. Gen B-277768, 97-2 CPD 1 148 (1997)
(approving a sixty-two percent premium ($3.47 million) because on-time delivery quality of
missile warhead metal parts was deemed paramount to price considerations);JCI Envtl. Servs.
Comp. Gen. B-250752.3, 93-1 CPD 1 299 (1993) (denying the low-priced offeror's protest
despite its 43.6 million cost/price advantage, where the Defense Logistics Agency had agreed to
pay a 127 percent premium for hazardous waste removal even though price was more important
than technical and past performance under the evaluation scheme).
254. See Holiday Inn-Laurel-Protest and Request for Costs, Comp. Gen. B-270860.3 et al.,
96-1 CPD 259, rern, denied, 96-2 CPD 1 23 (1996) (sustaining protest due to failure to follow
evaluation criteria where award involved a $714,000/26 percent price premium); PMT Servs.,
Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270538.2, 96-2 CPD 98, recon. denied, Comp. Gen. B-270538.5 et aL, 96-2
CPD 1 194 (1996) (sustaining protest due to unreasonable evaluation where award involved $1
million/49 percent price premium); Alliant Techsystems, Inc.,; Olin Corp., Comp. Gen. B-
260215.4 et aL, 95-2 CPD 1 79 (1995) (sustaining protest due to lack of meaningful discussion;
amount of premium redacted); Ashland Sales & Serv., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-255159, 94-1 CPD
108 (1994) (sustaining protest due to unsupported proposal evaluation where award involved
a $130,490/13 percent price premium).
255. See generally 15 U.S.C. §637(b)(7)(A) (listing the elements of responsibility as
"capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, and tenacity"); 13 C.F.R.
§§ 124.313, 125.5 (explaining the Certificate of Competency ("COC") program which certifies
the named business as possessing the responsibility to perform the Government contract); FAR,
48 C.F.R. § 19.601 (a) (listing "competency, capability, credit, integrity, perseverance, tenacity
and limitations on subcontracting" as elements of responsibility); Nomura Enter., Inc., Comp.
Gen. B-277768, 97-2 CPD 1 148 (1997) (rejecting a small business concern's contention that a
comparative assessment of past performance was actually a responsibility determination that
should have been referred to the SBA); SWR, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-276878, 97-2 CPD 1 34 (1997)
(finding a small business concern to be "nonresponsible" by a procuring agency based on Sec.
8(b) (7) of the Small Business Act).
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An interesting, though unsuccessful strategy, concerning a
responsibility determination was devised by counsel in Hughes Georgia,
Inc"-' to challenge an award to a small business. Hughes lost the
contract based on a $4.4 million price difference, where the small
business awardee received a "neutral and [therefore] acceptable" past
performance rating.07 The evaluation criteria included only cost and
"past performance risk. ''25 The small business won only because the
Army's nonresponsibility determination was overturned when the
SBA issued a Certificate of Competency ("COC").u 9  Hughes
contended that what was supposed to have been a responsibility
determination for the small business had in effect been converted
into a comprehensive technical evaluation.20 Hughes argued that it
was therefore improper for the Army to refer the small business
awardee's responsibility to the SBA.
2
61
Rejecting Hughes's argument, GAO took the opportunity to
discuss the difference between a past performance risk evaluation
and a responsibility determination:
The findings of the pre-award survey that [the winning offeror's]
lacked the necessary... equipment [ ] and facilities ... or the
ability to obtain them, concern Ainslie's responsibility .... While
traditional responsibility factors may be used as technical
evaluation criteria in a negotiated procurement when the agency's
needs warrant a comparative evaluation of those areas .... here the
RFP did not include technical evaluation factors. Thus, neither the
inclusion of agency technical personnel in the conduct of the pre-
award survey nor the recommendation of "no award"... could
arguably convert this clear responsibility process into a technical
evaluation .... Since the SBA has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the responsibility of a small business, our Office
generally does not review either the contracting officer's decision
to refer a responsibility question to the SBA, or the SBA's decision
262to issue a COC ....
The reverse situation occurred in Smith of Galeton Gloves, Inc.,26' where
256. Comp. Gen. B-272526, 96-2 CPD 1 151 (1996).
257. Sev id. at 4.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 3 (reporting that the COG was based upon copies of the solicitation, drawing
packages and specifications, survey reports and findings, an abstract of the proposals, and an
opinion of Ainslie's capability).
260. See id. at 5-6 (stating that "Hughes contends that the pre-award survey team's finding
that Ainslie lacked the technical expertise and equipment... constituted a determination that
Ainslie's proposal was technically unacceptable .... Thus, in Hughes's view, referral to the SBA
was improper. This argument is without merit").
261. See id. at 1.
262. Id. at 5-6.
263. Comp. Gen. -271686, 96-2 CPD 1 36 (1996).
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a small business claimed that it could not be downgraded under the
past performance evaluation factor unless the agency referred the
matter to the SBA for a COC.2  GAO rejected the argument,
addressing the distinction between responsibility versus past
performance as a non-cost evaluation factor:
The requirement for referral does not apply here. While the past
performance criterion is a responsibility-type factor, it was not
applied on a pass/fail basis. Rather, each proposal... was
comparatively evaluated under this factor, and assigned a
comparative adjectival rating. That means that the agency did not
in essence make a responsibility determination, but simply
integrated its relative assessment of past performance into its
overall determination of which proposal was more advantageous to
the government. In such circumstances, there was no need for
referral to the SBA ... 2
Thus, information that bears on contractor responsibility may
permissibly be considered in an "integrated assessment" including
past performance as an evaluation criterion for award.
In Cessna Aircraft Co.,2 6 the Source Selection Official was found to
have properly considered and resolved issues related to the awardee's
prior plea agreement in evaluating that offeror's past performance.267
GAO did not consider the plea agreement to raise an issue of
"responsibility. ' '268 This is the only way GAO would even consider the
issue, given the fact that in most cases GAO does not entertain
protests challenging affirmative determinations of responsibility.6
Some cases involving the distinction between past performance as a
matter of responsibility as opposed to a non-cost evaluation factor are
difficult to understand. For example, in SEAIR Transportation Services,
Inc.,270 a small business set aside solicitation which did not provide for
scoring of the past performance factor, but did list past performance
as the third most important factor following the management and
271
technical criteria. The agency rated both offerors in past
264. See id. at 1.
265. Id. at 7.
266. Comp. Gen. B-261953.5, 96-1 CPD 1 132 (1996).
267. See id. (noting that the plea agreement was based on a subcontractor's payment of a
contingent fee to a foreign official under a past Foreign Military Sales contract).
268. See id.
269. See 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(c) (1997) (stating that "an affirmative determination of
responsibility will not be reviewed absent a showing of possible bad faith on the part of
government officials or that definitive responsibility criteria in the solicitation were not met").
270. Comp. Gen. B-252266, 93-1 CPD 1 458 (1993) (denying SEAIR's protest of award of a
contract to Phoenix Management for maintenance of aircraft and aircraft ground support
equipment).




performance as "satisfactory" based solely on the information in their
proposals without, however, checking references or sending
questionnaires to outside sources.272 The protester claimed that the
Army violated the solicitation by failing to evaluate past performance
at all. 73 Only after the protest was filed with the Army and the Army
forwarded the protest to the SBA did the Army make reference
inquiries concerning the awardee. 74 The protester felt that it had
been prejudiced by the government's knowledge of the awardee's
subcontractor (the incumbent) without looking into the past
performance of the protester and its subcontractor.275 On their face,
all protests appeared to be respectable contentions. However, GAO
denied the protest.276 Because the Army already had selected the
awardee before the past performance inquiries were made, GAO
concluded that "we view this as being part of the agency's
responsibility determination ....
While Pacific Utility Equipment Company, is a case involving
noncompliance with a "definitive responsibility criterion" as opposed
to a case involving past performance as a non-cost evaluation factor,
the agency's handling of experience, past performance, and
responsibility was hard to differentiate. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") employed two-step formal
advertising to purchase all-terrain tracked vehicles. At step one,
technical proposals, the NOAA rated the awardee "capable of being
made acceptable," without, however, ascertaining whether the
awardee met a solicitation requirement that it had sold four units of
the offered product during the preceding two years.279 The awardee's
past performance questionnaire listed four "manufactured track
vehicle contracts. ,2" NOAAjudged the awardee "responsible" based
on the questionnaire response. The protester claimed that the
awardee's step-one proposal was unacceptable because it had not sold
four of the offered units during the two-year period.282 GAO agreed
that the awardee was not qualified, and explained that because the
272. See id. at 3.
273. See id. at 2
274. See ad. at 4 (reporting SEAIR's complaint that Phoenix lacked the required experience
for a contract and was "overly dependent on [an] 'ostensible subcontractor' as joint venturer").
275. See id. at 4.
276. See id. at 1.
277. Id. at 7.
278. Comp. Gen. B-259942, 95-2 CPD 1 114 (1995) (sustaining protest and explaining how
the agency improperly rated awardee's proposal as technically acceptable).
279. See id. at 2.
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two-year requirement may have limited competition significantly, it
had to be regarded as a basic or essential requirement for
qualification for phase two, sealed bidding.83 The "manufactured
track vehicles" claimed by the awardee were not of the same type as
those offered. 4 Moreover, the awardee's answer to the questionnaire
showed that the customer had made the purchase outside the two-
year window permitted by the solicitation. 5 Thus, GAO held that the
awardee's offer was not acceptable because it had failed to meet the
requirement.286 The author classifies this decision as a responsibility
case and not a comparative past performance evaluation factor case.
The sole issue was whether the awardee met an objective qualification
for award on a "pass/fail" basis.
287
7. May point scoring systems be utilized in past performance evaluations?
GAO has frequently approved agency use of point scoring in past
performance evaluations when the point scoring schemes were
rational. There are numerous cases that involve point scored
288evaluations of past performance.
In GAO's view, the fact that individual evaluators produce differing
point scores in the past performance rating is not an indication of
procurement error. Reference checks necessarily involve some
degree of subjectivity.289 In addition, GAO has no difficulty denying
283. See id. at 3-4 (stating that the requirement was to "ensure the reliability of the vehicle
and the availability of the parts").
284. See id. at 4 (explaining that the language of the requirement could not be interpreted
to allow for selling of any model type within the last twenty-four months).
285. See id. at 5.
286. See id. at 6 (concluding that "there is no evidence that RV Specialties satisfied the
requirement that it have sold four of the models offered within the previous 24 months, and
thus it should not have been determined acceptable under Step One or permitted to bid on
Step Two").
287. See Smith of Galeton Gloves, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271686, 96-2 CPD 1 36 (1996)
(determining it unnecessary to use a pass/fail evaluation over a comparative past performance
evaluation).
288. See USA Elecs., Comp. Gen. B-275389, 97-1 CPD 1 75, at 2 (1997) (using Automated
Best Value Model ("ABVM") scores of 71.3 out of 100 and 100 out of 100 and awarding contract
to 100 out of 100); United Ammunition Container, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-275213, 97-1 CPD 1 58,
at 2 (1997) (denying protest and finding agency's evaluation reasonable where agency
determined that 93 out of 100 and 97.2 out of 100 scores were technically equal and awarded
contract to the lower evaluated price); HSG-Holzmann Technischer Servs. GmbH; HSG-GeBe,
Comp. Gen. B-274992.2; B-274993.2, 97-1 CPD 87, at 4 (1997) (describing past performance
of thirteen and fifteen out of fifteen points under the two RFPs); Quality Elevator Co., Comp.
Gen. B-271899, 96-2 CPD 1 89 (1996) (stating a past performance of 200 out of 1,000 total
points); Contrack Int'l, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270102, B-270102.2, 96-1 CPD 1 53 (1996)
(reporting past performance of sixty out of 108 total points); Executive Closers, Inc., Comp.
Gen. B-259848, 95-1 CPD 1 184 (1995) (describing past performance of forty out of 100
technical evaluation points).
289. See Continental Serv. Co., Comp. Gen. B-274531, 97-1 CPD 1 9, at 3 (1996) (explaining
that evaluating past performance is the primary responsibility of the contracting agency); see
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protests where an agency takes the offeror's past performance and
complexity of the past effort into consideration when adjusting
tentative point scores.20
Thus, in one disturbing case, Moore Medical Corp.,29' GAO upheld a
seemingly arbitrary point scoring method. The Department of
Veterans Affairs ("DVA") adjusted the points assigned to the
protester, which had received the highest technical and price scores,
based on the lowest price, by a "level of confidence assessment rating"
("LOCAR") factor. 2 The protester's LOCAR, which reflected the
contracting officer's subjective level of confidence in the offeror's
ability to perform as promised, was only 0.50 because the contracting
officer felt the offeror had significantly underbid the contract and
had only half a chance of fulfilling the promises made in the
proposal .' Because this method cut the protester's points in half, 4
GAO upheld this decision. GAO found that it was not unreasonable
for the contracting officer to conclude that most of the protester's
experience was not relevant and had been gained as a
subcontractori2'
There is, however, one reported case, American Development Corp.,29
in which GAO felt the point scoring system was used unreasonably.
The procuring agency had adjusted the raw point scores by a
"relevance" of past performance factor.2 7 The more "relevant" the
past performance on a prior contract, the greater the impact of that
contract on the final evaluation.298  In substance, however, the
agency's approach improperly rewarded an offeror for a "relevant"
contract in which its performance had been poor, but failed to
reward other offerors for good or even excellent past performance in
less relevant contracts.2 '
also HLC Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274374, 96-2 CPD 1 214 (1996) (denying protest because
Agency acted reasonably in determining that ten point difference attributable to past
performance ratings was decisive).
290. See Hughes Missile Sys. Co., Comp. Gen. B-272418 et aL 96-2 CPD 1 221 (1996)
(denying protest against evaluation of past performance where consideration of agency was
reasonable).
291. Comp. Gen. B-261758, 95-2 CPD 1 204 (1995).
292. See id. at 2 (explaining that rating reflects government's confidence in offeror's
promises).
293. See i at 4.
294, See id.
295. See id. at 7. This was one of the truly remarkable decisions reviewed in the course of
developing this Article.
296. Comp. Gen. B-251876.4, 93-2 CPD 1 49 (1993).
297. See id. at 6.
298. See id. at 7 (explaining how relevance was calculated).
299. See id. at 10.
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8. How thoroughly must the evaluators check the offeror's references?
As discussed, OFPP's Best Practices Guidebook states in Chapter
Three that because offerors have already had the opportunity to
rebut information in agency past performance files and databases, it
is rarely necessary for the agency to inquire further about such
information sources.3s°  What about references supplied by the
offeror in the proposal? Is it necessary for the evaluation team to
check each such reference, and if so, to what extent?
GAO has made it clear that the agency has no obligation to check
all references provided by an offeror. Thus, in HLC Industries, Inc.,""
GAO denied the protest despite the fact that the Bureau of Prisons
checked only one of the protester's references. GAO postulated:
"There is no requirement that all references listed in a proposal be
checked.
3 °0 2
A more remarkable case is Advanced Data Concepts, Inc.3°1 GAO
denied the protest even though none of the offeror's references
returned the past performance questionnaire to the agency."" The
contractor's argument-that the DOE violated the letter and spirit of-05
FAR Part 42.15 by failing to require the references to respond"" -has
a certain force. GAO held that there was no demonstrated prejudice
because the agency assigned a "neutral" rating and translated it into
an "eight" on a ten-point scale.306
300. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
301. Comp. Gen. B-274374,96-2 CPD 1 214 (1997).
302. Id. at 7; see also Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., Comp. Gen. B-279492-.2, 98-1
CPD 1 173 (1998) (stating there is no legal requirement that all references listed in a proposal
be checked); Braswell Services Group, Inc., Comp. Gen. 3-278921.2, 98-2 CPD 1 10 (1998)
(same);Jason Assoc. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-278689 et aL, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 61 (1998)
(denying a protest based on failure to check all references listed and stating no legal
requirement to do so); U.S. Tech. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-278584, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS
66 (1998) (stating no requirement to contact all past performance references for a valid review
of past performance to stand); ValueCAD, Comp. Gen. B-272936, 96-2 CPD 1 176 (1996)
(asserting no requirement for an agency to check all listed references in a proposal, especially
where the written proposal did not meet stated technical requirements); Quality Elevator Co.,
Comp. Gen. B-271899, 96-2 CPD 89 (1996) (denying protest partly because the agency
checked only one reference for each offeror); Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-
259252, 95-1 CPD 1 149 (1995) (denying a protest where one reference of three was contacted
to evaluate past performance because agency had no requirement to contact all references and
proposal did not meet technical requirements); SDA Inc., Comp. Gen. B-256075, B-256206, 94-
2 CPD 1 71, at 7 n.8 (1994) (denying protest because agency had no requirement to investigate
independently the accuracy of information obtained from references); Dragon Servs., Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-255354, 94-1 CPD 1 151 (1994) (stating no requirement to obtain information
regarding performance of earlier contracts in addition to most recent contract); Questech, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-236028, 89-2 CPD 407 (1989) (asserting no legal requirement that all
references listed in proposal be checked).
303. Comp. Gen. B-277801.4,98-1 CPD 1 145 (1998).
304. See id. at 7.
305. See id. at 9.
306. See id.at 10.
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Moreover, references in a new proposal need not be rechecked
where the agency inquired about the same reference in connection
3017with an earlier competition. Further, to the extent that the agency
has prior experience of its own with the offeror, the agency can be its
own reference." The burden rests on the offeror to ensure that the
references it supplies in connection with a competitive procurement
actually do respond to the procuring agency's reference inquiries.'
9. May reference questionnaires be utilized?
GAO does not object to the use of past performance questionnaires
by agencies in conducting source selections. ° For example, in
Continental Services Company," the Defense Fuel Supply Center used a
twenty-question survey, of which twelve questions pertained to the
offeror's contract compliance, responsiveness, ability, willingness,
training, technical expertise, safety, pollution prevention, equipment,
312cooperation, and overall performance.: Scores of one for
unsatisfactory, two for satisfactory, or three for good, were to be
assigned. ' The remaining eight questions, to be answered yes or no,
sought information concerning statutory violations, corrective action
requests, cure notices, failure to correct deficiencies, default
terminations, requests for equitable adjustment, financial problems,
and whether the reference would award the offeror another
-14contract." Offerors were given the opportunity to respond to
307. See Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-256346, 94-1 CPD 365 (1994) (denying
protest because review was reasonable and consistent with past performance evaluation scheme
set forth in solicitation).
308. SeeOmega World Travel, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271262.2, 96-2 CPD 144 (1996) (denying
protest and explaining that evaluator's personal knowledge may be considered in evaluating
past performance); see also Advanced Data Concepts, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-258322.5 et al., 96-1
CPD 1 8, at 7 (1995) (confirming that personal knowledge may be considered in evaluation).
309. See Consolidated Eng'g Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277273, 97-2 CPD 1 86, at 2 (1997)
(rejecting the contention that the agency "should have made a better effort to contact the
references [the offeror] provided in its proposal .... It was the protester's responsibility-not
the agency's-to obtain and provide accurate information regarding its prior contracts"); see
also PCT Services, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-279168, 98-1 CPD 1 152 (1998) (indicating that the
agency did not act improperly where a contractor reference simply did not respond to a past
performance questionnaire).
310. SeeSWR, Inc., Comp. Gen. 13-276878, 97-2 CPD 1 34 (1997) (supporting the use of past
performance questionnaires); Orlando Business Telephone Sys., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-275053.5 et
at. 97-1 CPD 1 217 (1997); Computer Sys. Dev. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-275356, 97-1 CPD 1 91
(1997); Northport Handling, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274615, 97-1 CPD 1 3 (1996); Continental
Serv. Co., Comp. Gen. B-274531, 97-1 CPD 1 9 (1996); Caltech Serv. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-
261044.4, 95-2 CPD 1 285 (1995); Aqua-Chem, Inc.; Gizmo, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-249516.2 et aL,
93-1 CPD 1 389 (1993); CTA Inc., Comp. Gen. B-253654, 93-2 CPD 1 218 (1993).
311. Comp. Gen. B-274531, 97-1 CPD 1 9 (1996).
312. See id. at 2; se, also SEAIR Transp. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274436, 96-2 CPD 1 224
(1996) (upholding the use of the twenty-question survey and denying the protest).
313. See id.
314. See id.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1539
information developed during the survey process.31' Largely because
of the contracting officer's independent validation of several survey
ratings, GAO. found the past performance ratings assigned to be
reasonable.3 6
10. What do the cases say about evaluating firms with no relevant corporate
past performance?
Under OFPP Policy Letter 92-5, 3' 7 FASA,3 8 and the FAR," offerors
having no relevant past performance are to be rated neutrally--- in a
manner that neither helps nor hurts the offeror's chances of
receiving award. The issue is the inherent fairness of this rule. An
inexperienced firm could receive a higher "neutral" rating than a
firm with significant experience and success, but with a problem
arising from such matters as having submitted claims to the
government or having received a disputed cure notice for alleged
nonperformance.
GAO has not expressed any basic problem with assigning neutral
ratings to new firms. In Hughes Georgia, Inc.,32° one offeror had no
relevant contracts and was given a "neutral and acceptable" rating. 2'
GAO found it reasonable to assign this rating because the offeror had
no past contracts for the "same or similar hardware. " 1, In Excalibur
Systems, Inc.3 2 3 GAO also stated that it did not believe that the use of
"neutral" evaluations precluded past-performance/price trade-offs,
particularly where a high past performance firm was selected rather
than a "neutral" firm. 4
The GAO found that the requirement to assign "neutral"
evaluations was not appropriate, however, where ajoint venture as an
entity has no past performance, but the venturers individually do
have records of past performance. GAO held in Ralph G. Moore &A •.325
Associates, that under such circumstances, it is proper to rate the
315. See id. at 3.
316. See id. at 7 (stating that "[w]e see nothing objectionable here; each procurement is a
separate transaction and the prior past performance evaluation data need not govern the
current evaluation process where the current evaluation information was obtained from a
reasonable and appropriate source").
317. See supra Part IA (discussing OFPP past performance initiatives).
318. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994).
319. See supra Part I.C (discussing FAR coverage of past performance information).
320. Comp. Gen. B-272526, 96-2 CPD 1 151 (1996) (denying the protest and allowing
evaluation based only on price and past performance).
321. See id. (explaining that a rating of "unknown risk" would be considered "neutral and
acceptable").
322. See id. at 4.
323. Comp. Gen. B-272017, 96-2 CPD 1 13 (1996).
324. See id. at 3.
325. Comp. Gen. B-270686 el al., 96-1 CPD 1 118 (1996).
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joint venture based on the constituent companiesY.2 " Likewise, where
key personnel of the offeror have previously worked on relevant
contracts, past performance may be rated based on that experience
and a neutral rating need not be assigned. 7
In a few cases, resourceful protesters have attempted to argue that
they in fact have no truly "relevant" past performance or experience,
and accordingly, were entitled to a neutral rating rather than one less
favorable. In Creative Apparel Associates,128 the protester unsuccessfully
argued that it should have been assigned a neutral past performance
rating because it previously had never manufactured any end item for
a U.S. Government agency or a commercial customer.32' GAO found
that the protester had been performing another firm's contracts
pending approval of a novation agreement and therefore it did, in
fact, have relevant past contracts.3 Also, in Executive Court Reporters,
Inc.,13 GAO rejected this same argument when it found that the
protester had fifteen years of experience in "electronic court
reporting," despite its contention that it had not previously handled
reporting for the federal and state courts, including the Tax Court,
the awarding entity.
32
33In one troublesome case, Moore Medical Corp. , the agency
dramatically downgraded an offeror lacking past performance
instead of rating the offeror "neutral." The case involved a contract
award from DVA for medical and surgical supplies.334 Because the
offeror lacked relevant experience in medical and surgical supplies,
having supplied only pharmaceuticals, and because the agency felt
that the offered prices were too low, the contracting officer applied a
LOCAR factor of 0.50 to the party with the otherwise highest point
score among offerors"3 This adjustment was critical in eliminating
the protester from the competition. GAO improperly approved this
evaluation in the face of former FAR § 15.608(a) (2) (iii), which as
326. See id. at 4.
327. See Consultants on Family Addiction, Comp. Gen. B-274924.2, 97-1 CPD [ 80 (1997)
(denying protest because Agency's evaluation of awardee's technical proposal was superior to
protestor's based in part on staff capabilities is reasonable). But see Hawk Servs., Inc.; A-Bear's
Janitorial Serv., Comp. Gen. B-257299.4, B-257299.5, 95-2 CPD 1 91, at 4 (1995) (concluding
that the protester was not entitled to past performance rating based on its managers'
experience/past performance where solicitation "provided only for the evaluation of the
offeror's past performance").
328. Comp. Gen. B-275139, 97-1 CPD 1 65 (1997).
329. See zd. at 4.
330. See id.
331. Comp. Gen. B-272981 el aL, 96-2 CPD 1 227 (1996).
332. See id. at 5-6.
333. Comp. Gen. B-261758, 95-2 CPD 1 204 (1995).
334. See id. at 1.
335. See id. at 4.
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noted required a "neutral" rating for firms lacking relevant past
performance." 6 Because the decision did not discuss the "neutral"
issue at all, it is assumed that the protester did not think of the
argument and that it did not otherwise occur to GAO.
3 7
11. Should the agency consider past performance information concerning the
offeror's parent company, affiliate, or predecessor company?
Where the past performance of a predecessor firm is relevant to
the RFP requirements, the agency not only may, but must consider
such a factor in assigning a past performance rating.33 No problems
with agencies considering past performance information concerning
predecessor companies have arisen through case precedent.
39
Questions are sometimes raised, however, about the propriety of
awarding evaluation credit for the past performance of the offeror's
parent company or affiliated companies, or conversely, for attributing
an affiliate's poor past performance to the offeror in a new
competition. GAO addressed this issue in ST Aerospace Engines Pte.,
Ltd.40  In that case, the Coast Guard downgraded the protester's
proposal for a contract for engine reduction gearboxes based upon
an affiliated company's late deliveries of overhauled propellers under
another contract.3" GAO sustained the protest and in explaining the
reasoning behind its decision, it stated:
In determining whether one company's performance should be
attributed to another, the agency must consider not simply whether
the two companies are affiliated, but the nature and the extent of
the relationship between the two-in particular, whether the
workforce, management, facilities, or other resources of one may
affect contract performance by the other. In this regard, while it
would be appropriate to consider an affiliate's performance record
336. SeeFAR, 48 C.F.R. § 15.608(a) (2) (iii) (1997).
337. See, e.g., California Resources, Comp. Gen. B-280176, 98-2 CPD 1 61, 1998 U.S. Comp.
Gen. LEXIS 298 (1998) (stating, inexplicably, that the agency's evaluations reasonably
determined that an offeror's quote was unacceptable due to the offeror's failure to furnish
references establishing relevant experience).
338. Seeid. § 15.305(a)(2)(iii).
339. See generallyYKK (U.S.A.), Inc., Comp. Gen. B-280447, 98-2 CPD 1 68, 1998 U.S. Comp.
Gen. LEXIS 292 (1998) (holding that an agency may properly consider the experience of a
predecessor firm); Creative Apparel Assocs., Comp. Gen. B-275139, 97-1 CPD 1 65 (1997)
(involving a bankrupt predecessor whose assets were acquired by the offeror); Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (GS), Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271903, 96-2 CPD 1 75 (1996) (considering experience with
controlling other owned facilities in past performance evaluation). In particular, crediting a
successor firm with a past performance rating based on a predecessor's performance has been
found to be appropriate where the predecessor's personnel and assets have been acquired by
the successor firm submitting an offer under the instant procurement. See Oklahoma County
Newspapers, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270849, B-270849.2, 96-1 CPD 1 213 (1996).
340. Comp. Gen. B-275725, 97-1 CPD 1 161 (1997).
341. See id. at 2.
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where it will be involved in the contract effort... [citations
omitted], it would be inappropriate to consider the affiliate's
record where that record does not bear on the likelihood of
successful performance by the offeror [citations omitted] .
GAO did not object to the FAA awarding positive evaluation credit
to an offeror for an affiliate's past performance in Fluor Daniel, Inc.
3 43
Raytheon Support Services Company received a "low" risk assessment
rating based, in substantial part, on the successful past performance
of its parent company, Raytheon Service Company.4 4  The two
corporations shared the same top management and many support
functions, and the record showed that the affiliate would provide
"management effort" on an "interdivisional basis. 345 GAO stated that
crediting the affiliate's past performance on this basis was not
objectionable where the RFP did not expressly state that the past
performance of affiliates would not be considered.34" According to
GAO, "[w]here the experience of an affiliated corporation is clearly
related to an offeror's proposed contract performance, it may be
reasonable for an agency to give credit for the affiliate's related
experience. '47
Similarly, in Wackenhut International, Inc., and Wackenhut de
Guatemala, S.A. v. United States,34 s the Court of Federal Claims held
that the Department of State did not abuse its discretion in
considering past performance information for a parent company
where the actual in-country security guard services would be
performed at a U.S. Embassy by a newly-organized Guatemalan
subsidiary34'
While an agency apparently may consider an affiliate's past
performance, it is not required to do so. Where the agency declines
to evaluate the affiliate's past performance for all offerors, GAO does
not seem prepared to sustain a protest even where a protester turns
up derogatory information concerning an awardee's affiliate. Thus,
342. Id.
343. Comp. Gen. B-262051 et aL, 95-2 CPD 1 241 (1995).
344. See id. at 4.
345. See id. at 12.
346. See id.
347. Id. at 12; cf Macon Apparel Corp., Comp. Gen. B-253008, 93-2 CPD 1 93 (1993)
(reporting that it is proper to rate an offeror "extremely marginal" in past performance based
on the poor performance of affiliated companies where the key management position in the
offeror's proposal was to be staffed by the same individual who had been in charge of the
affiliates' past contracts).
348. 40 Fed. Cl. 93 (1998).
349. See zd. at 78,666 ("Thus, DOS did not act improperly [by] ... not barring Intercon's
arrangement to use its newly created Guatemalan subsidiary as a branch office to assist in
contract performance.").
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in Federal Environmental Services, Inc.,Y GAO stated that the agency
"has discretion to determine the scope of the offerors' performance
histories to be considered"3' and that it was "reasonable for the
agency to have limited the scope of its review of offerors' past
performance to that of the entities submitting proposals. ' ' 2
12. Should the agency consider past performance information concerning
proposed subcontractors?
A subcontractor's past performance information can be highly
relevant to the evaluation and, according to the FAR, should be taken
into account in the evaluation where the subcontractor "will perform
major or critical aspects of the requirement" and "when such0 ,53
information is relevant to the instant acquisition. As stated in GZA
Remediation, Inc.,354 "[a] proposed subcontractor's prior contracts
properly may be considered under relevant evaluation factors where
the RFP allows for the use of subcontractors to perform the contract
and does not prohibit the consideration of a subcontractor's
contracting history in the evaluation of proposals."355  As a result,
GAO denied the protest contention that the agency erred in
considering subcontractor past performance data.56
350. Comp. Gen. B-250135.4, 93-1 CPD 398 (1993).
351. Id. at 12.
352. Id.; see also Pannesma Co., Comp. Gen. B-251688, 93-1 CPD 1 333 (1993) (holding that
a parent company's marginal performance under the incumbent contract justified a "moderate
risk" to "high risk" rating for the subsidiary).
353. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 15.305(a) (2) (iii) (1997).
354. Comp. Gen. B-272386, 96-2 CPD 1 155 (1996).
355. Id. at 3; see also SEAIR Transp. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-252266, 93-1 CPD 458
(1993).
356. See GZA Remediation, Inc., 96-2 CPD 1 155 at 3; see also Wackenhut Services, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-276012.2, 98-2 CPD 1 75, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 313 (1998) (indicating it
is proper to consider a proposed subcontractor/term member's past performance where the
firm will be involved in the contract effort); Magnum Products, Inc., Amida Industries, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-277917 et at, 97-2 CPD 1 160 (1997) (stating that "as a general rle, the
experience of a technically qualified subcontractor may be used to satisfy experience
requirements for a prospective prime contractor"); PW Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272248 el
at, 96-2 CPD 1 130 (1996) (involving an agency's consideration of the good "track record" in
past performance of the awardee and its proposed subcontract team); Olin Corp., Comp. Gen.
B-260215.4 et at, 95-2 CPD 1 79 (1995) (describing an agency that made extensive use of
subcontractor past performance information in choosing the awardee); Calspan Corp., Comp.
Gen. B-258441, 95-1 CPD 1 28 (1995) (indicating that a request for proposals issued by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration for a contract award included "relevant
experience and past performance" as one of four evaluation factors, and that the source
selection official's evaluation of that fact was correct); SRS Techs., Comp. Gen. B-258170.3, 95-1
CPD 1 95 (1995) (confirming that NASA officials did not act improperly by providing source
selection officials with data regarding contact applicant's relevant experience and past
performance in successive presentations in order to discover weaknesses); Cleveland
Telecomm. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-257294, 94-2 CPD 1 105 (1994) (explaining that an agency
may consider an offeror's subcontractor's abilities in its evaluation); Alliant Techsystems, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-260215, 95-2 CPD 1 79 (1995) (recognizing that past performance of offeror for
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However, where the agency has good reasons for requiring the
prime contract offeror itself to have the relevant experience or past
performance, it may decline to consider subcontractors. Thus, in
Decision System Technologies, Inc.; NCI Information Systems, Inc. , GAO
denied a protest objecting to the Air Force's exclusion of
subcontractors in its past performance risk evaluation:
[W] here an agency has legitimate reasons for concluding that the
successful offeror itself must possess the relevant experience in
order to ensure successful performance of the contract it may,
consistent with the RFP, consider only the offeror's experience in
the evaluation of .proposals, and not that of its proposed
subcontractors ....
GAO found it reasonable to consider only the prime contractor's
past performance and experience under the program management
subfactor because the small business offeror would remain
responsible for performance of the prime contract."'
Further, based upon GAO's decisions in Federal Environmental
Services, Inc.3'(' and Kings Point Industries, Inc., ,1 it is not necessarily
improper to downgrade an offeror's past performance where the
offeror was not itself at fault, but as the prime contractor, it was
responsible for all aspects of performance, including a deficient
subcontractor 2
While the performance of subcontractors may ordinarily be
an Army contract was a relevant evaluation subfactor, and that offerors could reasonably expect
to be apprised of past performance deficiencies, particularly where offerors had consented to
allow the agency to discuss such evaluations with the offeror).
357. Comp. Gen. B-257186 et aL, 94-2 CPD 1 167 (1994).
358. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
359. See id.
360. Comp. Gen. B-260289, 95-1 CPD 1 261 (1995) (denying protests of a contract awarded
for disposal and removal of hazardous waste, and indicating that protests were based on
improper past performance evaluations).
361. Comp. Gen. B-249616, 92-2 CPD 1 395 (1992) (denying protest of award of contract
for 42,000 flyer's aramid drawers, and stating that the challenger argued that the awarding
agency improperly evaluated its past performance).
362. See Federal Envtl. Servs., 95-1 CPD 1 261, at 5 (1995) (holding that "[a] prime
contractor is responsible for the performance of its subcontractors" and finding that the
subcontractor's misconduct was so serious that the agency had a reasonable basis to conclude
that the prime contractor had not properly supervised its subcontractor); Kings Point Indus.
Inc. 92-2 CPD 1 395, at 4 ("[A] prime contractor generally is responsible for all of the work
performed under its contracts with the government, including that of suppliers."). In United
Intemational Engineering, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-257607.3, 95-2 CPD 1 108 (1995), GAO found that
the Army acted reasonably in rating a disadvantaged small business firm as "high performance
risk" for battlefield automated systems support. See id. at 4. While the offeror's proposed
subcontractors had all been rated satisfactory, the offeror proposed to subcontract only thirty-
seven percent of this effort. See id. at 7. The rating was found reasonable because, among other
reasons, on a prior contract the offeror had "demonstrated an inability to plan, develop, and
implement procedures which result in the delivery of high quality products and services on
schedule and within budget." Id. at 5 (citing report of prior contracting officer).
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considered, in Morrison Knudsen Corp.,f"; it was held to be
unreasonable to credit an awardee for "superior subcontractor
approach" and past performance where the awardee did not commit
to use the subcontractors named in the proposal. " Rather, the
offeror indicated that subcontractor selection would be completed
after award.365
On the other hand, without fully explaining the rationale, GAO
found to the contrary in Caltech Service Corp.366 The GAO held that the
Air Force did not act unreasonably in refusing to grant the protester
a favorable past performance rating under a "security subfactor"
when the offeror planned to subcontract certain areas of work to the
incumbent contractor.67 While the offeror did plan to subcontract
with the incumbent, the proposed subcontract would not include the
security area .38 However, the offeror did plan to hire the former
subcontractor's employees and integrate them into its work force-A""
Based on these fact, the GAO found that a neutral rating under this
subfactor was proper.70
13. To what extent may the agency rely on past performance information
provided by other agencies and non-U.S. Government sources?
OFPP Policy Letter 92-5371 expresses every intention that agencies
consider all types of past performance information from other
agencies and from commercial customers. 2 Precedent supports this
intention.3
363. Comp. Gen. B-270703, 96-2 CPD 1 86 (1996).
364. See id. at 4.
365. See id.
366. Comp. Gen. B-261044.4, 95-2 CPD 285 (1995) (discussing a case involving a
disadvantaged small business which was set-aside).
367. See id. at 7 (explaining that the subcontractor was only hired for fire protection/crash
rescue, not for other areas of the security subfactor).
368. See id.
369. See id.
370. See id. ("[T]he agency reasonably determined that Caltech's proposal should not
receive an enhanced or low performance risk rating for other areas."). Oceanometncs, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-278647.2, 98-1 CPD 1 159 (1998), is consistent with Caltech Services Corp. While
the subcontractor was highly rated, it would have performed only 25 percent of the contract
work. GAO stated that while the agency may consider the past performance of a subcontractor,
"the key consideration is whether the experience is reasonably predictive of the offeror's
performance." Id. at 5; see also Xeno Technix, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-278738, 98-1 CPD 110
(1998) (explaining the propriety of Navy determination not to credit a prime contractor for
past performance of a proposed subcontractor where the subcontractor would perform less
than one percent of the work).
371. 58 Fed. Reg. 3573 (1993).
372. See id. at 3576 ("Data on a contractor's performance may be obtained from a variety of
sources .... Information on contracts outside the agency may be obtained from.., other
contracting activities including private firms.").
373. There are several cases in which agencies properly relied on past performance
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In Centre Manufacturing Co.,374 GAO rejected the protester's
contention that the agency was precluded from considering
commercial past performance information where the awardee had
previously manufactured clothing items for the private market. GAO
stated:
The RFP focused on evaluating an offeror's past performance not
only for evidence of producing an item in conformance with
government specifications but more generally for evidence of the
offeror's overall reliability and capability. Thus, while.., the RFP
referred to "the offeror's record of conforming to [g]overnment
specification requirements" as one element of past performance,
the solicitation also defined past performance to include the
offeror's adherence to contract schedules; its reputation for
"reasonable and cooperative behavior and commitment to
customer satisfaction"; and the offeror's concern for its customer's
interests. These factors all are elements of a contractor's
performance regardless of whether a commercial or a government
contract is involved .... 375
14. What limitations, if any, apply to the agency's use of contractor
performance information databases?
GAO has not expressed any reservations concerning agencies
relying on information derived from contractor performance
databases. Significant reliance by agencies on past performance
information found in databases has been an issue in numerous
protests. '
information based on contracts or subcontracts with other U.S. Government agencies. See HLC
Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. 1B-274374, 96-2 CPD 1 214, at 3 (1997) (reporting reliance by Bureau
of Prisons upon Postal Service information); Hughes Missile Sys. Co., Comp. Gen. B-272418 et
al, 96-2 CPD 1 221, at 6-8 (1996) (describing reliance by Air Force upon Navy information);
Quality Elevator Co., Comp. Gen. B-271899, 96-2 CPD 1 89, at 19-21 (1996) (noting a reliance
by the Commerce Department on State Department information); Cessna Aircraft Co., Comp.
Gen. B-261953.5, 96-1 CPD 1 132 (1996) (upholding reliance by Air Force on Navy
information). There are also instances in which agencies relied upon reference or past
performance information supplied by non-U.S. Government customers. See American
Combustion Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-275057.2, 97-1 CPD 1 105, at 10-11 (1997) (expressing
no concern with the consolidation of information obtained fromJames Madison University, but
sustaining a protest based on the agency's failure to provide offeror an opportunity to rebut this
unfavorable reference); GZA Remediation, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272386, 96-2 CPD 1 155, at 3-4
(1996) (relying upon information from an unidentified commercial customer); Contrack Int'l
Inc., Comp. Gen. B-270102 et aL, 96-1 CPD 1 53, at 4-5 (1996) (relying upon past performance
information from Government of Qatar); US Defense Sys., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-260702 et at, 95-
2 CPD 1 22, at 4-6 (1995) (using information from private-sector security guard service clients
including hospitals, convention center, and airports); Ashland Sales & Serv., Inc., Comp. Gen.
B-255159, 94-1 CPD 1 108, at 4 (1994) (upholding reliance upon unidentified commercial
customers).
374. Comp. Gen. B-251665, 93-1 CPD 1 340 (1993).
375. Id. at 4.
376. See Rotair Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-276435.2, 97-2 CPD 117, at 2 (1997) (supporting
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15. What do the cases have to say concerning negotiations addressing the
offeror's past performance information ?
Not surprisingly, in numerous cases, protesters have contended
that the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions concerning
adverse information developed in reference checks or in past
performance files and databases. 77 As noted in American Combustion
Industries, Inc.,78 nothing in the regulations or past performance
decisions changes the basic principle that if the agency has invoked
FAR § 15.306(a)(3), and notified offerors that a contract may be
awarded based on the initial proposals without negotiations, then• 379
negotiations are not required.
The most debatable theme found in the negotiations cases is the
notion that some aspects of past performance are purely historical in
nature, and that agencies need not pursue discussions in such cases
because historical facts simply do not change. Closely allied with this
principle is the idea that once the offeror has had an opportunity to
rebut unfavorable past performance information pursuant to the
routine procedures in FAR Subpart 42.15, no new opportunity to
discuss the information is required as a part of the discussions process
during a competitive procurement. These principles have created
the use of Defense Logistics Agency "Automated Best Value Model" database); Best Foam
Fabricators, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-275436, 97-1 CPD 1 78, at 1 (1997) (allowing reliance upon Air
Force "Blue Ribbon Program" for negotiated spare parts acquisition); USA Elects., Comp. Gen.
B-275389, 97-1 CPD 1 75, at 1 (1997) (permitting the use of Defense Supply Center "Automated
Best Value Model" score calculated monthly for each contractor); H.F. Henderson Indus.,
Comp. Gen. B-275017, 97-1 CPD 1 27, at 2 (1997) (conceding Air Force reliance on
"Mechanization of Contract Administration System"); Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 96-2 CPD, at 5
(accepting reliance on the Air Force's "Contractor Performance Assessment Reports" database);
PW Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-272248 el aL, 96-2 CPD 1 130, at 5-6 (1996) (supporting
reliance on the unidentified Navy performance database); Rockwell Int'l Corp., Comp. Gen. B-
261953.2 et aL, 96-1 CPD 34, at 11 (1995) (upholding reliance on the Air Force's "Contractor
Performance Assessment Reports" database); Hi-Shear Tech. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-258814.2,
95-1 CPD 1 250, at 2 (1995) (accepting reliance on the Air Force's "Blue Ribbon Program");
John Brown U.S. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-258158 et al., 95-1 CPD 1 35, at 7 n.5 (1994)
(permitting reliance upon the unidentified Navy "computerized database containing past
performance information"); Brunswick Defense, Comp. Gen. B-255764, 94-1 CPD 1 225, at 2
(1994) (describing reference to "existing government data bases" in instructions to offerors);
Lockheed Aircraft Serv. Co., Comp. Gen. B-255305 et aL, 94-1 CPD 1 205, at 10 (1994)
(reporting reliance on Defense Logistics Agency "MOCAS" database).
377. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the few cases in which GAO has agreed with protest
contentions regarding discussions).
378. Comp. Gen. B-275057.2, 97-1 CPD 1 105 (1997).
379. See id. at 10 n.5. In addition, procuring agencies are not required to conduct
discussions regarding an offeror's past performance in source selections utilizing "simplified
acquisition procedures." SeeM3 Corp., Comp. Gen. B-278906, 98-1 CPD 1 95, 1998 U.S. Comp.
Gen. LEXIS 151 (Apr. 1, 1998) (stating that an agency is not required to engage in discussions
regarding a protestor's negative past performance references under simplified acquisition
procedures); cf FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 13.106-2(b)(1) (1997) (stating that conduct of discussions is
not required in purchases exceeding the micro-purchase threshold).
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much protest disputation in GAO and in at least one reported court
decision."
At first, GAO routinely held that discussions regarding adverse
information of offerors were not required as to matters which were
"historical" in nature and allegedly could not be changed as a result
of discussions. "" However, in American Combustion Industries, Inc.,
GAO subsequently found that this line of decisions had been
effectively overruled by former FAR § 15.610(c) (6). 82 This former
FAR section provided that offerors generally must be given a
reasonable opportunity to discuss "past performance information
from references on which the offeror had not had a previous
opportunity to comment.
'' 3
However, a decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims calls
GAO's interpretation of former FAR § 15.610(c) (6) into question. In
Cincom Systems, Inc. v. United States,384 the Court stated that former FAR
§ 15.610(c) (6) "cannot be interpreted to apply to a reference that
plaintiff itself has provided."3 5  The Court opined that the
opportunity to comment on past performance information
referenced in FAR § 15.610(c)(6) is available only where the
government, pursuant to former FAR § 15.608(2)(ii), has
independently discovered unfavorable past performance information
concerning the offeror.1 6 Further, the current FAR, in
§ 15.306(d) (3), affords offerors in the competitive range an express
opportunity to rebut past performance problems that agencies have
turned up in their evaluations only where the weakness, deficiency, or
380. Cincom Sys., Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 663 (1997).
381. SeeMoore Med. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-261758, 95-2 CPD 1 204, at 7 (1995) ("The prior
experience of an offeror is an aspect of its proposal that is generally not subject to
improvement .... [Clonsequently, agencies are not always obligated to discuss weaknesses
identified in prior experience."). Similarly, in Appalachian Council, Inc., GAO held that where
offerors knew that references might be checked, the protester was not entitled to discussions
addressing references that provided unfavorable comments. See Appalachian Council, Inc.,
Comp. Gen B-256179, 94-1 CPD 1 319, at 12 (1994). GAO stated that information from
references is "essentially historical in nature" and the protester is "generally unlikely to be able
to make a significant contribution to its interpretation." Id.; see also SDA, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-
256075 et aL, 94-2 CPD 1 71, at 7 n.9 (1994) (reiterating the prior holding that an agency may
contact references and consider their replies without permitting the offerors to rebut the
information and without further investigation into the accuracy of the information); Dragon
Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-255354, 94-1 CPD 1 151, at 7 (1994) ("An agency's evaluation of past
performance may be based upon the procuring agency's reasonable perception of inadequate
prior performance, even where the contractor disputes the agency's interpretation of the
facts.").
382. See Ameican Combustion, 97-1 CPD 1 105, at 11.
383. 48 C.F.R. § 15.610(c) (6) (1996), revised by 62 Fed. Reg. 51,224 (1997) (effective Oct.
10, 1997).
384. 37 Fed. Cl. 663 (1997).
385. Id. at 676 n.39.
386. See id.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1539
other perceived problem with the proposal "could, in the opinion of
the contracting officer, be altered or explained to enhance materially
the proposal's potential for award.,
38 7
Another concern is whether the contracting officer has discretion
to determine whether a perceived past performance problem could
be changed or adequately explained by an offeror without first
actually hearing the offeror's explanation? For example, where the
purported past performance problem is based on erroneous data
pertaining to another company with a similar name, or to a remote
affiliate, can the offeror be penalized by a poor past performance
rating it has had no opportunity to see, much less confront? Answers
to such questions will have to await consideration in further GAO and
Court decisions. 388
Discussions are not required in all situations. While an agency is
required to conduct meaningful discussions concerning "weaknesses
[in past performance] that, unless corrected would prevent an
offeror from having a reasonable chance for award, ''38 9 under the
rationale of Quality Elevator Company, discussions are not required
where, despite arguably unfavorable past performance information,
the offeror is still rated "very good" in that area." Similarly, in Caltech
Services Corp.,39' GAO stated, "[w]here, as here, a proposal is
considered to be acceptable [under the past performance factor] and
in the competitive range, the agency is not obligated to discuss every
aspect of the proposal that receives less than the maximum possible
rating."392  Further, in conducting discussions relative to past
performance, an agency is not required to provide offerors with the
verbatim comments set forth in past performance surveys the agency
has received 3  The agency need only identify the categories of past
performance problems that relate to the specific problems noted in
387. 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(d) (3) (1997).
388. SeeJCI Envtl. Servs., Comp. Gen. B-250752.3, 93-1 CPD 1 299 (1993) (holding that the
Defense Logistics Agency was not required to give the protester an opportunity to discuss a
prior termination for default where the same agency had recently obtained the protester's
response in another pending procurement).
389. Quality Elevator Co., Comp. Gen. B-271899, 96-2 CPD 1 89, at 7 (1996).
390. See id. at 7. In Morrison Knudsen Corp., in which GAO sustained the protest on other
grounds, GAO noted that, assuming the agency saw a past performance weakness as a
"significant weakness" in a proposal, it was required to advise the offeror accordingly during
discussions. See Morrison Knudsen Corp., Comp. Gen. B-270703, 96-2 CPD 1 86, at 4 (1996); see
also Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-259252, 95-1 CPD 1 149, at 10
(1995) ("[C]ontracting officials must advise offerors of deficiencies in their proposals and afford
offerors an opportunity to submit revised proposals....") (citation omitted).
391. Caltech Servs. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-261044.4,95-2 CPD 1 285 (1995).
392. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).




16. Does the evaluation of past peformance involve a risk ofde facto
debarment?
a. GAO's experience with actual allegations ofde facto debarment
In a few cases, protesters have explicitly alleged defacto debarment
as a result of an agency's past performance ratings. This type of
allegation is understandable because the same, unfavorable past
performance information is used repetitively by the agencies and
presumably has the same negative effect on any evaluator who may
come across it in evaluating proposals for a new contract. Given the
extraordinary burden of proof that GAO utilizes in such cases, it is
not surprising that GAO has denied each such protest.
In Dynamic Aviation-Helicopters,"9 a small business claimed bias and
defacto debarment in connection with its past performance evaluation
in a negotiated procurement.'9 Citing the absence of evidence of
bias, GAO gave the agency the benefit of the presumption that
government officials act in good faith, stating "[w] e do not attribute
unfair or prejudicial motives to them on the basis of inference or
supposition."3 7
Similarly in SDA, Inc.,398 the protester received devastatingly poor
reference reports from two sources. As a result, GAO rejected the
protester's contention that GSA "is attempting to punish SDA for
filing legitimate claims under the disputes provisions of prior
contracts"4 " and that this was a "form of defacto debarment."' ' GAO
disposed of the case by simply stating that "the agency followed the
evaluation criteria" and acted reasonably in downgrading the
protester's past performance based on the uniformly poor
394. See id.
395. Comp. Gen. B-274122, 96-2 CPD 1 166 (1996).
396. See id. at 2, 4 (discussing protester's contentions for why it should have been awarded
the contract based on its lowest-price offer).
397. Id. at 4.
398. Comp. Gen. B-256075 et aL, 94-2 CPD 1 71 (1994).
399. See id. at 4-5. "Reference A" stated that the customer would not work with the protester
again "if [we] have a choice." "Reference B" stated that while the protester's quality was "good,"
the company "spends a lot of time on minute details [and] will charge [the] government for all
possible delays." Regarding schedule compliance, "Reference A" stated that the contract had
been performed on time but the protester was "very difficult to work with." "Reference B"
stated: "Yes, on time [but] can't trust them to perform without a lot of hassle [and)
unnecessary delays." One evaluator wrote: "All references were very displeased .... I was
seriously advised not to work with them. No good qualities identified." Id.
400. Id. at 5-6.
401. Id.at8.
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402
recommendations.
In JCI Environmental Services,4 °s the protester claimed de facto
debarment when the Defense Logistics Agency awarded the contract
to another firm at a $3.6 million price premium due to a poor past
performance rating for the protester.404 Rejecting the argument,
GAO stated:
A contracting agency may not exclude a firm from contracting with
it without following the procedures for suspension or debarment
by making repeated determinations of nonresponsibility as part of
a long-term disqualification effort. Here, the agency has not found
JCI nonresponsible. Rather, in each solicitation under which JCI
has submitted a proposal, it has been considered eligible for award.
JCI has not been selected for award because it did not present the
best value in part due to the agency's assessment of JCI's past
performance. The agency's determinations were based upon
technical evaluations, and not responsibility, and JCI's failure to
receive the awards does not constitute de facto debarment. While
JCI cannot change its past performance, it can submit a past
performance proposal to highlight its relevant experience and
explain its prior unacceptable performance. Moreover, we find no
evidence of bias or discrimination on this record. Where a
protester alleges bias on the part of procurement officials, the
protester must prove that the officials intended to harm the
protester. In the absence of such proof, contracting officials are
presumed to act in good faith."'
Despite GAO's statements in the cited cases, once a contractor has
received poor contract performance ratings, the practical difficulty of
explaining or refuting the adverse reports may very well result in
exclusion of certain contractors from government contracting.
b. What success, if any, have protesters had in rebutting adverse past
performance ratings?
In answering the general question whether the use of past
performance as an evaluation factor in source selections may have the
effect of debarring contractors, perhaps the more appropriate
question is whether a protester who challenges its own past
performance rating has any real prospect of successfully rebutting the
agency's evaluation in GAO or in the courts.
An examination of those decisions in which GAO has sustained
402. See id. at 7.
403. Comp. Gen. B-250752.3, 93-1 CPD 1 299 (1993).
404. See id. at 1, 8.
405. Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
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protests reveals, seemingly without exception, situations where the
source selection involved a clearly erroneous or unreasonable award
decision on the face of the record before GAO. Each of these cases is
discussed in detail below. Close examination shows, however, that
currently no protester has succeeded in challenging the correctness
or validity of the underlying past performance information itself.
The protester's inability to win such cases appears to be a logical
result of GAO's fundamental approach. GAO simply stops the
analysis when it has found that the evaluation score, color code,
adjectival, or other assigned rating has some arguable support in the
protest record. Consequently, in Hughes Missile Systems Co.,406 GAO
stated in seemingly categorical fashion, "[a]n evaluation of past
performance may be based on the agency's reasonable perception of
inadequate prior performance, even where the contractor disputes
the agency's interpretation of the facts." °7
GAO does not seem interested in going behind the write-up of the
past performance evaluation to examine the legitimacy of the past
performance information supplied to the evaluator. GAO seem
concerned with whether that information came from an agency
database, from contract files, or from reference checks and
questionnaires utilized by the evaluators.In Cesna ircrft " 408
In Cessna Aircraft Company, the protester obtained a ruling from
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals ("ASBCA") in its favor
with regard to some of the performance problems and cost overruns,
which had resulted in its less than ideal past performance rating.
However, the protester's response to discussion items may not have
taken full advantage of the opportunity to advise the government of
the ASBCA results.
410 Furthermore, in Rockwell International Corp.,"
GAO brushed off Rockwell's explanations of perceived past
performance problems,42 as well as its contention that at the time
406. Comp. Gen. B-272418 et aL, 96-2 CPD 1 221 (1996).
407. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted); see also Braswell Services Group, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-
278921.2, 98-2 CPD 1 10 (stating an "agency may base a past performance evaluation on its
reasonable perception of inadequate prior performance even where the contractor disputes the
agency's interpretation of the facts"); Cessna Aircraft Co., Comp. Gen. B-261953.5, 96-1 CPD
132, at 17 (1996) (same); Quality Fabricators, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-271431, 96-2 CPD 1 22, at 6-
7 (1996) (holding that a protestor failed to rebut information in agency database); Macon
Apparel Corp., Comp. Gen. B-272162, 96-2 CPD 1 95, at 3 (1996) (stating that protestor's
"disagreement with this [past performance] assessment by the agency provides no basis for
finding that assessment unreasonable") (citation omitted).
408. Comp. Gen. B-261953.5, 96-1 CPD 1 132 (1996).
409. See id. at 20.
410. See id.
411. Comp. Gen. B-261953.2 et aL, 96-1 CPD 1 34 (1995).
412. See id. at 11 (rejecting Rockwell's argument that the past performance down grade was
irrelevant where the prior contract has been a developmental contract and the present one was
15971998]
1598 THE AMERICAN UNIVERS1'Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1539
Contractor Performance Assessment Reports ("CPAR") were
prepared, various disputes were pending before the agency."'
Rockwell contended "that the unfavorable information in the CPAR
was a deliberate attempt by the agency to buttress its defense to the
pending claims., 414 GAO's response included:
An agency's evaluation of past performance may be based on the
procuring agency's reasonable perception of inadequate prior
performance, even where the contractor disputes the agency's
interpretation of the facts .... Based on our review of the record,
we think that the "moderate" risk rating assigned Rockwell's
proposal under these factors is consistent with the PRAG's




There are many examples of cases where protesters have
unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the underlying past
performance information in the context of a GAO protest.46 These
decisions are not necessarily wrong and most are probably right. The
point to be made here, however, concerns process. Once a
a production contract and that Rockwell had taken steps to improve problems encountered
under both contracts).
413. Seeid. at 11 n.13.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
416. See Pearl Properties, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277250.2, 97-2 CPD 80, at 4-5 (1997)
(holding that a successful appeal to the Board of Contract Appeals did not preclude the agency
from considering the underlying facts concerning offeror's deficient performance in
subsequent competitive negotiation); MAC's Gen. Contractor, Comp. Gen. B-276755, 97-2 CPD
1 29, at 3 (1997) (holding that a contractor's appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, following unsuccessful an appeal to Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, did not
preclude the agency from considering default termination as indicative of poor past
performance). In addition, the fact that a contractor may be appealing does not mean it is
unreasonable for the agency to rely on termination as evidence of the firm's past performance.
See id.; see also Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-275066, 97-1 CPD 1 30, at 3-4 (1997)
(holding that the offeror did not persuade GAO that information provided by a reference
concerning poor quality of work and disruptive behavior was erroneous); Continental Serv. Co.,
Comp. Gen. B-274531, 97-1 CPD 1 9, at 6 (1997) (rejecting protester's rebuttal to a reference's
survey questionnaire despite protester's "explanations and interpretations of events that
provide a more favorable view of the protester's past performance and possible mitigating
circumstances"); HLC Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-274374, 96-2 CPD 1 214, at 5-6 (1996)
(rejecting protester's contention that delays under a prior contract were excusable); Dragon
Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-255354, 94-1 CPD 1 151, at 6-7 (1994) (rejecting protester's rebuttal
of "erroneous information" concerning its past performance). GAO decided that "[a]n
agency's evaluation of past performance may be based on the procuring agency's reasonable
perception of inadequate prior performance, even where the contractor disputes the agency's
interpretation of the facts." Id. at 10-11 (1994); see also Lockheed Aircraft Serv. Co., Comp.
Gen. B-255305 et aL, 94-1 CPD 1 205, at 10-11 (1994) (demonstrating that GAO was not
interested in protester's challenge to accuracy of performance information in database);
Pannesma Co., Ltd., Comp. Gen. B-251688, 93-1 CPD 333, at 6 (1993) (reciting the basic
principle that a past performance evaluation will be upheld if it is reasonable despite the
contractor's position that past performance information is flawed); JCI Envtl. Servs., Comp.
Gen. B-250752.3, 93-1 CPD 1 299, at 4-5 (1993) (stating that GAO is not interested in hearing
reasons why a default termination was allegedly improper).
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contractor has unfavorable past performance information in its
record, it may be virtually impossible to overcome the negative effects
of that information in the contract award process. A GAO protest will
not likely provide the ideal forum for a challenge.
The issue addressed here is directly resolved by GAO's decision in
SDA, Inc.,417 where GAO stated in denying a request for a hearing on
the validity of the protester's past performance information:
[W]e find that the agency reasonably relied upon the references
that the protester itself provided in response to the [solicitation].
Since we do not think that the agency had to "go behind" the
opinions expressed by the references and conduct further
independent investigation as to the adequacy or quality of the
protester's performance under four different contracts, we found a
hearing unnecessary and denied the request.418
GAO further stated: "We do not think the agency was required to
conduct further investigation to independently establish the validity
of the reports from the references."419
Even more indicative of GAO's inhospitable attitude toward
challenges to allegedly erroneous past performance information is
Kings Point Industries, Inc., 40 where GAO simply and categorically
stated: "The question of whether the delays under these [past]
contracts... were legally excusable is outside of our bid protest
jurisdiction. 42'
c. Is GAO equipped to handle protester challenges to evaluations of past
performance?
Practitioners with experience handling GAO protests know of the
limited standards of review in that forum. Most protests are decided
on the written record. While protesters may request documents,
recent amendments to GAO's rules now require the protester to
demonstrate the relevance of the documents before the agency is
required to respond.42 Additional discovery is not available from the
awardee except to the extent the awardee's proposal and related
documentation are already part of the agency's file on the
procurement.42 Depositions are not available in GAO proceedings
424
417. Comp. Gen. B-256075 et at, 94-2 CPD 1 71 (1994).
418. Id. at 6 n.7.
419. Id. at 7 n.9.
420. Comp. Gen. B-249616, 92-2 CPD 395 (1992).
421. Id. at 4.
422. See4 C.F.R. §§ 21.1(d)(2), 21.3(g), 21.3(h) (1998).
423. See generally 4 C.F.R. pt. 21 (1998).
424. See id,
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and hearings are not mandatory. When GAO agrees to convene a
hearing, usually its scope is limited to whatever specific issue GAO
defines as involving a question of fact which cannot otherwise be
resolved on the written record.
For these reasons, it is clear that GAO is not currently well-
equipped, or even inclined, to be of much help in a protester's
search for the truth in investigating and challenging the procuring
agency's past performance determinations. These factors combined
lead to the conclusion that currently, the use of past performance as
an evaluation factor for award does, in fact, create a substantial risk of
de facto debarment, as well as a certain potential for favoritism and
abuse of the procurement process.
B. Analysis of General Accounting Office and Court Decisions Sustaining
Protests Involving Issues of Past Performance
To date, GAO and the courts have sustained only twenty-four
protests where the decision depended in some way on an issue of past
performance. These cases can be classified in the following four
general categories: failure to follow evaluation criteria relating to
past performance, misevaluation of past performance information,
other unreasonable evaluation problems, and contract award without
meaningful discussions.
1. Failure to follow evaluation criteria relating to past performance
The first category of cases in which GAO has sustained protests
reveals situations where stated past performance evaluation factors
were not followed.
For example, in NavCom Defense Electronics, Inc.,26 GAO sustained a
protest against an Air Force award of a contract for repair of the
Tactical Air Navigation ("TACAN") system. 7 Past performance and
price were the only two evaluation criteria, and they were weighted
equally.428 Past performance was to be evaluated, in part, based on
the offeror's past and present performance for "the same or similar
efforts specified in the [RFP]."4,29 While the protester had extensive
experience in repairing the TACAN system, the awardee's
425. See id. at § 21.7(a) (providing that GAO "may conduct a hearing in connection with a
protest").
426. Comp. Gen. B-276163, 97-1 CPD 1 189 (1997).
427. See id. at 5.
428. See id. at 2 (explaining further that the RFP did not require submissions for technical
proposals because the Air Force believed that any offer considered "responsive and responsible"
was technically acceptable).
429. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the RFP).
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documented experience was in repairing radio power supplies.430 All
offerors received "low risk" ratings based on the past performance
information submitted.43' The awardee submitted the low price.
4 2
After reciting the basic principle that the government must follow the
stated evaluation factors in making its award decision, GAO held that
the record contained no analysis regarding which power supply
repair was properly judged "similar" to TACAN system repair.
33
Furthermore, the agency disregarded and effectively waived the same
or similar requirement contained in the RFP evaluation criteria.434
Another sustained protest involving failure to follow evaluation
factors is in Holiday Inn-Laurel-Protest and Request for Costs,4 35 which
involved a contract for lodging and meals. There, GAO awarded
costs and sustained a protest where the Army rejected the protester's
$2.7 million price and set the contract award at $3.5 million.40 The
protester's technical evaluation had proved marginal with "poor" past
performance. 37  To make matters worse, the Army found the
protester nonresponsible, citing both poor past performance and
alleged falsification of past performance information in the
proposal . Sustaining the protest, GAO found that instead of giving
past performance its proper weight as just one among six equal
technical evaluation factors, past performance adversely affected the
protester's rating under numerous other evaluation factors.439 As a
result, GAO found that the Army greatly exaggerated the importance
of past performance when compared to the weight assigned in
Section M of the solicitation.4
In another case, Halter Marine, Inc.,441 GAO was prompted to sustain
a protest challenging a best-value source selection by the Panama
Canal Commission in contracting for a new vessel. 2  While "past
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See id. at 3.
433. See id. at 5 (concluding that "[iln the absence of any support in the record for the
agency's assignment of the same low performance risk rating to both offerors, we cannot
conclude that the award to Integrity was reasonable").
434. See id. at 5 n.2.
435. Comp. Gen. B-270860.3 et aL, 96-1 CPD 1 259, recon. denied, Comp. Gen. B-270860.5,
96-2 CPD 1 23 (1996).
436. See id. at 2.
437. See id.
438. See id. at 3.
439. See id. at 4-5 (explaining that the agency failed to weigh the factors equally as stated in
the RFP's statement).
440. See id. at 3-4 (stating that "each evaluator improperly downgraded the firm ... in areas
not calling for [past performance] review").
441. Comp. Gen. B-255429,94-1 CPD 1 161 (1994).
442. See id. at 1.
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performance" was not expressly listed as one of the four stated
evaluation factors, the government required submission of
information concerning construction of similar vessels during the
past five years under the "experience" factor.43 Although the agency
rated the protester lower than the awardee overall, the "experience"
ratings for each were the same.444 The protester's price was initially a
narrow $22,000 lower than the awardee. 44*5 The government judged
that the anticipated extra cost of quality surveillance, when added to
the protester's cost, would offset the price advantage.' The
Contracting Officer, upon reviewing the proposals, downgraded the
protester's past performance to "poor" from "less than satisfactory"
and upgraded the awardee to "superior" from "satisfactory. '44 7 Upon
receipt of Best and Final Offers, the protester's cost margin increased
to $53,000 due to a price reduction. 48 At this point, the government
made its mistake: it did not consider whether the price reduction
overcame the technical superiority of the winning offeror. The
technical evaluation committee's calculations indicated that the
result might have been different. However, the government had
made its final cost technical trade-off based on the initial price
difference of $22,000. 44" Another problem cited by GAO was that the
agency gave "overwhelming weight" to past performance in
evaluating other factors, including technical merit and quality
control, where past performance issues were not identified as
considerations in the evaluation scheme. 45° Repeated consideration
of past performance information under numerous factors rendered
the award decision unreasonable.4
Alternatively, Latecoere International Inc. v. United States Department of
the Navy,452 an egregious case of bad faith and manipulation in the
443. See id.
444. See id. at 3 (stating that both parties received a "6" for experience).
445. See id. at 4.
446. See id. (reporting that Swiftship's use of a higher grade of aluminum alloy also made
their offer a better value for the government).
447. See id.
448. See id. (explaining that Halter had lowered their price by more than $30,000).
449. See id. at 5-6 (noting that "Halter's price reduction might have offset the claimed value
of the Swiftships proposal").
450. See id. at 6-7 ("It is fundamental that offerors must be advised of the basis upon which
their proposals will be evaluated.").
451. See id. at 7. Failure to follow the stated evaluation criteria was an alternative basis of
GAO's decision sustaining a protest in GTS Duratek, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-280511.2 et aL, 1998
U.S. Comp. Gen. WL 840923, at 16 (1998). This decision primarily turned upon the
Comptroller General's holding that it was unreasonable for the Army to ignore clearly relevant
past performance information known to one of the technical evaluators who served as the
Controlling Officer's Representative under the particular past contract in question. Id. at 14.
This decision is more fully considered at infra Part III.B.3.
452. 19 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1994).
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court's eyes, represents the one reported court decision where a
performance evaluation issue was resolved in a protester's favor. 5'
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the
Navy committed prejudicial error by completely ignoring the past
performance evaluation factor.54  The Naval Training Center
solicited proposals for "G-Tolerance Improvement Program" pilot
training systems.455 A six-volume proposal was required, including
one entire volume devoted solely to past performance. 56  Section M
set forth a Best Value selection scheme with technical factors more
important than cost/price.4 57 The Source Selection Advisory Council
("SSAC") recommended awarding the contract to Latecoere, a
French firm, because it was rated superior technically and also had
proposed a price of $20.9 million, compared to $35.2 million from
the other offeror that had been included in the competitive range.458
Interestingly, the ultimate awardee, ETC, had not even been included
in the competitive range initially.4 9 Latecoere's proposal had been
rated acceptable while the other firm in the competitive range was
unacceptableW The Source Selection Authority ("SSA")
recommended the award go to Latecoere without discussions.
4 61
However, upper Navy management did not wish to award the
contract to a non-U.S. firm and would not sign the Business
Clearance Memorandum unless discussions were held.4 2 After the
discussions and following the submission of revised proposals, ETC
was priced at $10.3 million compared to $11.2 million for
Latecoere.4G6 Yet, ETC was rated "marginal" under numerous factors,
including past performance.4" The SSAC decided to upgrade the
ETC rating to "acceptable" even though the past performance
information on ETC suggested that delays of up to nine months were
453. See id. at 1344.
454. See id. at 1363-64 (remarking that the Navy, in contradiction to the request for
proposals, concluded that past performance was not relevant).
455. See id. at 1344-45.
456. See id. at 1345.
457. See id.
458. See id. at 1347.
459. See id.
460. See id. (stating that Latecoere's proposal was acceptable but ETC's was not).
461. See id. (quoting the Selection Authority as saying "[iut is my opinion that added
discussions with all the offerors would not insure that the unacceptable offerors' redesign and
resubmittal of their proposals would result in an appreciable technical and cost advantage to
the Government").
462. See id. at 1348-50 (describing the "Buy American" concerns of the Navy and how the
Navy made this decision).
463. See id. at 1350.
464. See id.
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possible. 46 Despite this information, the Navy awarded the contract
to ETC.46 During a meeting between the SSAC and the SSA, the SSA
stated that "the American companies might apply political 'heat' if
the award went to a foreign company."067 When the Contracting
Officer was asked whether any offerors were likely to protest, she
responded that Latecoere was not likely to protest, while ETC was
very likely to do so. 4  Thus, the SSA rejected the SSAC's
recommendation of award to Latecoere. 40 The SSA conceded that
ETC presented more of a performance risk than Latecoere ° GAO
denied Latecoere's protest, and a U.S. district court denied injunctive
relief.
47'1
The Court of Appeals reversed after finding "overwhelming
evidence that the [SSAC's] manipulation of ETC's ratings was
arbitrary, irrational, improperly motivated, and a clear and
prejudicial violation of 48 C.F.R. § 15.608(a)... 472  The Court
discovered numerous violations of law, including the Navy's emphasis
on cost to the exclusion of the other, non-cost evaluation factors,
4
7
and stated that the Navy "effectively scratched the past performance
evaluation criteria out of the Solicitation based on the hope that
constant government supervision would ensure proper
performance. 474 The Court stated: "[I]nstead of providing adequate
support for his decision to equate the two proposals in regard to the
offerors' past performance, [the SSA's] rationale effectively changed
the Solicitation's terms, a clear and prejudicial violation of
procurement regulations. 47'
2. Mis-evaluation of past performance information: Unsupported
evaluation or source selection decision
GAO has sustained protests in the second category of cases in
which selection decision, though not necessarily unreasonable on its
465. See id. at 1350-51.
466. See id. at 1353 (stating that the Navy assumed that ETC's proposal would be equal to
Latecoere's if it was "fleshed-out").
467. Id. at 1351.
468. See id. (reporting that ETC had been active and vocal during the procurement
process).
469. See id.
470. See id. at 1352.
471. See id. at 1353-54.
472. Id. at 1359.
473. See id. at 1360. Under 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b) (1) (1994), and 41 U.S.C. § 253b(a) (1994),
procuring agencies may make contract awards only in accordance with the evaluation factors
stated in the solicitation.




face, proved to be unsupported in the documentary record.
In The Real Estate Center-Costs,' a case that awarded the protester
its attorneys' fees, GAO noted that the record contained no support
for a Department of Veterans Affairs evaluation, which had assigned
the protester "zero" out of a possible ten points under the past
performance factor. 7 Simply stated, DVA provided no narrative
discussion to support this seemingly arbitrary rating.7 Yet the record
indicated that the protester had been rated "excellent" by the DVA
just six months prior to the evaluation in issue, and that the protester
had apparently managed 2,000 properties for the agency prior to the
subject solicitation.'
In Mechanical Contractors, S.A., 0° GAO sustained a protest against
award of a contract by the Panama Canal Commission to perform
cleaning and painting of miter gate leaves. 4 ' The technical
evaluation included a "performance capability" factor that embraced
past performance. The RFP stated that favorable consideration
would be given to offerors having either past contracts requiring
confined space removal and painting with forced ventilation systems
or possessing an official certification by the Steel Structures Painting
Council ("SSPC") known as "QP-2.,'W" Despite the fact that the
protester's subcontractor held the SSPC QP-2 certification, the
protester was downgraded significantly under past performance due
to fewer relevant past contracts and some instances of late
completion.4  GAO held that the source selection decision was not
adequately supported 8" The contemporaneous evaluation
documentation identified only one weakness in the protester's
416proposal, a lack of experience in the last three years. At the same
time, the record contained no indication that the protester had
received any evaluation credit for holding the QP-2 certi .7recevedanyevalatin ceditforholing e - certification.
476. Comp. Gen. B-274081.7, 98-1 CPD 1 105 (1998).
477. See id. at 3-4 (explaining that the score of "zero" lacked any reasonable basis in the
record).
478. See id. (stating that the only explanation in the record was that the firm was "resistant to
change").
479. See id. at 4.
480. Comp. Gen. B-277916, 97-2 CPD 1 121 (1997).
481. Seeid.atl.
482. See id. at 1-2 (remarking that past performance was one of five subfactors of
"performance capability").
483. See id. at 2 (reporting that the timelines and quality of the past performance would also
be considered).
484. See id. at 2-3.
485. See id. at 3.
486. See id.
487. See id. at 4 (holding that failure to consider the protester's QP-2 certification was
.unreasonable and inconsistent with the RFP language").
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Moreover, the agency had admittedly considered certain "non-
similar" contracts when, in fact, there was only one "similar" contract
where the protester's performance had been late.4s GAO
recommended that the agency reevaluate both proposals, properly
document the reevaluation, and make a new selection decision.""'
Similarly, in Ogden Support Services, Inc.,49 and a subsequent protest
based on the same procurement, Ogden Support Services, Inc., 9 ' GAO
sustained the protester's challenge to the awardee's higher past
492performance score. In the first protest, Ogden convinced GAO that
the CIA's "near perfect" rating of the awardee's performance was
unsupported. 3  Following GAO's initial ruling, the CIA Technical
Management Evaluation Team ("TMET") simply reevaluated the
information it already had seen. 4  CIA obtained no new past
performance information as a part of its reevaluation.' 5 The TMET
again found the awardee near-perfect in past performance.4 9 GAO
again sustained Ogden's protest because "CIA's actions... ignore [d]
our past decision" and because there was no new information or
"meaningful rationale" supporting the awardee's high score.497 For a
second time, GAO found that the prior mail and courier service
contracts, on which the high rating had been based, were only
peripheral and unlike the effort described in the Statement of
Work. 8  CIA had not explained why maintenance, janitorial and
facilities service contracts, which "only peripherally involve [d] mail or
courier service," justified an "excellent" rating.f Under the
circumstances, the awardee's near perfect past performance score
''effectively removed the evaluation weight assigned the past
performance criterion."' °  Because the record did not support the
awardee's strong past performance rating, CIA lacked "a proper
basis" for concluding that the protester and the awardee should be
488. See id. at 4-5.
489. See id. at 7.
490. Comp. Gen. B-270012.2, 96-1 CPD 1 177 (1996).
491. Comp. Gen. B-270012.3, 96-2 CPD 1 137 (1996).
492. See Ogden Support Serus., Inc., 96-1 CPD 1 177, at 5 (determining agency based its
assessment of past performance scores on insufficient information); Ogden Support Sews., Inc.,
96-2 CDP 1 137, at 2 (sustaining protest because the agency failed to support its past
performance evaluations with a rational basis).
493. See Ogden Support Servs., Inc., 96-1 CPD 1177, at 5-6.
494. See Ogden Support Sers., Inc., 96-2 CPD 1 137 at 2-3.
495. See id. at 2 (stating that the CIA received no new information prior to reevaluating the
past performance of the parties).
496. See id. (reporting the CIA evaluators confirmed the awardee's near perfect score).
497. See id.
498. See id. at 2-3.




rated equally on past performance.5'
In Morrison Knudsen Corp.,"° involving a Defense Nuclear Agency
("DNA") award for dismantling of missile silos in Kazakhstan,
"experience [and] record of [past] performance" was one of three
subfactors under the most highly rated factor,
"technical/management superiority. ''a °3 DNA selected a lower-scored
proposal (81.7 versus 87.6 technical points) evaluated at only $92,088
or 3/10 of one percent lower in price than the protester."4 DNA
reasoned that the protester presented an unacceptable risk due to
concerns regarding availability of working equipment in Kazakhstan
and unreliable Kazakhstani subcontractors. The SSA awarded the
contract to the other offeror because of its supposedly superior
subcontracting approach (featuring three Kazakhstani subcontractors
the agency approved) and because the protester had incurred a 133
percent overrun on a prior DNA contract due to major subcontractor
cost growth.5" GAO held that DNA's selection was unreasonable
because the subcontracting approach of both offerors was not
"fundamentally different."' 7 While the awardee's best and final offer
("BAFO") named the three subcontractors, resulting in an excellent
evaluation, the awardee's BAFO had not in fact committed to using
these subcontractors!"8  Both offerors had proposed to complete
subcontractor selection following an award of the prime contracti5
Because the record did not support "crucial" reason for the award the
perceived superiority of the awardee in subcontractor approach,
GAO sustained the protest.
510
Likewise, in PMT Services, Inc.,5 ' GAO sustained a protest against a
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service ("DRMS") award for
hazardous waste disposal services. According to GAO, DRMS had no
basis for concluding, in evaluating the protester's past performance,
that the protester's past contract efforts were not as complex as the
501. See id. at 4 (asserting that Ogden's proposal in fact should be technically superior).
502. Comp. Gen. B-270703, 96-2 CPD 1 86 (1996).
503. See id, at 2.
504. See id. This evaluation came after the protestor's price had been increased by $1.77
million in the cost realism evaluation. See id.
505. See id. (concluding that "in-country equipment" is usually broken or has been taken
apart for spare parts and that imported equipment is more reliable).
506. See id. at 2-3 (reporting that the agency viewed these factors as "crucial aspects" of the
proposal).
507. See id. at 3.
508. See id. (stating that this approach was the same as that proposed by the protester).
509. See id. at 3-4 (noting that in addition, the three potential subcontractors named by the
awardee were also named by the protester).
510. See id. at 5-6.
511. Comp. Gen. B-270538.2, 96-2 CPD 1 98, recon, denied, Comp. Gen. B-270538.5 et aL, 96-
2 CPD 1 194 (1996).
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effort called for by the RFP.5 2 DRMS stipulated three evaluation
factors: technical, past performance, and price.'5  The technical
evaluation was "go/no-go," with the remaining factors being
evaluated comparatively. 54 Past performance was the most important
award factor' 5 One aspect of the past performance evaluation was
the "complexities" of the services offered in past efforts."" PMT
proposed a price of $2.1 million, compared to $3.1 million for the
awardee, but PMT was rated "marginal" in past performance
compared to the awardee's "acceptable" rating under that 
factor. 1 7
PMT's proposal cited fifteen hazardous waste disposal contracts in
the past two years ranging from very small to a high of $446,000.""
The protester's references rated PMT as "excellent" or "satisfactory in
all respects., 51 9  However, DRMS rated PMT "marginal," with a
likelihood of a successful performance being poor, "solely because
PMT had not previously performed a contract of similar size and
'complexity' .... ,20 GAO sustained the protest because DRMS had
"not defined, either in the RFP or in its protest submissions, what is
intended by the term complexity with respect to these services. '0 2,
The agency had not taken into account such factors as degree of care
or special handling needed, specific types of waste, size of staff
needed, level of reporting and record keeping required, or number
of vehicles needed.52 The agency based its conclusions only on the
size of the protester's previous contracts.523 This information alone
did not necessarily "yield a meaningful conclusion about an offeror's
probability of future success. '524 On this record, GAO said that the
government's evaluation of PMT's past performance was
unreasonable-52 s
In New Breed Leasing Corp., 5 26 GAO sustained a protest against a Navy
award for transportation services. The RFP set forth a best value
selection scheme, listing past performance, management and
512. See id. at 6 (asserting that the term "complexity" had not been defined in the RFP).
513. See id. at 1.
514. See id. at 1-2.
515. See id. at 2 (reporting that price was a lesser factor).
516. Seeid.




521. Id. at 6.




526. Comp. Gen. B-259328, 96-2 CPD 1 84 (1995).
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administration, and method of operation as equally important
technical evaluation factors, the total of which was more important
than the price.2  The Navy awarded a contract to the higher priced
offeror, at $20.4 million, versus the protester's low price at $20.1
million.12" The Navy made this selection based on a finding that the
$300,000 price difference "is insignificant when considering the
excellent technical rating given to [the awardee]. [The awardee] and
[its] major subcontractor offered vast experience in transportation
services of similar size and complexity, and had excellent past
performance references. ''52 However, GAO sustained the protest
because the source selection turned on "information that contained
uncorrected errors concerning [the protester's] ratings, failed to
accurately represent [the awardee's] past performance record, and
provided conclusions about the two proposals' technical differences
that were inconsistent with the evaluation record. ,,30 The
protester's past performance rating had been "understated."53' The
favorable results of a reference check with the Postal Service had not
been communicated to the Technical Evaluation Board ("TEB"), and
the TEB chairman stated in the summary evaluation that if this
information had been available to the TEB members, the protester's
"very good" past performance rating would have been raised to
"excellent."532 However, the SSA accepted the TEB report as filed,
with the protester's past performance rated only "very good."""
Further, the awardee's past performance rating was unreasonable
because the "excellent" rating, based on reference checks for
contracts that purportedly were of "similar size and complexity,"
actually involved much smaller contracts-most valued at less than $1
million per year compared to the estimated $4 million per year
here. 4 GAO concluded that the awardee in fact had not performed
any prior contracts of similar size and complexity, plus the awardee's
references rated the firm as "satisfactory."535  By comparison, the
protester had performed a number of multi-million dollar contracts
527. See id. at 2 (explaining that if the technical evaluations are similar, then their price
becomes a more important factor).
528. See id. at 3-4.
529. Id. at 4.
530. Id.
531. See id. at 4-5 (finding that the ratings should have been "excellent" instead of "very
good").
532. See id. at 5.
533. See id. (remarking that SSB did not discuss New Breed's past performance in its
report).
534. See id. at 6-7.
535. See id. (evaluating the protester's past performance).
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with references all either "very good" or "excellent.,136 Hence, the
Navy did not accurately report the protester's evaluation to the SSA
and the TEB evaluation did not support the stated technical
discriminators between the protester and the awardee.57 Thus the
selection was unreasonable and GAO sustained the protest. 38
Ashland Sales & Services, Inc.39 found that the Defense Personnel
Support Center ("DPSC") misevaluated proposals in a competitive
procurement for military clothing. Technical factors outweighed
price, and "experience/past performance" was the second-most-
important factor.54° DPSC rated the protester "acceptable" in two
factors and "marginally acceptable" in all other areas. 4' In evaluating
the protester's past performance, DPSC reviewed four prior DPSC
contracts with the protester.542  The protester was the low-price
offeror at $1,007,236 compared to $1,137,726 for the awardee, whose
technical advantage the government felt outweighed the price
difference.543  Ashland's protest claimed inadequate discussions
regarding past performance information. 44 Although questions
concerning Ashland's past performance on a commercial contract
were resolved in the protester's favor, problems on past DPSC
contracts were viewed as troublesome.5 ' 5 Even after reevaluating the
protester's military past performance as a response to the protest,
there was no change in the evaluation and DPSC ratified its choice. G
GAO reviewed the record concerning the protester's past
performance, concluding that the record did not support a finding
that the protester had been at fault for delivery delays on a contract
under which it served as subcontractor. 47 Initially the agency found
that the prime contractor had been wholly at fault, based on financial
problems . 8 Upon reevaluation of the proposals, however, DPSC
changed its mind, rejecting the position that the prime contractor's
financial problem led to difficulty in providing cloth for the protester
536. See id. at 7.
537. See id. at 8.
538. See id.
539. Comp. Gen. B-255159, 94-1 CPD 1 108 (1994).
540. See id. at 1.
541. See id. at 2 (observing that Ashland received an "acceptable" rating for its men's
product demonstration model and for quality assurance).
542. See id. (reporting that of the four contracts evaluated, three were delinquent).
543. See id.
544. See id. (stating that Ashland claimed there was a "lack of meaningful discussion"
regarding past performance).
545. See id. at 3-4.
546. See id. at 4.
547. See id.
548. See id. (explaining that the agency's original evaluation excused Ashland from any
responsibility for the delays).
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to sew and blaming the late deliveries on the protester. 49 GAO could
find no support in the written record for the government's reversal of
its prior finding that the protester had not been at fault.5 °  The
original evaluation results were more reliable than the revised ones.55
GAO found DPSC's reasoning to be unsupported and could not "tell
from the record whether or not the reevaluation was a reasonable
one.
552
3. Other unreasonable evaluation problems
In the third category of sustained GAO protests, there is some
other set of circumstances prompting GAO to hold that the
evaluation lacked a reasonable basis-apart from a failure to follow
evaluation criteria or to support adequately the past performance
evaluation. The most recent sustained protest in this line of cases is
GTS Duratek, Inc.5  Past performance was listed as the most
important among three evaluation criteria for award of a contract for
disposal of radioactive waste at a Naval shipyard.554  The Navy
evaluated the protester's past performance as "good" based upon five
"Contractor Past Performance Data Sheets" submitted with the
protester's proposal and responses to surveys obtained by the Navy
from three of these five references.55  However, the Navy failed to
consider the protester's past performance on another highly relevant
contract for "radioactive metal melt and recycling services" at the
same Naval Shipyard (Pearl Harbor) as that which would be served by
the new contract. The Navy did not consider this information only
because the protester did not submit a Contractor Past Performance
Data Sheet on that contract.556 The contract was discussed, however,
in the offeror's past performance proposal.5 7 After the filing of the
protest, the Navy did obtain a past performance survey for that
549. See id. (detailing that the reevaluation was based on the fact that Ashland had stated
that the contractor's financial troubles began inJune 1992 rather thanJanuary 1992).
550. See id. (describing the documentary evidence to the contrary).
551. See id.
552. Id. at 6. GAO's decision in Pacfic Repair and Fabrication, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-279793, 98-
2 CPD 1 29 (1998), deserves mention among the sustained protests finding unsupported past
performance evaluations. GAO found unreasonable the Navy's "Satisfactory" past performance
ratings on four of the protest's past contracts, where the Navy had not been able to locate any
personnel knowledgeable enough to provide a rating. GAO stated that if the Navy wished to
include these contracts in its evaluation at all, it had a duty to obtain information about them
that would be adequate to support the evaluation results. Id. at 5. However, due to the look of
demonstrated prejudice to the protest, the protest was denied. Id. at 5, 7.
553. Comp. Gen. B-280511.2 et aL, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. WL 840923 (1998).
554. See id. at 2.
555. See id. at 12.
556. See id. at 13.
557. See id. at 12.
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contract, yet maintained before GAO that the additional information
did not change the offeror's rating. The GAO nevertheless
sustained the protest because "the agency could not reasonably
ignore personally known information about [the protester's] prior
experience... merely because the firm did not submit a Contractor
Past Performance Data Sheet for that contract.05 1 GAO stated "some
information is simply too close at hand to ignore.'' o
In another such case, GAO found the Army's past performance
evaluation of the protester unreasonable in the recent Matter of Trifax
Corporation.5 The Army downgraded Trifax under the "present and
past performance" evaluation factor due to concerns about payment
of employee benefits, reports that the firm had issued bad checks to
employees, alleged difficulty in recruiting employees on one contract,
and the submission of two references, rather than three, as required
by the solicitation.62 As a result, the Army excluded the Trifax
proposal from further consideration. Trifax apparently had
anticipated the performance issue, bringing these matters to the
Army's attention in response to news articles reporting the cited
concerns and asserting the reports to be erroneous.563 While the
contracting officer purportedly accepted the protester's explanation
that the reported information was erroneous, the protester's
evaluation score was still not good enough, in the Army's view, to be
considered further in the competition."" Based upon its review of the
record, GAO found insignificant the qualitative differences between
the protester's corrected past performance information and the
information regarding other offerors, who remained in the
competition. GAO thus sustained the protest on the basis that the
Army's past performance evaluation was unreasonable. 5
The third such case is SCIENTECH, Inc.- There, DOE had
excluded the protester from the competitive range after checking
four of the ten references provided.5 7 Notably, the agency had
declined to consider the protester's performance as an incumbent
contractor for the identical services covered by the instant
558. See id. at 13-14.
559. Id. at 14.
560. Id.
561. Comp. Gen. B-279561, 98-2 CPD 1 24 (1998).
562. See id. at 3.
563. See id.
564. See id at 3-4.
565. See id. at 5.
566. Comp. Gen. B-277805.2, 98-1 CPD 1 33 (1998).
567. See id. at 3 (noting that SCIENTECH asserts that the four contracts chosen were smaller
and less relevant than other contracts it specified).
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solicitation. 'f Recognizing that there is no requirement that all
references be checked as a part of the evaluation process,"9 GAO
stated that "some information is simply too close at hand to require
offerors to shoulder the inequities that spring from an agency's
failure to obtain and consider the information., 570  Based on this
assessment, GAO found that it was unreasonable to exclude the
protester from the competitive range without considering its past
performance information for the incumbent contract.
57'
In another case, U.S. Property Management Services Corp. ,7 GAO
found that the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") acted unreasonably. In evaluating "prior management
experience" (thirty out of one-hundred technical points) and "past
performance" (twenty-five out of one-hundred technical points),
HUD treated two similarly-situated firms differently.573 Both the
protester and the awardee were newly-formed corporations.5
Interestingly, just prior to the solicitation in question, the presidents
of both firms had worked together as principals of a third company.575
A business dispute evidently caused a split shortly before proposals
were due in response to the instant solicitation.5 6 In the technical
proposals, each of the two offerors relied on its president's prior
experience and past performance gained while working for the same
prior company.5 7 In discussing past performance, both proposals
identified the same contracts, which had been performed by the
prior company for which both individuals had worked.*5 HUD's
Technical Evaluation Panel downgraded the protester because,
despite its president's relevant experience and past performance, it
was a newly-formed corporation and had no "corporate"
experience. 79 However, the awardee, though it had basically the
same experience and past performance as the protester, had not
been downgraded for lack of corporate experience.5 s GAO sustained
568. See id.
569. See supra Part III.A.8.
570. SCIENTECH, Inc., 98-1 CPD 1 33, at 5.
571. See id. (holding that not evaluating the protester's incumbent contract was "patently
unfair").
572. Comp. Gen. B-278727, 98-1 CPD 1 88 (1998).
573. See id. at 2.
574. See id. at 4.
575. See id. at 3-4.
576. See id. at 4.
577. See id.
578. See id.
579. See id. at 5 (remarking that the SSO considered the awardee more experienced and
capable based on its proposed staff).
580. See id. at 5-6.
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the protest because HUD had not evaluated proposals on an
equivalent basis.Y
In another case of unreasonable evaluation, ST Aerospace Engines
Pte. Ltd.,-8 the Coast Guard awarded a contract for overhaul of engine
reduction gearboxes and torquemeters to the protester's competitor
largely because of concerns related to the protester's past
performance. 5" However, the past performance issues actually
derived from past contract efforts in overhauling propellers by the
protester's sister company, which, while it shared common
ownership, was located in separate facilities and had separate
management and work forces.584 Since there was no indication in the
protester's proposal that either the common parent company or the
affiliate would be involved to any degree in performance of the
instant contract, GAO held it to be unreasonable for the agency
simply to attribute the perceived performance problems of the
affiliate to the offeror without determining what relationship, if any,
was planned between the offeror and its affiliate on the contract in
question.585
Furthermore, in International Business Systems, Inc.,586 GAO held that
it was irrational for a DVA Contracting Officer to ignore a readily
available reference within the agency itself, and then to rate the
protester's past performance as merely "good" based on just one of
two directly relevant prior contracts to install the same type of
telephone system involved in the instant procurement.8 7  The
Contracting Officer rated the protester only "good," based on just
one of two prior contracts, where the contracting officer disregarded
the second contract only because "the individual within the agency
responsible for completing the form did not do so."' 8 In fact, not
only was the Contracting Officer herself completely familiar with the
protester's past performance on that contract (a nearly identical DVA
installation in New England), but she had officially informed the SBA
just a few months earlier that the protester's performance there had
581. See id. (reporting that the protester had been prejudiced by this unequal evaluation).
582. Comp. Gen. B-275725, 97-1 CPD 1 161 (1997).
583. See id. at 2.
584. See id.
585. See id. at 3-6 (stating that the relationship should have been clarified and that STA
Engines should have been given an opportunity to comment on the information).
586. Comp. Gen. B-275554, 97-1 CPD 1 114 (1997).
587. See id. at 3-5. On re-evaluation of the awardee's past performance, the agency found
that it had erred in rating the successful firm "excellent" when in fact it had no relevant past
performance and should have been rated only "neutral." See id. at 3.
588. Id. at 3-4.
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been "exemplary. ' "9 Given these facts, GAO concluded that it was
unreasonable to rate the protester only "good," and to conclude that
this "good" rating was in substance "essentially equal" to the "neutral"
rating assigned the awardee.'90 GAO stated that while an agency
normally is not required to check all available references, its
evaluation here was "overly mechanical" and moreover, "some
information is simply too close at hand to require offerors to
shoulder the inequities that spring from an agency's failure to obtain,
and consider, the information."59'
Finally, in American Development Corp.,"2 the Army awarded a
contract for modular ferry systems using a best value source selection
process." Technical factors were twice as important as price, with
past performance (fifteen points) the most heavily weighted of ten
technical factors.Y Section M provided that a "past performance
evaluation would assess the probability that an offeror would satisfy
the RFP requirements, as indicated by that offeror's performance
record."" The RFP also explicitly stated that if "'a source outside the
offeror's proposal provides the government with derogatory past
performance information, the offeror will be given the opportunity to
rebut or corroborate such information.- 59 The protester received a
number of questions during discussions, but none addressing past
performance information.597 While some of the comments for the
protester were negative, the protester was never apprised of this and
no rebuttal was requested. In addition, prior to receiving the initial
proposals, the Army had decided to consider the "relevance" of past
5918contracts in assessing past performance. Worried that a
consideration of relevance might give undue preference to offerors
with significant experience in the area of modular causeway systems
at the expense of smaller firms, the evaluators decided to score past
performance in two steps: (1) "calculating the average performance
rating based largely on comments received from other government
agencies,'  and then (2) "assigning a relevance rating," from zero to
589. Seeid. at4n.l.
590. See id. at 6 (asserting that an "exemplary" past performance would at least result in an
evaluation of "good").
591. Id. at 5.
592. Comp. Gen. B-251876.4, 93-2 CPD 1 49 (1993).
593. See id. at 2.
594. See id. at 2-3.
595. Id. at 3.
596. Id. (quoting the RFP).
597. See id. at 4.
598. See id. at 6-7 (explaining that this decision was based on the fact that information about
irrelevant contracts had no bearing on how the offeror would perform the contract).
599. Id. at 7.
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twenty-seven, for each contract and then multiplying the average
performance rating for the firm by the relevance factor to reach the
"overall" past performance score.6°° This evaluation had the effect of
increasing the awardee's past performance score relative to the
protester because of more "relevant" past contracts. 60' While holding
that the government had the right to make judgments concerning
the "relevance" of the prior contracts cited by the offeror in support
of its past performance rating, GAO found that the Army's method
did not take into account "the implication of an offeror having
performed less than well on a relevant contract." 2 The method used
heavily rewarded relevance (by a factor of up to twenty-seven), in that
the highest relevance factor was multiplied by the offeror's average
performance rating.Y The relevance factor was not lowered or
adjusted where the offeror's performance on a highly relevant
contract was substandard.60 4 Hence, outstanding performance by the
protester on a less relevant contract was overcome by lackluster
performance by the awardee on a highly relevant contract.05 GAO
sustained the protest because this method was judged
unreasonable.
4. Evaluations without meaningful discussions
The only other circumstance in which GAO has sustained protests
challenging past performance evaluations is in cases involving
inadequate discussions. Typically these cases have involved a
situation where the agency did not give the protester the opportunity
to rebut unfavorable information obtained as a part of the reference
check process. In some cases, the unfavorable information turned up
in checking references supplied by the offeror in its own proposal. In
others, the information obtained in checking references was
generated by the agency itself.
Most recently, GAO sustained a protest based upon inadequate
discussions concerning past performance information in Aerospace
Design & Fabrication, Inc.607  The redacted decision indicates that
NASA had received unfavorable references regarding the protester's
600. See id.
601. See id.
602. Id. at 10.
603. See id. at 10-11.
604. See id.
605. See id. (quoting the agency as saying, "[i]f one time you've shown you can do it, then
you can do it").
606. See id. GAO also found that discussions were inadequate in this case, although that
point was not essential to GAO's decision sustaining the protest. See id. at 11-16.
607. Comp. Gen. B-278896.2 et aL, 98-1 CPD 1 139 (1998).
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performance of a prior contract.0 s  Conceding that it had not
brought this information to the protester's attention during
discussions, NASA contended that the protester had had a prior
opportunity to rebut this information in connection with award fee
discussions under a prior contract under which the protester had
been a subcontractor."" GAO agreed generally that award fee
discussions under prior contracts can, under certain circumstances,
provide an adequate opportunity for a contractor or subcontractor to
hear and dispute reports concerning its past performance.r °
However, based upon the testimony adduced at a hearing, GAO
determined that in view of its status as a subcontractor under the
prior contract in question, and given the fact that normally,
subcontractors do not attend award fee discussions between the
government and its prime contractor, the protester had not had a
meaningful opportunity to rebut the unfavorable information that
NASA relied upon in making its award decision."
In McHugh/Calumet, a Joint Venture,612 GAO sustained a protest
against an award of a contract for construction of a federal
courthouse where GSA had failed to advise the protester, during
discussions, of adverse past performance information. 3
Interestingly, the Chairman of the Source Selection Evaluation Board
("SSEB") was also the government's Project Manager for the prior
project and was the individual who had reported negatively on the
protester.' 4  GAO rejected GSA's arguments that former FAR
§ 15.610(c) (6)"5 did not apply where the reference was from within
the procuring agency itself, and that FAR § 15.610(c)(6) did not
apply because the protester had previously had the opportunity to
comment on this project.616  GAO held that there was no basis to
608. See id. at 15.
609. See id. Under a "cost-plus-award-fee" contract the Government reimburses the
contractor's incurred allowable costs, plus pays an "award fee" that generally is based upon the
Government's judgmental assessment of the contractor's quality and timeliness of performance
during the award fee evaluation period. SeeFAR, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.305, 16.404-2.
610. Aerospace Design, 98-1 CPD, at 15.
611. See id. at 15-16. GAO cited two additional grounds for sustaining this protest: (1) The
awardee's proposal contained material misrepresentations of fact concerning the nature of
employment commitments received from certain proposed project management personnel
prior to submitting the proposal, see id. at 5; and (2) latent ambiguity in the solicitation had
prompted the protester to provide a less extensive elaboration of its past performance
information, see id. at 13-14.
612. Comp. Gen. B-276472, 97-1 CPD 1 226 (1997).
613. See id. at 5. The past performance information included an allegedly "negative working
relationship" and "adversarial and opportunistic" and "change-order oriented" attitudes. See id.
614. See id.
615. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.610 (c)(6) (revised by 62 Fed. Reg. 51, 224, 51, 230 (1997) (effective
Oct. 10, 1997)).
616. See id. at 7 (noting that problems on the project were "common knowledge" and that
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support the argument that former FAR § 15.610(c)(6) was not
applicable, and that "the clear language of the regulation conditions
the requirement for discussions solely on whether the offeror has had
an opportunity to address past performance information and carves
out no exceptions based on the source of such information. ' G
In American Combustion Industries, Inc.,6'8 GAO sustained a protest
based on the agency's failure, during discussions, to give the protester
an opportunity to rebut unfavorable past performance information."'
The National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") issued
an RFP for construction of a structure housing two boilers. 2 1 Of six
technical evaluation factors, four (aggregating eighty points) were for
past performance."2 Only the protester and the awardee were
included in the competitive range. One of the protester's references,
named in its proposal, provided a negative report. James Madison
University had advised NIST that the protester was "'not on time-5
months late-due to slow delivery of boiler and parts due to [the
protester]. ' '6s The agency asked the protester no questions about
this reference.62 3 GAO rejected the agency's contention that no
violation of the regulations occurred because the information from
the reference was historical and no response would have changed the
facts.62 4 GAO cited FAR § 15.610(c)(6), stating that a contracting
officer shall "[p]rovide the offeror an opportunity to discuss past
performance information obtained from references on which the
offeror had not had a previous opportunity to comment.'
Furthermore, it stated that its decisions denying protests on similar
facts because the information was "historical" were no longer
controlling; FAR § 16.610(c) (6) had been adopted subsequent to
these decisions26 and expressly required the agency to bring negative
GSA had repeatedly expressed its lack of confidence in the offeror).
617. Id. Notably, in McHugh/Calumet, GAO did not discuss the United States Court of
Federal Claims' decision in Cincom Systems, Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 663, 676 n.39 (1997),
to the effect that former FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 15.610(c)(6) does not apply to adverse past
performance information obtained from references the offeror itself has supplied.
618. Comp. Gen. B-275057.2, 97-1 CPD 1 105 (1997).
619. See id. at 2.
620. See id.
621. See id. (explaining that past performance evaluations included past performance on
building construction, past performance on phased refurbishing, past performance of
personnel, and past performance of construction schedule adherence).
622. Id. at 10.
623. See id.
624. See id. at 10-11 (rejecting the agency's intention and holding that the cases they cite
were decided before FAR § 15.610(c) (6) became effective).
625. Id.
626. See Federal Acquisition Circular 90-26, 60 Fed. Reg 16,718, 16,719 (1995) (setting forth
an effective date of May 30, 1995).
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reference information to the offeror's attention.627
In another case, Alliant Techsystems, Inc.; Olin Corp., '28 GAO found
that the Army's discussions with the protester had not been
meaningful, where the Army's impressions of a subcontractor's past
performance on a related program had not been discussed with
Alliant.62" The three evaluation factors were, in descending order:
(1) Mission, (2) Performance Risk, and (3) Cost! ° Performance risk
was divided into two subfactors, "experience" and "past
performance. 6 1' The "past performance" subfactor evaluated prior
contracts, default contracts, "new corporates," and "corporate
continuity., 612 Offerors were required to submit their subcontractors'
consents allowing government personnel to discuss the
subcontractor's past performance with the prime contractor during
pre-award discussions. 6 3  While all the offerors were rated
"green/acceptable" (in terms of technical/risk rating), the rating of
the protester (Alliant) was downgraded because of a subcontractor's
performance under one prior contract (HYDRA-70 rocket
contract).6* The SSA believed that the protester's lower cost did not
offset the perceived past performance problems related to the
subcontractor. 05  Alliant contended that had it known of the
subcontractor evaluation in question, then it would have
fundamentally changed its BAFO.36 While the heavily-redacted
decision does not state what the change would have been, one
possibility is that Alliant would have changed subcontractors. The
Army admitted that it had not identified problems with the
subcontractor during discussions with the protester.37 GAO rejected
the Army's argument that the protester had known about the
subcontractor's past performance problems and that because these
problems were "historical" and could not be changed by discussions,
the failure to discuss the issue was not prejudicial.6 ' GAO agreed
with the protester that had the protestor known of the agency's
627. See id. at 11.
628. Comp. Gen. B-260215.4 et aL, 95-2 CPD [ 79 (1995).
629. See id. at 2.




634. See id. at 4-5.
635. See id. at 5.
636. See id. at 6 (holding that the Army failed to conduct meaningful discussion with Alliant
by failing to inform it of the deficiencies in the proposal).
637. See id.
638. See id. at 7.
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concerns, it could have changed its proposal.6 9 Due to inadequate
discussions, the protest was sustained.60
Finally, in Daun-Ray Casuals, Inc.,64' GAO sustained a protest
challenging the Defense Personnel Support Center's ("DPSC") award
of a cold-weather clothing contract because the agency failed to
conduct meaningful discussions concerning the protester's past
performance information.64 Past performance was the second-most
important of four technical evaluation factors. 3 Section M of the
RFP expressly stated that "' [o]fferors will be given an opportunity to
address especially unfavorable reports of past performance ....
The protester was rated "acceptable" in this area based on the initial
technical evaluation, and for this reason, discussions with the
protester did not include any coverage of a perceived problem
involving three delinquent contracts. 45 One delinquency had been
found excusable, one inexcusable, and one was not counted against
the contractor because the subcontractor had been at fault.(6  Based
on the BAFO, the protester was rated higher technically than the
awardee, and despite a $136,000 price disadvantage, was initially
selected for the award. 7  Following a protest by another firm,
however, DPSC reevaluated the protester's past performance
information and changed its assessment from excusably delinquent
to inexcusably delinquent on seven out of nine contracts. 6  The
GAO concluded, therefore, that DPSC should have rated the
protester "marginally acceptable" under past performance.6 '9 The
award was therefore reversed, and the protest followed.""4 ' GAO held
that discussions were required with the protester when the agency
developed negative reviews of the protester's past performance and
changed its earlier past performance evaluation. 5' GAO rejected
639. See id. at 8.
640. See id. at 11.
641. Comp. Gen. B-255217.3 e aL, 94-2 CPD 1 42 (1994).
642. See id. at 1.
643. See id. at 2.
644. Id. (alteration in original) (citing RFP).
645. See id at 3 (reporting that one of the protester's past contracts had been inexcusably
delinquent).
646. See id.
647. See id. at 3-4 (stating that the protester's offer had initially been selected as the best
value for the government).
648. See id. at 4 (finding that the reevaluation contained a clerical error that had designated
the protester's delinquencies as excusable rather than inexcusable).
649. See id.
650. See id. at 5.
651. See id. at 6 (holding that the agency was required to hold discussions with the protester




DPSC's argument that an opportunity to rebut the unfavorable
reports was not required because the information came from within
the agency. 5' The RFP language, extending to each offeror the
opportunity to address "especially unfavorable" past performance
information, made no distinction based on the source of the
information. Because the new information resulted in a
downgrading of the protester's standing, the information was
"especially unfavorable. ' ' 4 The protester's explanations of its delays
left open the possibility that the agency might have revised its rating
had it heard the story.""5 Accordingly, the protest was sustained.6 56
After reviewing the precedent, it is evident that GAO has not been
particularly venturesome in sustaining protests. GAO has relied on
established principles of government contract law in approaching
these cases, granting protesters relief only in cases where the stated
evaluation factors clearly were not followed, where the past
performance evaluation was not supported by the record, where the
selection decision otherwise lacked a rational basis, or where
discussions were inadequate. The one court decision,5 7 to the extent
it addressed a defect in the past performance evaluation, also turned
on the failure to follow stated evaluation criteria.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO EMPLOYALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING CONTRACTOR PAST PERFORMANCE
The decisions discussed above demonstrate that neither GAO nor
the Courts provides an attractive forum for a contractor seeking to
challenge adverse determinations regarding its past performance.
Obtaining meaningful and timely review of past performance during
the actual course of a competitive acquisition is especially difficult
because the problem in many instances may not even be known to
the contractor before the proposal is submitted. Hence a protest may
seem to be the only answer. Even the FAR provisions specifying end-
of-contract performance evaluations, as a normal part of the contract
652. See id. at 7.
653. See id. (stating that the reports in this case were "sufficiently unfavorable" to trigger the
clause in the RFP granting discussions).
654. See id.
655. See id.
656. See id. at 10. In ST Aerospace Engines Pie. Ltd., GAO also held that the Coast Guard
denied the protester meaningful discussions when it failed to inform the offeror of adverse past
performance information that had been developed concerning an affiliated company. See
Comp. Gen. B-275725, 97-1 CPD 161, at 5 (1997).
657. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
658. See supra notes 452-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's
decision for the protestor in Latecoere Int'l).
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administration process, provide only in the most general terms for
review of an adverse determination "at a level above the contracting
officer," with no time lines given with which such review must be
undertaken or completed .
Other forms of seeking administrative or even judicial review seem
similarly problematic. One approach might be for the disappointed
contractor to pursue the matter under the Contract Disputes Act of
1978 . ' While the precise issue has yet to be decided by any board of
contract appeals or court, a contractor's request for further review of
a determination regarding its past performance may fall within the
definition of a "claim" as set forth in FAR § 33.201, viz., " .. . a written
demand or written assertion... seeking, as a matter of right, the
payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation
of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to that
contract."'" The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
("ASBCA") and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit have both held that various nonmonetary claims do confer
subject matterjurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act.""2
Even these additional remedies would be time consuming and
potentially expensive, and as noted, the legal questions regarding the
availability of Contract Disputes Act review have not yet been
answered. Contractors need speedier review where they are not
satisfied with the result of an informal review "at a level above the
contracting officer."
659. SeeFAR, 48 C.F.R.§ 42.1503(b) (1997).
660. 41 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1998).
661. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 33.201, definition of "Claim" (emphasis added.) The Contract
Disputes Act itself does not define the term "claim," as recognized by the court in Garrett V.
General Electric Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
662. See Garrett, 987 F.2d at 748, 752 (holding that the ASBCA had subject matter over a
contractor's appeal from a Navy directive to make corrections to defective work); Malone v.
United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the ASBCA had jurisdiction
over a contractor's appeal from a default termination); Litton Systems, Inc., ASBCA No. 37,131,
94-2 B.CA. (CCH) 26, 731 (1994) (holding that the ASBCA had jurisdiction over a non-
monetary claim involving dispute regarding the contractor's compliance with Cost Accounting
Standards); Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 40515 et a., 93-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 25,899 (1993)
(holding that the ASBCA had subject matter jurisdiction of a contractor's nonmonetary claim
for a time extension). 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (2) (1994) provides generally that the United States
Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to render judgments under the Contract Disputes Act
with regard to "any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor.... including a dispute
concerning termination of a contract, rights in tangible or intangible property, compliance with
cost accounting standards, and other nonmonetary disputes on which a decision of the
contracting officer has been issued...." Even if Contract Disputes Act jurisdiction were found
to be lacking, jurisdiction would be present in the U.S. district courts pursuant to the "Federal
Question" grant of subject matter jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). Where such
jurisdiction is present, the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1994), authorize court review and direct the district courts to set aside
agency action found to be arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
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The author believes that as a matter of procurement policy,
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") should be freely utilized
when, despite the parties' effort to resolve their differences, the
contractor is still dissatisfied with the government's past performance
evaluation. Congress enacted the Administrative Disputes Resolution
Act to set the stage for ADR in resolving public-private disputes.6
ADR is now firmly established as a part of the FAR as it relates to
contract disputes. One forum that is particularly well situated to
facilitate ADR and to assist the parties in resolving such disputes is the
General Services Administration Board of Contact Appeals
("GSBCA") .r" GSBCA Rule 204 provides that this Board "will make
its services available for ADR proceedings in contract and
procurement matters involving any agency, regardless of whether the
agency uses the Board to resolve its Contract Disputes Act appeals."
' 6
Modifying FAR § 42.1503(b) by adding the underlined sentence
where indicated below would be advisable to establish a clear policy
of using ADR techniques to resolve past performance controversies:
42.1503 Procedures.
(b) Agency evaluations of contractor performance prepared under
this subpart shall be provided to the contractor as soon as
practicable after the completion of the evaluation. Contractors
shall be given a minimum of 30 days to submit comments,
rebutting statements, or additional information. Agencies shall
provide for a review at a level above the contracting officer to
consider disagreements between the parties regarding the
evaluation. Alternative dispute resolution shall be employed where
requested by the contractor when agreement cannot be reached.
See 33.214. [Continue as presently worded.]I
Such an amendment would make it clear to government agencies
that ADR is a preferred method for resolving disagreements
concerning end-of-contract performance assessments pursuant to
FAR § 42.1503. While the above FAR change would not deal with
past performance controversies that arise solely from questionnaire
responses obtained by procuring agencies during a solicitation
663. Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2378 (1990), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 571 et seq.
(1994).
664. SeeFAR, 48 C.F.R. § 33.214 (1997), as amended by 63 Fed. Reg. 58,594 (1998).
665. The GSBCA was established pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 "as an
independent tribunal to hear and decide contract disputes between contractors and the
General Services Administration ("GSA") and other executive agencies of the United States."
48 C.F.R. § 6101.0 (1997) (Foreword to the GSBCA Rules of Procedure).
666. GSBCA Rule 204(a), 48 C.F.R. § 6102.4(a) (1997).
667. 48 C.F.R. § 42.1503(b) (1997).
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process, in the author's judgment it would, nevertheless, improve the
quality of information coming to the government's attention
concerning past performance of prospective contractors.
ADR seems like the natural choice in resolving such problems.
The government should not be hesitant to engage in ADR in
resolving past performance issues for at least two reasons. First, the
ADR process will tend to make past performance judgments better.
Second, the public interest would be served because, where a
contractor obtains timely relief, the number of competitors
potentially in a realistic position to win the government's business will
be greater.
CONCLUSION
Since the advent of OFPP Policy Letter 92-5, GAO has rarely
granted protests in cases challenging past performance evaluations.
In those few cases where GAO protests have been sustained, the
Comptroller General has acted because the problems were blatantly
demonstrated on the face of the agency record, or were due to a
finding of inadequate discussions. GAO has not been willing to go
behind the written record in order to test the validity or the
correctness of the underlying past performance information upon
which source selection decisions have been based. GAO has said that
the protester's "mere disagreement" with an agency's data on past
performance information is not a basis for protest.
While one reported court decision reflects a success for the
plaintiff, the offeror had previously lost that case in both GAO and in
U.S. district court before convincing the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that it had merit. The cost of
pursuing justice through these three fora was no doubt very high. In
addition, the usual standard of judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act is quite limited. The sole victory for a
plaintiff in the courts certainly is not enough to suggest that
protesters will fare better there than in GAO.
In making source selection decisions for new contract awards, the
information contained in past performance databases will be used
repetitively, for up to three years. While contractors theoretically
have the opportunity to comment on or rebut these past
performance evaluations and have them reviewed one level above the
contracting officer, the review procedures are not well established
668. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994) (setting forth grounds for reversing agency action,
including actions which are "arbitrary and capricious" or "not in accordance with law").
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and may be somewhat ad hoc at present. Unless agencies are
extremely fair and diligent in compiling accurate and timely past
performance information in these databases, contractors may unfairly
experience ongoing problems repeatedly dealing with the same
adverse information in subsequent competitions.
Moreover, unlike the situation for compiling routine contractor
performance data under FAR Subpart 42.15,"9 reference check
replies and past performance questionnaire responses returned to
procuring agencies during a new competition most likely will not be
reviewed within the respondent agency above the level of the
individual providing the response. The regulations provide no
guidance on who has authority to respond to reference check
inquiries or to complete and return past performance questionnaires.
Whatever the reference reply or questionnaire response says about
the contractor, regardless of the source, may well be the final word
with no review and no appeal. These responses may effectively
determine the offeror's success or failure in winning new business.
Given the sharply limited opportunity for review in GAO and in the
courts, and given the state of the law as it exists today, the only
sensible approach is for contractors to be extremely vigilant in
monitoring the government's compilation of information concerning
their performance of contract work. Contractors must become
activists in seeking to influence the development of their own end-of-
contract reviews as an original matter, and certainly should not wait
to be handed a poor "report card." As a priority matter, contract
managers should request permission to submit self-evaluation
memoranda to the agency well in advance of the time the agency
prepares the final report. The opportunity to comment on reviews
while they are still drafts should be aggressively pursued. Moreover,
contractors should treat the creation of past performance reports as a
process to be managed to the maximum extent possible. Active
management is essential, in view of the surprisingly low success rate
that contractors have experienced to date in challenging these
evaluations after the fact, when a contract has been lost and the only
avenue of relief is through GAO or the courts.
669. See48 C.F.R §§ 42.1500-.1503 (1997).
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